The Saddam was bluffing theory

[Patrick Degan]

Then there is the findings reported to the UN by Hans Blix on the progress of UNMOVIC inspections to consider:


http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/27c/124.html

Blix report excerpts:

March 8 2003

Inspection process
Inspections in Iraq resumed on 27 November 2002. In matters relating to process, notably prompt access to sites, we have faced relatively few difficulties and certainly much less than those that were faced by UNSCOM in the period 1991 to 1998. This may well be due to the strong outside pressure.

Some practical matters, which were not settled by the talks Dr. ElBaradei and I had with the Iraqi side in Vienna prior to inspections or in resolution 1441 (2002), have been resolved at meetings which we have had in Baghdad. Initial difficulties raised by the Iraqi side about helicopters and aerial surveillance planes operating in the no-fly zones were overcome. This is not to say that the operation of inspections is free from frictions, but at this juncture we are able to perform professional no-notice inspections all over Iraq and to increase aerial surveillance.

American U-2 and French Mirage surveillance aircraft already give us valuable imagery, supplementing satellite pictures and we would expect soon to be able to add night vision capability through an aircraft offered to us by the Russian Federation. We also expect to add low-level, close area surveillance through drones provided by Germany. We are grateful not only to the countries which place these valuable tools at our disposal, but also to the States, most recently Cyprus, which has agreed to the stationing of aircraft on their territory.

And

As I noted on 14 February, intelligence authorities have claimed that weapons of mass destruction are moved around Iraq by trucks and, in particular, that there are mobile production units for biological weapons. The Iraqi side states that such activities do not exist. Several inspections have taken place at declared and undeclared sites in relation to mobile production facilities. Food testing mobile laboratories and mobile workshops have been seen, as well as large containers with seed processing equipment. No evidence of proscribed activities has so far been found. Iraq is expected to assist in the development of credible ways to conduct random checks of ground transportation.

Inspectors are also engaged in examining Iraq's programme for Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPVs). A number of sites have been inspected with data being collected to assess the range and other capabilities of the various models found. Inspections are continuing in this area.

There have been reports, denied from the Iraqi side, that proscribed activities are conducted underground. Iraq should provide information on any underground structure suitable for the production or storage of weapons of mass destruction. During inspections of declared or undeclared facilities, inspection teams have examined building structures for any possible underground facilities. In addition, ground penetrating radar equipment was used in several specific locations. No underground facilities for chemical or biological production or storage were found so far.

And

As of today, there is more. While during our meetings in Baghdad, the Iraqi side tried to persuade us that the Al Samoud 2 missiles they have declared fall within the permissible range set by the Security Council, the calculations of an international panel of experts led us to the opposite conclusion. Iraq has since accepted that these missiles and associated items be destroyed and has started the process of destruction under our supervision. The destruction undertaken constitutes a substantial measure of disarmament - indeed, the first since the middle of the 1990s. We are not watching the breaking of toothpicks. Lethal weapons are being destroyed.

However I must add that the report I have today tells me that no destruction work has continued today. I hope this is a temporary break.

Until today, 34 Al Samoud 2 missiles, including 4 training missiles, 2 combat warheads, 1 launcher and 5 engines have been destroyed under UNMOVIC supervision. Work is continuing to identify and inventory the parts and equipment associated with the Al Samoud 2 programme.

Two 'reconstituted' casting chambers used in the production of solid propellant missiles have been destroyed and the remnants melted or encased in concrete.

The legality of the Al Fatah missile is still under review, pending further investigation and measurement of various parameters of that missile.

More papers on anthrax, VX and missiles have recently been provided. Many have been found to restate what Iraq already has declared, and some will require further study and discussion.

There is a significant Iraqi effort underway to clarify a major source of uncertainty as to the quantities of biological and chemical weapons, which were unilaterally destroyed in 1991. A part of this effort concerns a disposal site, which was deemed too dangerous for full investigation in the past. It is now being re-excavated. To date, Iraq has unearthed eight complete bombs comprising two liquid-filled intact R-400 bombs and six other complete bombs. Bomb fragments were also found. Samples have been taken. The investigation of the destruction site could, in the best case, allow the determination of the number of bombs destroyed at that site. It should be followed by a serious and credible effort to determine the separate issue of how many R-400 type bombs were produced. In this, as in other matters, inspection work is moving on and may yield results.

And

Against this background, the question is now asked whether Iraq has cooperated “immediately, unconditionally and actively” with UNMOVIC, as is required under paragraph 9 of resolution 1441 (2002). The answers can be seen from the factual descriptions that I have provided. However, if more direct answers are desired, I would say the following:

The Iraqi side has tried on occasion to attach conditions, as it did regarding helicopters and U-2 planes. It has not, however, so far persisted in these or other conditions for the exercise of any of our inspection rights. If it did, we would report it.

It is obvious that, while the numerous initiatives, which are now taken by the Iraqi side with a view to resolving some long-standing open disarmament issues, can be seen as “active”, or even “proactive”, these initiatives 3-4 months into the new resolution cannot be said to constitute “immediate” cooperation. Nor do they necessarily cover all areas of relevance. They are nevertheless welcome and UNMOVIC is responding to them in the hope of solving presently unresolved disarmament issues.

And

UNSCOM and the Amorim Panel did valuable work to identify the disarmament issues, which were still open at the end of 1998. UNMOVIC has used this material as starting points but analysed the data behind it and data and documents post 1998 up to the present time to compile its own list of “unresolved disarmament issues” or, rather, clustered issues. It is the answers to these issues which we seek through our inspection activities, and it is also from the list of these clustered issues that UNMOVIC will identify the “key remaining disarmament tasks”. As noted in the report before you, this list of clustered issues is ready.

UNMOVIC is only required to submit the work programme with the “key remaining disarmament tasks” to the Council. As I understand, several Council members are interested in the working document with the complete clusters of disarmament issues, and we have declassified it and are ready to make it available to members of the Council on request. In this working document, which may still be adjusted in the light of new information, members will get a more up-to-date review of the outstanding issues than in the documents of 1999, which Members usually refer to. Each cluster in the working document ends with a number of points indicating what Iraq could do to solve the issue. Hence, Iraq's cooperation could be measured against the successful resolution of issues.

And

How much time would it take to resolve the key remaining disarmament tasks? While cooperation can and is to be immediate, disarmament and at any rate the verification of it cannot be instant. Even with a proactive Iraqi attitude, induced by continued outside pressure, it would still take some time to verify sites and items, analyse documents, interview relevant persons, and draw conclusions. It would not take years, nor weeks, but months. Neither governments nor inspectors would want disarmament inspection to go on forever. However, it must be remembered that in accordance with the governing resolutions, a sustained inspection and monitoring system is to remain in place after verified disarmament to give confidence and to strike an alarm, if signs were seen of the revival of any proscribed weapons programme.

This story was found at:
http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/03/ ... 48383.html


Iraq was under a microscope at this point —not only that of international inspectors but also, as will be seen, from U.S. Intel scouting the country in preparation for combat operations. However, the report certainly indicates that the world's attention was not going to be shifting away from Iraq, as Kast has attempted to argue, at any point in any forseeable future.

[Patrick Degan]

Just how successful would Saddam Hussein have been in evacuating his alledged vast WMD arsenal to his allegedly secure locations in the run-up to war? Or procuring arms for use in upcoming combat operations against the anticipated American invasion?


http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airc ... sum03.html

excerpt:

First, operations did not begin with the decapitating strikes, nor with the much-touted "shock and awe" bombing campaign, nor with the multipronged thrust into Iraq by British, Australian, and US ground and special operations forces. The foundation for every success that the coalition has enjoyed to date stems from an intense information-gathering campaign that relied on air and space power, human intelligence, and intelligence-gathering efforts by special operations personnel. The precision strikes against strategic and operational targets during Iraqi Freedom stand as evidence of predictive battlespace awareness (PBA). This unprecedented capability to fuse intelligence data from various sources and make it useful to combatant commanders is one of the cornerstones of the transformation of air and space power. 

Because of investments in technology and, more importantly, in doctrine and forward-thinking operational concepts, coalition planners are able to develop a strategic assessment of the enemy’s plans, force structure, and capabilities that is unprecedented in its accuracy and timeliness. This predictive awareness is such a pervasive capability for US forces that we now have changed our perceptions about the precision and flexibility that have always characterized air and space power. As a result of this transformational capability, we can now speak about the effectiveness of air and space power with greater authority and certainty. After Operation Desert Storm, analysts described the closing of the gap between air and space power’s technological limits and its potential. In the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, we have witnessed a conceptual and organizational transformation that redefines how we think about employing air and space power to achieve national strategic and operational goals. Using air and space power’s PBA capabilities, we can alter the character, pace, depth, and scope of operations to suit our timing and objectives. 

Second, operations in Iraq reveal a seamless integration of air and space power’s capabilities with those of other components. In the past,  we thought of joint operations as cobbling together a tactically—or even an operationally— effective force from various service components. In Iraqi Freedom, the interservice conflicts that accompanied former joint efforts have not occurred. Air and space power doctrine, organization, and employment now occur within the context of mature joint structures and operating concepts. The result is a complex, integrated, and synchronized campaign that allows coalition commanders to outthink and outfight enemy commanders and their forces. The difference between the capabilities displayed by coalition forces and those of the Iraqi military is comparable to the difference that would occur if a US Civil War–era force suddenly found itself confronted by the Allied forces in Europe near the end of World War II. The Iraqi military’s inability to compete against the coalition’s seamless operational and tactical integration renders it tragically clumsy and impotent.


Perhaps movements of WMDs occurred while we were blinking? Or the convoys were hidden by cloaking devices?

[Patrick Degan]

And what about those SCUDs, which Kast argues could have set the Saudi oilfields ablaze?


http://www.fas.org/news/iraq/2000/07/iraq-000727c.htm

excerpt:

Although Iraq had produced both chemical and biological warheads for their Scuds, they did not employ them during the war. According to the information paper, the threat of massive U.S. retaliation and technical difficulties encountered in testing chemical/biological warheads deterred Saddam Hussein from taking this course. No chemical or biological agent warheads were found in the debris of Scud missiles.

Some veterans thought that Iraq launched more Scuds at coalition forces than actually occurred. Scuds broke up on re-entry or after Patriot missile intercepts and debris hit the ground in separate areas. This, together with numerous false alarms, and Patriot missile fire on false targets, contributed to this impression.


http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline ... /scud.html

excerpt:

"The Iraqis modified Scuds for greater range, largely by reducing warhead weight, enlarging their fuel tanks and burning all of the fuel during the early phase of flight (rather than continuously). Such a Scud therefore came down with a relatively heavy warhead and a heavy motor, separated by the light empty fuel tank. It was structurally unstable and often broke up in the upper atmosphere. That further reduced its already poor accuracy, but it also made the missile difficult to intercept, since its flight path was unpredictable.


http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/iraqmissile.cfm

excerpt:

Accuracy remains an important problem for the Iraqi missile force.  Iraq has participated in sustained efforts to both covertly import guidance components and to reverse engineer those components it has on hand.  The outcomes of these efforts remain unclear.  Still, other factors will continue to inhibit accuracy.  An Iraqi Scud warhead does not have the ability to “spin up” or rotate along its longitudinal axis like a bullet from a gun.  Rather, this warhead tumbles about its center of gravity as it falls upon its target, making it very inaccurate.  Consequently, these weapons have little military utility when deployed against a highly mobile adversary in the field. 

and

In Saudi Arabia, the casualty toll from scud attacks was 31 dead and 400 injured.  The majority of the dead, 29, were victims of a single attack on the U.S. barracks in Dharhran, Saudi Arabia, apparently a lucky shot for the Iraqis.

and

Casualty rates for Scuds carrying nonconventional chemical or biological payloads are more difficult to estimate.  The technical challenges involved in effectively disseminating a biological weapon in this way are many, and it is not clear that the Iraqis have the know-how to surmount these challenges.  Scuds carrying chemical weapons can be expected to kill dozens of people per warhead depending on variables such as weather conditions, type of agent used, civil defense preparations, and degree of advanced warning.

and

Initially, it was believed that the Patriot Advanced Capabilities 2 (PAC-2) systems deployed in Saudi Arabia and Israel achieved close to a 100 percent success rate in intercepting incoming Iraqi missiles.  But even before the end of the conflict Israeli analyses were pointing to a much lower success rate – around 20 percent.  Later analyses lowered the success rate still, and some questioned whether any Scuds had been intercepted by PAC-2 systems.  Because Iraqi Scud variants are poorly designed and constructed, they have a tendency to disintegrate as they fall to their target. 


http://www.news-journal.com/news/conten ... SRAEL.html

excerpt:

The Arrow's main advantage is its range. The old generation Patriot failed in 1991 because the relatively low-tech Scuds disintegrated into many pieces before contact with the Earth, making it difficult for the U.S. missile to identify the warhead. The Arrow is designed to destroy incoming targets at altitudes of up to 30 miles -- before the Scud trajectory causes disintegration.


Junk SCUDs fired blindly, with poor onboard guidance, which tended to fall to bits in flight, and carried at most 300kg. warheads threatened Saudi's oilfields, eh?

[Crown]

Jeezus H Wow Patrick! Remind me to never get on your bad side ...

[BoredShirtless]

Core dump! But Patrick, posts like these do NOTHING. You've just supplied more fuel for him to use; he'll feed on this and form the same old fallacy ridden arguments he's been using from day one. Why don't you guys just walk away? It's like watching Pete Sampras playing against a brick wall. Fun at first to see him play his shots, but after a while it's just.....pointless.

[Patrick Degan]

So, how fearsome a threat was the allegedly Mighty Iraqi War Machine™ of Kast's conception?


http://edition.cnn.com/SPECIALS/1998/iraq/equipment/

excerpt:

From Jane's World Armies (1996)

There has been no military equipment procurement from recognised sources since August 1990.

As a consequence of the 1990-91 Gulf conflict and resulting destruction of large amounts of equipment, the Iraqi armed forces are in need of a complete range of modern equipment for all three services. Once UN sanctions end, this area will become an extremely attractive market for the majority of the world's defence manufacturers.

and

According to informed sources among Iraqi defectors, Iraqi elite units still get the best equipment. For instance, the good quality T-72s are assigned to the Republican Guard, while the tanks that are less effective or need spare parts are mostly assigned to the regular army. The Iraqi forces that seized Arbil at the end of August included elements of the Republican Guard, equipped with T-72s. However, it would appear that even the Republican Guard has to be content with much smaller allocations of armour compared with pre-war levels. It has been estimated that each armoured division of the Republican Guard used to have around 500 MBTs and APCs and that this number has now shrunk to about 120.


http://www.aerotechnews.com/starc/2002/ ... itary.html

excerpt:

Much of the problems facing the Iraqi military stem from poor training. Years of U.N.-imposed sanctions have had an effect. "Equipment shortages and manpower shortages, we believe, affect the quality and quantity of their training," the official said.
Even when they do train, training methods are ineffective by Western standards. They don't often conduct live-fire exercises, and training lacks realism, complexity and intensity, he explained.

The Iraqi military is considerably smaller than the force that opposed coalition troops in the Gulf War. The Iraqi army had 70 divisions in 1991, but only 23 today. Its elite Republican Guard is half the 12 divisions it was in 1991.

"Not only do they have fewer divisions, but the divisions tend to be more hollow than they were in 1991, because they lost a lot of equipment in 1991," the official said. Trucks, in particular, are in critically short supply, making it difficult for Iraqi forces to move equipment, ammunition and personnel.

http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnf ... 1_1105.htm

excerpt:

Flash forward to 2003. Saddam Hussein, the despised Iraqi despot, is now in exile on the isle of Elba, once Napoleon's haunt. A new coalition government in Baghdad friendly to the U.S. is getting organized. But Iran is making ominous noises about border issues, raising fears it might exploit its neighbor's weakness. A decade of economic sanctions has seriously eroded the Iraqi military's conventional capability, and now the country is sorely in need of weapons to defend itself. So the U.S., which just finished disarming Iraq by rooting out weapons of mass destruction, now is considering how to rearm Baghdad.

and

The Iraqi military's current situation is great for the U.S. if a conflict arises but not so wonderful for a post-Saddam government, considering the rough neighborhood Iraq is in. Baghdad lost 40% of its army and air forces in Operation Desert Storm. Its army, once a million-plus troops, now numbers perhaps 400,000, and most divisions are at 50% combat effectiveness. About a third of its 2,200 tanks are modern enough to be useful. Only 50 of its 316 aircraft are considered up-to-date by military experts, and new pilots fly as little as 20 hours a year, compared with 200 for U.S. pilots. Instead of the $3 billion a year in arms imports before Desert Storm, Iraq has imported less than $400 million of weapons in the intervening decade. Spare parts are scarce.

The good news is that Iraq no longer really has an offensive capability. The bad news is that it may not be able to defend itself after Saddam is gone.


http://www.sanluisobispo.com/mld/sanlui ... 588269.htm

excerpt:

Even before the war, Iraq's military had only rudimentary systems for collecting battlefield intelligence and commanding troops.

Their one- and two-man observation posts were equipped with simple radios, regular landline telephones and sometimes cordless phones slightly more powerful than the household variety, plus Thuraya satellite telephones.

http://www.cato.org/dailys/02-14-03-2.html

excerpt:

However, the issue of whether Iraq has weapons of mass destruction completely misses the more important and fundamental question relative to U.S. security. If mere possession of WMD is the criteria for pre-emptive U.S. military action, then Iraq should not be the only target. After all, according to the Pentagon, existing and emerging threats to the United States include 12 countries with nuclear weapons' programs, 13 countries with biological weapons, and 16 with chemical weapons.

The relevant issue should be whether Iraq directly threatens the United States requiring pre-emptive U.S. military action. The litmus test to use military force must be that the territorial integrity, national sovereignty, or liberty of the United States is at risk. To begin, although Iraq has chemical and biological weapons, it does not have any military capability to directly attack the United States. None. Zero. Artillery shells capable of carrying chemical munitions possibly tens of miles do not constitute a threat. The longest range weapons Iraq has are a handful of Scud missiles with a range of several hundred kilometers -- again, not enough to reach the United States. And the Iraqi military is about half of what it was when the United States defeated it in less than one week in the first Gulf War. Thus, the threat that has been conjured up by the administration is the merging of two disparate notions: WMD and terrorism. Playing on the public's sense of fear and vulnerability in the aftermath of September 11, the administration's argument comes down to the assertion that Iraq will give weapons of mass destruction to al Qaeda terrorists.

To be sure, Saddam and al Qaeda share a common hatred for the United States. However, that is hardly an overwhelming incentive for Iraq to hand over weapons of mass destruction, especially if it knows that it would be at the top of the suspect list and the target of decisive U.S. retaliation. Indeed, the lesson of the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan is that such an association is a prescription for regime change.

And there is no history of Iraq giving weapons of mass destruction to terrorists. Saddam has had more than a decade to arm Palestinian suicide terrorists with chemical and biological weapons to use against Israel, a country hated as much as the United States. Yet he has not done so. On the contrary, Saddam trusts only a few loyal officers with such weapons. There just isn't a mountain of evidence supporting the administration's position. Indeed, it's more like a molehill. According to Powell, alleged linkages to al Qaeda involve connecting Abu Mussab al-Zarqawi to the Ansar al-Islam terrorist group operating in northeastern Iraq. But this is Kurdish-controlled territory protected by U.S.-led enforcement of the no-fly zone, and collaboration between Ansar al-Islam and the Iraqi regime is not proven. Furthermore, no case has been made that Iraq supported al Qaeda in the planning, financing, or operation of the 9/11 attacks.


http://www.fas.org/irp/gulf/intel/961031/002mc_91.txt

excerpt:

Desert Storm left the Iraqi Air Force totally ineffective as a military force and the Iraqi Navy was virtually destroyed 15 days into the air campaign.

Iraq's chemical and biological production capabilities were near entirely destroyed and it will take years and millions of dollars to rebuild its capability back to pre-war levels.

- Numerous theories could explain Baghdad's failure to use these weapons

Although initial expectations that the Iraqi SRBM force could be quickly subdued, it remained a powerful threat throughout the crisis period.

[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]

Iraq's Chemical and Biological Warfare Capability and Response

Coalition air forces struck Iraqi biological weapon research, development, and storage facilities and chemical weapon research and development, production, filling, and storage facilities through the duration of the air campaign.

Coalition forces initially identified and targeted four BW R&D/production facilities. A fifth facility was identified in February. Coalition bombing destroyed 11 of the 13 buildings associated with BW R&D/production and severely damaged the other 2 buildings. All five facilities are assessed to be unable to support BW R&D or production. Additionally, BW storage initially included 19 12-frame refrigerated bunkers at 11 locations. In February, two more bunkers were identified. All of the original 19 bunkers were destroyed, however, the final two bunkers were discovered too late in the campaign to be attacked.

CW production facilities were located at two sites. Of the 10 buildings located at Samarra, 6 were destroyed, incapacitating Iraq's CW production capability by 70 percent. Additionally, all three facilities at Habbaniyah were destroyed. CW storage facilities consisted of 8 cruciform bunkers at Samarra and 22 S-shaped bunkers at 13 locations. One of the 8 cruciform bunkers was destroyed while the remaining 7 sustained only superficial damage. Of the 22 S-shaped bunkers, 16 were destroyed and 6 suffered serious damage.

Reproducing Iraq's entire prewar BW system would require spending $100-200 million and a minimum of 5-8 years. Iraq could, however, reestablish a significant BW capability within 3-4 years for less than S100 million. To rebuild Iraq's prewar CW capabilities would take $400-600 million and 3-5 years.

Iraq's failure to use its chemical weapons cannot be completely understood without a full accounting of the Iraqi military and political leadership's plans in preparation for the war and the execution of those plans. Information on this subject remains limited, and analysis of the reasoning is still preliminary. The following is an estimate of the influence of several factors that may have contributed to Iraq's failure to use these weapons:


If Iraq did not deploy its chemical weapons to the KTO, two possible explanations are likely. First, Iraq believed that both Israel and the Coalition had chemical and nuclear weapons and would use them if provoked. Iraqi leaders also realized that these weapons could be delivered anywhere in Iraq with accuracy. Saddam probably concluded that the consequences of attacking with chemical weapons would be too severe to justify their use, and this may have led to an early decision not to use them. Saddam may also have assumed that Iraqi use of CW weapons would cause Coalition forces to seek his removal as a top priority including the liberation of Kuwait.

Second, it is just as likely that the leadership made a fundamental miscalculation about how the Coalition would prosecute the war and how effectively its own forces would be able to respond. Baghdad may have expected the Coalition forces to fight much like the Iranians did (attacking first with infantry followed by mobile armor). They perceived that this would have given them days or even weeks to move chemical munitions into the KTO once the offensive had begun.

and

Also, Iraq's C3 system had been heavily damaged at this point. Iraqi commanders could not control their forces, in part because of their intelligence system's complete failure. This inability to accurately depict the disp~ planning extremely difficult could also have added to the reasons that chemical weapons were not used.

Additionally, destruction of Iraqi CW production and storage centers may also have precluded their use. The chemicals made earlier may have deteriorated in storage and/or been destroyed.

and

Other factors which could have deterred their use are:

o Loss of their ability to be delivered by air due to Coalition air supremacy.

o Artillery and MRL losses were extremely high by the time the ground offensive began limiting their use fcr chemical delivery.

o SCUD technical problems in their long range versions made the use of chemical warheads extremely inexact, and again the speed of the Coalition advance may have precluded their use of the SCUD-B for delivery.

o Damage to the logistics infrastructure may have made their transportation impossible.

http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/KHA304A.html

excerpt:

The IAEA explicitly exposed the fact that a uranium procurement document provided by British and American intelligence as a piece of evidence proving Iraq's nuclear weapon capability was in fact a planted forgery. Cheney provocatively claimed, on the day before Bush's 48 hours ultimatum to invade Iraq, that U.S. intelligence had proof otherwise. My last retort to that incredible plain lie was that some bogus evidence might be planted once U.S. forces were on the ground in Iraq.

Bombing to waste, yet again, the main Nuclear Research Center at Tuwaitha, and foolishly allowing American soldiers to break IAEA protective seals and opening Tuwaitha's radioactive burial mound for looters who then contaminated themselves and their families, the Americans have yet to produce their "evidence" of a nuclear weapon program in Iraq. Why is Cheney now silent about Iraq's nuclear weapon program? With U.S. troops in control of Iraq, this information cannot be a "national security" issue anymore.

In addition to the non-existent nuclear weapon program, two developments in the past two months have convinced me that since 1991-1992 Iraq did not rejuvenate its chemical or biological weapon programs, either.

The first development was a Newsweek story on March 03, 2003 unveiling, after eight years of suppression, the transcript of Hussain Kamel's debriefing by officials from the IAEA and the U.N. inspection team known as UNSCOM; this debriefing took place after Kamel defected to Jordan in 1995. In it, he affirmed that Iraq had indeed destroyed its entire stockpile of chemical and biological weapons and banned missiles after the Gulf War. All that remained were "hidden blueprints, computer disks, microfiches." The weapons were destroyed secretly, in order to hide their existence from inspectors, in the hopes of someday resuming production after inspections had finished. According to John Barry, who broke the story, the CIA and MI6 were told the same account and "a military aide who defected with Kamel ... backed Kamel's assertions about the destruction of WMD stocks." But these statements were "hushed up by the U.N. inspectors" in order to "bluff Saddam into disclosing still more."

http://www.commondreams.org/headlines02/1020-03.htm

excerpt:

Published on Sunday, October 20, 2002 by the Boston Globe

War Would Crush Iraqi Cities, Analysts Say
Utilities, hospitals seen as weaker than in '91 conflict

by Anthony Shadid

BAGHDAD - A US-led attack on Iraq would probably devastate the country's tattered and already overwhelmed infrastructure, shutting down power to hospitals and water treatment plants, cutting off drinking water almost immediately to millions of residents in Baghdad and possibly elsewhere, and pouring raw sewage into the streets within hours, aid workers and specialists say.

Unlike the eve of the 1991 Gulf War, when Iraq's infrastructure was largely intact despite an eight-year war with Iran, the country's water, sewage, and electricity systems today are far more vulnerable, UN reports show. Even without a conflict, those services stand on the brink of collapse, a result of 12 years of sweeping UN sanctions, the aftermath of the Gulf War, and the government's questionable spending priorities, aid workers say.

and

The memories of that conflict - in particular, the 43 days of air strikes that preceded a US-led ground attack to drive Iraqi forces from Kuwait - are largely responsible for the deep anxiety expressed in a country where infant mortality rates have doubled, incomes have dropped to one-fifth of pre-Gulf War levels, and clean water remains the exception.

In the bombardment of more than 700 sites in Iraq, US forces struck leadership facilities, weapons plants, air defense, military forces, and communications networks - to incapacitate the Iraqi Army. But bombs also knocked out bridges, railroads, oil refineries, and electricity. That left many Iraqis without power for weeks and clean water and sewage for far longer and unleashed epidemics of typhoid and cholera.

Of Iraq's 20 generating plants, 13 were damaged or destroyed in the first days of bombing. By war's end, only two were left working that generated 4 percent of Iraq's prewar output, according to a May 1991 report by a public health team from Harvard University that visited Iraq after the war.

UN reports, based on independent assessments, estimate that electricity demand today is 6,200 megawatts. Only 4,400 megawatts are available. The deficit, although smaller than five years ago, still causes blackouts of an average of 10 hours a day outside Baghdad. A half-hour of gusty winds last week disrupted electricity to much of the capital.

Repairs on jury-rigged, rapidly deteriorating plants are steady but limited. As much as two-fifths of the supplies purchased under UN-supervised oil sales are rusting outside the plants or sitting idle in warehouses, either because other crucial components are held up under the UN approval process or because the Iraqi government cannot pay for their installation and maintenance, UN officials say.


And as for the performance of these mighty warriors in battle:


http://www.philly.com/mld/inquirer/2003 ... 615732.htm

excerpt:

Thousands in Saddam Hussein's 360,000-man army deserted, until the military was little more than uniforms discarded along empty highways. Just why they did so puzzles even the U.S. officers who played major roles in the war.

"I wish I could sagely answer that question," said Col. Alan Baldwin, 49, of Panama City, Fla., an intelligence chief with the First Marine Expeditionary Force, which commands 60,000 Marines and 25,000 British troops.

Four entire divisions, up to 30,000 men, deserted around Kirkuk yesterday, changing into civilian clothes and starting the long walk home in loose columns as they grinned and flashed victory signs for passing journalists.

Two other divisions simply disappeared around the southeastern town of Amara, where Marines reported spotting one farmer dragging his plow behind a Soviet-era BMP armored vehicle.

Others abandoned 100 tanks in a Baghdad motor pool and 39 artillery cannons in a base to the southeast. British troops captured enough weapons to equip four divisions.


This was the fearsome Lion of Arabia which Kast continues to argue that we had to destroy before they could...what, exactly? Field an even more degraded army several years down the road? Try flying an air force with planes whose wings had been cut off before being simply buried in the sand? Attack the United States with their fearsome SCUD fleet, assuming the missiles didn't disintegrate in the middle of a 650km. flight? Just what sort of war machine was going to be built upon an industrial infrastructure which was ceasing to exist?

This was the threat Bush and Blair were suposedly so honest about in making the case for war to their respective publics?

[Iceberg]

It's easy to forget when running through Comical Axi's numerous adventures into ever more ridiculous war justifications and circular reasoning/ prove a negative fallacies that it's precisely correct that the US obviously had jack shit real evidence when it went to war, and just took it on faith that they'd find something to justify their claims post-war. None of their pre-war claims about Iraqi weapons have panned out, and now they have David Kay on the prowl, hoping to God that he finds ... something ... ANYTHING, so he can release a report and pray that the issue just goes away.

The thing to remember here is that President Bush knows that the issue is not going away without fairly substantial proof. And that worries him because his job is on the line in 16 months, he's got two active and aggressive challengers snapping at his heels (Howard Dean and John Kerry), and his job approval ratings took a 12-point hit over the last month and are back to where they were immediately pre-9/11. Worse (for him), he's got really nothing to support his policy other than winning Iraq and Afghanistan, because the economy is in a continuing slump with red ink as far as the eye can see in both federal and state budgets (save for Vermont, largely due to the governorship of the aforementioned Dr. Dean), American freedoms have visibly eroded under his presidency, and his foreign policy is rapidly making America the world's biggest pariah state, alienating and frustrating even close friends (like Canada).

If Mr. Bush is getting his marching orders from Machiavelli, he forgot to read the part where Machiavelli advised the princeling that one must be feared, but cannot afford to be hated. Dr. Dean had a campaign rally in Seattle last night that was attended by 15,000 - four months before the first primary, that's a lot of people. There are a lot of people who are not pleased with President Bush's policy, and that's a dangerous thing to have for a president facing re-election.

If he's acted this way in his FIRST term, imagine how much worse it's going to get in his second, when he doesn't have to face re-election again...

[Axis Kast]

Complete self-contradictin in source. One named, quoted general says they didn't expect tanks to enter the city (lack of imagination), and then "commanders" say Hussein was convinced they would repel American tanks and decided not to mine highways or blow up bridges leading into the capital? Did they expect tanks or NOT?

The point still stands: Hussein did not conduct the defense of Baghdad in a manner approaching sensible, ostensibly because he placed faith in the conduct and potential of Republican Guard units not fully functional since prior to the First Gulf War. If that - after over a decade of sanctions, embargoes, and attrition by time – isn’t delusional behavior, isn’t delusional analysis, I’m not prepared to say what is.

Bullshit. You tried to argue that because Iraq didn't launch conventional SCUDs at oil fields, that shows Saddam was delusional. And of course, that he was a stupid man has nothing to do with whether Iraq was prepared to launch WMD attacks on Israel out of the blue, which we know Iraq was not.

It does indeed show that Saddam Hussein was delusional. It was supremely high-risk activity on all counts – for very minimal chances of success but a high rate of failure by comparison to other options. That Saddam was willing to invest time and resources to these contingency schemes proves his unstable, unpredictable nature. We have precedent: he invaded neighbors twice, each time in disregard of good judgement – hell, in Kuwait, he actually anticipated that he’d be able to defeat the 82nd Airborne Division in a stand-up engagement. If you fail to see that his potential for other risky behavior – to which the United States, Great Britain, and very likely, Australia would be compelled to respond – is a motivation behind the desire by George W. Bush to prosecute war, it’s your failing and not mine.

Guerilla war orchestrated by regular combat troops? Oxymoron, moron. Regular troops change into civilian clothes, and become guerillas. Explain the Fedayeen Saddam, btw. That's guerilla warfare.

The charge was that Saddam Hussein hadn’t personally given orders for guerilla warfare, correct?

That’s irregardless of the fact that civilian irregulars – and dispersed pockets of fleeing troops – managed to instigate one on their own.

[sarcasm]Didn't see that one coming[/sarcasm] You asked why coalition forces didn't 'catch' them and I responded they weren't there to 'catch' them.

Wait. Let me get this straight. I first point out that we didn’t catch Iraq on the spot during all the instances in which it managed to smuggle items into the country, and then you respond with the argument that nobody was there to do so in the first place?

Translation= "I'm too stupid to take Iraqi scientists, commanders, soldiers, and executed-by-Saddam defectors word for it, instead, I will just construct hypothetical scenarios without evidence and engage in numerous fallacies to try and shore up my utterly collapsed argument".

Even your beloved UNSCOM was unable to verify anything more than that some quantity of something was destroyed at one time or another. Tell me, Vympel, if the Iraqi stockpiles missing since 1998 were so large in the first place, how exactly would unilateral destruction have been possible while still evading detection?

No. He knew it was false. That makes it a lie.

He might have been guilty of one of your fallacies: Appeal to Authority. At Blair’s suggestion that he was still behind the statement on the Nigerian yellowcake, Bush might have adopted that point-of-view – and the assessment that British intelligence was at that point the party most correct.

"We must attack Iraq to prevent Saddam stopping us from attacking Iraq". Idiot.

Idiot? I don’t see where that’s poor reasoning at all. It’s the whole argument behind preemptive action, in fact.

The United States must deal with a multitude of national security interests in the region. We are, for all intents, and purposes, the greatest guarantor of the status-quo. It was a necessity that we keep Saddam Hussein’s Iraq completely toothless, isolated, and, for all intentions and purposes, developmentally stunted. When there is concern that he might be reconstituting his arsenal – and there was -, it becomes a question of whether we wish to deal with it now – on our terms – or later – possibly on his.

His stockpile was being denied him. Fact.

No. Assumption based on short-lived inspections not yet fully complete.

Spare parts. Oooh, scary.

Indicative of holes in the first place. Scary indeed.

Oh, and occupying a hostile nation indefinitely trying to make it 'malleable' when everyone there clearly hates your guts, merely swapping from one shithole (SA) to another is clearly the superior option- adding of course the daily casualties.

We’ve done it before – in both Germany and Japan. It’s not a forlorn hope that once we manage a successful return of basic services and flesh out temporary leadership that we’ll reach a measure of stability and slowly work ourselves into public perception as at the very least tolerable. In Saudi Arabia, we were being hosted by a régime suspected of sponsorship of terrorism – which, of course, we couldn’t do anything about very easily.

When it was much stronger than it is now.

Those offensives were indicative of more than just conventional military strength – specifically, a leadership willing to take considerable risks on the long shot of sweeping victory. Many of Hussein’s expectations about the invasion of Kuwait are the very epitome of delusion.

Here's a hint genius: with accuracy like that 60 missiles is not a large enough barrage, and you have yet to define what exactly 'success' is supposed to be.

Aw, did you pick sixty all by yourself, too?

Success to the tune of major damage or fractional destruction to important oil fields by fire.

I seriously doubt Iraqi special forces would have the capability or the inclination in the middle of a wider war to venture into Saudi Arabia to blow up oil fields.

Certain elements of the Iraqi Special Forces were specifically trained to target enemy oil fields. If SCUD missile launchers could move with impunity throughout the desert – even after having launched -, it is hardly impossible to say that a small group of men and their much smaller equipment could do the same.

Because the violations were too mundane and unimportant to warrant investigation.

The question was how we learned about them. The answer is after the fact. Whether or not you personally deem Iraq’s many violations “unimportant” is irrelevant to this particular issue.

Intent is irrelevant. We know what Iraq intended. Capability to carry out your intent is the issue. Iraq had none.

Intent is quite relevant. If Iraq was already authorizing feasibility studies, it would prove the presence of an ongoing program, however much in its infancy. What part of: “We don’t want him making new forays into the field,” do you not understand?

No, it's a slippery slope. You take mundane spare parts and pretend they're equivalent. They aren't. At all.

I’m saying that the capability to smuggle spare parts undetected belies the capability to smuggle other items undetected. It’s something you’ve yet to admit to despite the realities of the situation.

Explain how importing anything on the sly will be useful to him without the weapons grade material/ cultures/ raw components and the construction facilities to build them. Oh that's right, you can't, because you don't know what you're talking about.

Reconstitution is reconstitution. Any violation of the sanctions is a concern to us, Vympel. Explain to me how it was possible for North Korea to reconstitute its own weapons capability despite being under observation itself. It is simply your personal opinion that anything but fissile material needn’t set off an alarm.

Provided of course Iraq was rebuilding its programs. To which there is no evidence for, and testimony from a multitude of sources to the contrary. Iraq did not have the ability to do anything threatening under sanctions. It would be noticed. Unless they're going to load your lathes into catapults and hurl them at Israel.

You’ve just acknowledged that it’s perfectly acceptable, in your humble opinion, that Iraq be back in the same boat as it was in 1991 – only a single step away from nuclear fission: i.e. procurement of fissile material. That’s taking it dangerously close to the edge, Vympel, don’t you think?

More bullshit. The IAEA never had a full mandate to prevent North Korea from building nuclear arms, it had a mandate to inspect fuel rods and make sure they stayed sealed. I've said that multiple times. As usual, you try and slip past bullshit and hope I don't notice.

United Nations inspectors weren’t on the ground until 2002. Even when Blix did arrive, he was only active in certain predesignated locations and a handful of randomly-selected schools, palaces, or public facilities. I want you to explain to me how North Korea’s facilities escaped detection by satellite but why Saddam Hussein’s couldn’t possibly remain hidden from two hundred or so persons in a country the size of Texas.

Considering Iraq didn't have any weapons grade material and any construction facilities of any kind, unlike North Korea, yes.

… which he couldn’t, of course, have smuggled in unnoticed if sanctions remain on the same level, because only spare parts could ever evade our notice?

… which he couldn’t rebuild down the line, of course, because the only country capable of doing so and yet still avoiding detection is North Korea?

nd put what in the warhead, you idiot? Anyone can machine components. Should we ban everyone's lathes too? How fucking desperate you are.

As far as I know, certain forms of lathe are banned as dual-use equipment. Not to mention that your continual focus on fissile material as the only possible item Iraq might import is rather ridiculous.

Burden of proof fallacy. It's not up to me to disprove every one of your flights of fancy.

So now it’s, “A flight of fancy” to acknowledge that it was ever in the realm of possibility for Iraq to have imported a prohibited item without our knowledge (irrespective of what was ever found)?

Actually, finding something along the lines of what was accused would prove your accusations.

How many times must it be made clear as day to you, Vympel? The investigations are not yet over.

More bullshit. If it's not 100% impossible, despite having no fucking proof, that's a war justification is it? Do you have any idea how insane that is?

Bullshit? I’m simply asking you to acknowledge the potential of a specific scenario – that’s all. You’re the one who’s worrying over whether I’m going to make an argument out of it. Now, kindly answer the question, please.

And destroyed all the infrastructure.

Infrastructure is not the question here. Stockpiles are.

"We must invade Iraq or else they'll get WMD (unsupported bullshit) and we won't be able to invade Iraq"

Great reasoning.

Considering that you’ve acknowledged it was most likely their intention, and that until the United States kicked the anthill, Iraq was falling out of the picture, I’d say it makes for good reasoning when combined with some of the other justifications.

Excuse me?

The Israelis were more concerned about a biological attack because they feared such a strike would be able to do the most damage.

Unsupported claim.

That missiles making a “lucky strike” on the correct targets could potentially start major infernos?

That Iraqi Special Forces – some of which were organized and trained to attack the oil fields of foreign powers specifically – could somehow burn oil fields on their own?

The problem, Vympel, is that we’re talking about potential contingencies. Even the “commando” option carries less risk than the strike on Israel.

And would achieve WHAT, exactly?

Forcing Saudi Arabia to reassess its position in the war. Forcing the Coalition to hesitate. It carries at least as much water as attempting to blackmail them by firing a few missiles at Israel (each unreliable, and with a small likelihood of inflicting more than minimal casualties).

Iraq used 60 missiles in the war.

And they wouldn’t have used more if Baghdad had come under attack, huh?

Last I heard, Coalition units weren't anywhere near Baghdad.

The caveat for the plan was that Coalition forces would be moving on Baghdad. If they moved through with sufficient speed, a nuclear assault would be out-of-the-question. Not that it was very likely anyway. Or that a conventional strike would have been a foregone conclusion given American intervention.

I am sorry, but the US has not managed to statisfactory support its initial accusations, let alone actually find WMD. Vympel's point stands Axis.

Vympel’s points hold water only as conclusions based on incomplete evidence.

It is necessary at this point to address the most tortured tautalogy which has been indulged thus far: the "Bush didn't lie because he stands by Tony Blair's word and Blair stands by his own word" argument. Leaving aside for the moment the truly bizarre attempt by Kast to redefine the word "lie" to make it mean something else entirely, even the developmentally-challenged must be able to pierce this childish bit of "reasoning" —that the truth of a thing cannot be grounded merely on somebody else's say-so (hence the logical fallacy known as the Appeal To Authority). Even if we were to make the assumption that both men believed genuinely the face value veracity of the data they based their case for war on, the fact remains that a)the alledged IAEA report stating existence of an active Iraqi nuclear weapons programme simply did not exist —except in the form of a forged document— and that its utter lack of credibility was well known; and b)the Niger Yellowcake story was known to be baseless by the CIA and the State Department even as Bush et al. continued to state falsehoods regarding the Iraqi nuclear threat. The only conceivable defence is that both Bush and Blair are either complete idiots or so negligent that they cannot be bothered to verify the factual bases for the statements they make in public and in governmental forums in making a case for war.

Nobody ever said Bush wasn’t guilty of an Appeal to Authority. The question here is whether he did so with malignant intentions in mind.

(a) Tony Blair, 30 May 2003: "There is no doubt about the chemical programme, the biological programme, indeed the nuclear weapons programme. All that is well documented by the United Nations."

It can be argued, based on the original source and the context in which the statement was made, that Blair was referring to the long history of Iraq’s programs:

“And when you say there is no evidence that weapons of mass destruction exist in Iraq, there are 12 years of United Nations resolutions about the weapons of mass destruction found in Iraq. There is no doubt about the chemical programme, the biological programme, indeed the nuclear weapons programme. All that is well documented by the United Nations.”

(b) Tony Blair, interview with Abu Dhabi television, 4 April 2003: "the reason why the inspectors couldn't do their job in the end was that Saddam wouldn't co-operate."

He refers to the extensive period of stalling. Iraq’s behavior made both Blair and Bush increasingly suspicious of the country’s actual motives – and, indeed, the future of the inspections process itself. This ties back into the original assertion of Bush himself: no full accounting was possible while Hussein was still in power, for there was always the risk of orchestrated, ongoing deception.

Hans Blix, Briefing to the Security Council, 15 February 2003: "To take an example, a document, which Iraq provided, suggested to us that some 1,000 tonnes of chemical agent were "unaccounted for". One must not jump to the conclusion that they exist."

… Blix just confirmed it. Nowhere did Blair suggest in the previous quotation that their existence was fact – merely that they were unaccounted for. Considering that the United Kingdom wanted to be certain of Iraq’s complete disarmament, this is hardly suspect.

(d) Tony Blair, Statement to the House of Commons, 25 February 2003: "Is it not reasonable that Saddam provides evidence of destruction of the biological and chemical agents and weapons the UN proved he had in 1999? So far he has provided none."

Where was Hussein’s evidence – i.e. the documents – regarding the destruction of those same items? Again, from the context of somebody concerned with total disclosure, it is an entirely legitimate question.

"We know that this man has got weapons of mass destruction. That sounds like a slightly abstract phrase, but what we are talking about is chemical weapons, biological weapons, viruses, bacilli and anthrax—10,000 litres of anthrax—that he has. We know that he has it, Dr. Blix points that out and he has failed to account for that."

Jack Straw is referring to Iraq’s lack of evidence regarding self-destruction. He clearly takes this to mean that they possess the weapons. I am willing to admit that this is standing and running with personal conclusions, despite the precedents he might have for such analysis.

Hans Blix, statement of 10 September 2002: "this is not the same as saying there are weapons of mass destruction. If I had solid evidence that Iraq retained weapons of mass destruction or were constructing such weapons I would take it to the Security Council."

What is not the same? Remind Iraq that it has not properly accounted for large stockpiles? All right, I’ll bite – but that still doesn’t absolve Saddam. The question still needs to be answered, and the items’ history made public.

"the only conclusion that can be drawn is that there is a high risk that Iraq purchased [items and materials required to produce biological warfare agents] and used them at least in part for proscribed purposes - the production of agents for biological weapons".

A “high risk” – not factual evidence. Blair is correct on the part of a technicality. There was no full confirmation until after Kemal.

Really: inspectors never found any anthrax stocks, which Iraq declared were destroyed in 1991. The factory at which the anthrax was made, al-Hakam, had been under investigation since 1991:

How did the inspectors reach their earlier conclusion about “high-risk items” if nothing was there at all?

Also – are you referring only to his statement as regards “a factory to make more,” or the 8,000 litres as well? Only your statement and Blair’s refer to “anthrax stocks.”

Next, we must examine the issue of the effectiveness of the UNSCOM and UNMOVIC inspections in uncovering and deterring Iraqi efforts to conceal or reconstitute WMD programmes. While having to act in the face of Iraqi intrangescence and obsfucation, considerable progress was indeed achieved in revealing and effecting the destruction of materiel stockpiles, facilities, technical equipment, and documentation related to Iraq's WMD capabilities which survived the extensive destruction wreaked during the 1991 Gulf War, as well as revealing on an ongoing basis the degredation of the supporting infrastructure necessary to sustain any WMD research and development —the full extent of which is now revealed beyond dispute by the swift conquest and occupation of the country.

Yes, UNMOVIC was unable to discover anything. As you pointed out however, they were required to “act in the face of Iraqi intransigence and obfuscation.” President Bush’s assertions should therefore not be forgotten so easily: no full accounting was possible while Hussein was still in power, for ongoing contravention was then still a possibility. You’ve also yet to cover the gap in Vympel’s argument: the stockpiles still unaccounted for when Blix left, and which the Iraqis claim they destroyed – without, of course, having done their paperwork. The full extent of their infrastructure – or lack thereof – is also not as persuasive as you would have us believe. Conventional degradation may have forced Iraq’s chemical warfare units into terrific decline; the attrition would certainly have been great. It is too much to say that nothing exists because nothing was used. It’s merely a statement of faith.

First, operations did not begin with the decapitating strikes, nor with the much-touted "shock and awe" bombing campaign, nor with the multipronged thrust into Iraq by British, Australian, and US ground and special operations forces. The foundation for every success that the coalition has enjoyed to date stems from an intense information-gathering campaign that relied on air and space power, human intelligence, and intelligence-gathering efforts by special operations personnel. The precision strikes against strategic and operational targets during Iraqi Freedom stand as evidence of predictive battlespace awareness (PBA). This unprecedented capability to fuse intelligence data from various sources and make it useful to combatant commanders is one of the cornerstones of the transformation of air and space power.

And yet they missed the planes at al-Taqqadum, buried just below the surface. Similar efforts were also in place during the Gulf War – the SCUD launchers still escaped in full. I agree that coverage was comprehensive. This does not however indicate that forces will limited equipment could not have escape. Droves in the Iraqi military managed to do so during the war. This also doesn’t speak to the question of whether the weapons could have remained hidden throughout.

Although Iraq had produced both chemical and biological warheads for their Scuds, they did not employ them during the war. According to the information paper, the threat of massive U.S. retaliation and technical difficulties encountered in testing chemical/biological warheads deterred Saddam Hussein from taking this course. No chemical or biological agent warheads were found in the debris of Scud missiles.

Some veterans thought that Iraq launched more Scuds at coalition forces than actually occurred. Scuds broke up on re-entry or after Patriot missile intercepts and debris hit the ground in separate areas. This, together with numerous false alarms, and Patriot missile fire on false targets, contributed to this impression.

And yet the plans still made it into circulation regarding Israel. It was always more likely that the U.S. would target a military formation rather than a city. Remember that Hussein had little personally to loose from the use of his weapons – at least against the United States - unless he was caught after the fact.

You’ve also managed to skirt the fact that the launches against Israel were a contingency rather than a foregone conclusion from the start.

"The Iraqis modified Scuds for greater range, largely by reducing warhead weight, enlarging their fuel tanks and burning all of the fuel during the early phase of flight (rather than continuously). Such a Scud therefore came down with a relatively heavy warhead and a heavy motor, separated by the light empty fuel tank. It was structurally unstable and often broke up in the upper atmosphere. That further reduced its already poor accuracy, but it also made the missile difficult to intercept, since its flight path was unpredictable.

So they were unreliable. They still might have managed to hit targets of the size we’re speaking about.

Casualty rates for Scuds carrying nonconventional chemical or biological payloads are more difficult to estimate. The technical challenges involved in effectively disseminating a biological weapon in this way are many, and it is not clear that the Iraqis have the know-how to surmount these challenges. Scuds carrying chemical weapons can be expected to kill dozens of people per warhead depending on variables such as weather conditions, type of agent used, civil defense preparations, and degree of advanced warning.

Evidence I used earlier to remind Vympel of the limited impact the chemical strikes might have – and thus their relatively minimal political reverberation.

Initially, it was believed that the Patriot Advanced Capabilities 2 (PAC-2) systems deployed in Saudi Arabia and Israel achieved close to a 100 percent success rate in intercepting incoming Iraqi missiles. But even before the end of the conflict Israeli analyses were pointing to a much lower success rate – around 20 percent. Later analyses lowered the success rate still, and some questioned whether any Scuds had been intercepted by PAC-2 systems. Because Iraqi Scud variants are poorly designed and constructed, they have a tendency to disintegrate as they fall to their target.

Again, this puts more nails in the coffin of the Israeli argument. It’s got more strikes against it than the Saudi plan. And then you haven’t even approached the Special Forces issue – which, come to think of it, would have been the best option for Saddam overall – and the least likely to cause him grief after the fact.

There has been no military equipment procurement from recognised sources since August 1990.

As a consequence of the 1990-91 Gulf conflict and resulting destruction of large amounts of equipment, the Iraqi armed forces are in need of a complete range of modern equipment for all three services. Once UN sanctions end, this area will become an extremely attractive market for the majority of the world's defence manufacturers.

This is all irrelevant. We’re not speaking about their conventional capabilities except as a compliment to WMD use in any regard.

As for the Jane’s report, it’s dated 1996. And what are “recognized sources,” exactly?

Much of the problems facing the Iraqi military stem from poor training. Years of U.N.-imposed sanctions have had an effect. "Equipment shortages and manpower shortages, we believe, affect the quality and quantity of their training," the official said.
Even when they do train, training methods are ineffective by Western standards. They don't often conduct live-fire exercises, and training lacks realism, complexity and intensity, he explained.

The Iraqi military is considerably smaller than the force that opposed coalition troops in the Gulf War. The Iraqi army had 70 divisions in 1991, but only 23 today. Its elite Republican Guard is half the 12 divisions it was in 1991.

"Not only do they have fewer divisions, but the divisions tend to be more hollow than they were in 1991, because they lost a lot of equipment in 1991," the official said. Trucks, in particular, are in critically short supply, making it difficult for Iraqi forces to move equipment, ammunition and personnel.

And this makes Hussein’s confidence in his men – to the point that he’d order certain defensive measures be left untaken – how much more justifiable?

The good news is that Iraq no longer really has an offensive capability. The bad news is that it may not be able to defend itself after Saddam is gone.

Except that we’re there … Anyway, relevance? As for the command-and-control issues, their poor quality is worthless as a point of argument since we’re discussing something that clearly came down from Hussein (on the issue of Baghdad’s defense).

However, the issue of whether Iraq has weapons of mass destruction completely misses the more important and fundamental question relative to U.S. security. If mere possession of WMD is the criteria for pre-emptive U.S. military action, then Iraq should not be the only target. After all, according to the Pentagon, existing and emerging threats to the United States include 12 countries with nuclear weapons' programs, 13 countries with biological weapons, and 16 with chemical weapons.

The relevant issue should be whether Iraq directly threatens the United States requiring pre-emptive U.S. military action. The litmus test to use military force must be that the territorial integrity, national sovereignty, or liberty of the United States is at risk. To begin, although Iraq has chemical and biological weapons, it does not have any military capability to directly attack the United States. None. Zero. Artillery shells capable of carrying chemical munitions possibly tens of miles do not constitute a threat. The longest range weapons Iraq has are a handful of Scud missiles with a range of several hundred kilometers -- again, not enough to reach the United States. And the Iraqi military is about half of what it was when the United States defeated it in less than one week in the first Gulf War. Thus, the threat that has been conjured up by the administration is the merging of two disparate notions: WMD and terrorism. Playing on the public's sense of fear and vulnerability in the aftermath of September 11, the administration's argument comes down to the assertion that Iraq will give weapons of mass destruction to al Qaeda terrorists.

To be sure, Saddam and al Qaeda share a common hatred for the United States. However, that is hardly an overwhelming incentive for Iraq to hand over weapons of mass destruction, especially if it knows that it would be at the top of the suspect list and the target of decisive U.S. retaliation. Indeed, the lesson of the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan is that such an association is a prescription for regime change.

And there is no history of Iraq giving weapons of mass destruction to terrorists. Saddam has had more than a decade to arm Palestinian suicide terrorists with chemical and biological weapons to use against Israel, a country hated as much as the United States. Yet he has not done so. On the contrary, Saddam trusts only a few loyal officers with such weapons. There just isn't a mountain of evidence supporting the administration's position. Indeed, it's more like a molehill. According to Powell, alleged linkages to al Qaeda involve connecting Abu Mussab al-Zarqawi to the Ansar al-Islam terrorist group operating in northeastern Iraq. But this is Kurdish-controlled territory protected by U.S.-led enforcement of the no-fly zone, and collaboration between Ansar al-Islam and the Iraqi regime is not proven. Furthermore, no case has been made that Iraq supported al Qaeda in the planning, financing, or operation of the 9/11 attacks.

Their “litmus test” lacks a fourth – and vital – element: national security interest. This is clearly isolationist opinion.

And, in case you haven’t noticed, al-Qaeda isn’t an issue in this debate.

If Iraq did not deploy its chemical weapons to the KTO, two possible explanations are likely. First, Iraq believed that both Israel and the Coalition had chemical and nuclear weapons and would use them if provoked. Iraqi leaders also realized that these weapons could be delivered anywhere in Iraq with accuracy. Saddam probably concluded that the consequences of attacking with chemical weapons would be too severe to justify their use, and this may have led to an early decision not to use them. Saddam may also have assumed that Iraqi use of CW weapons would cause Coalition forces to seek his removal as a top priority including the liberation of Kuwait.

Second, it is just as likely that the leadership made a fundamental miscalculation about how the Coalition would prosecute the war and how effectively its own forces would be able to respond. Baghdad may have expected the Coalition forces to fight much like the Iranians did (attacking first with infantry followed by mobile armor). They perceived that this would have given them days or even weeks to move chemical munitions into the KTO once the offensive had begun.

… hence why they weren’t used in 1991 (and, for the last quotation, in 2003). That does not however vindicate the man for having entertained such ludicrous contingency plans. You and Vympel are furthermore no closer to proving Saddam Hussein less-than-delusional as far as Kuwait – or his orders this time around.

Other factors which could have deterred their use are:

o Loss of their ability to be delivered by air due to Coalition air supremacy.

o Artillery and MRL losses were extremely high by the time the ground offensive began limiting their use fcr chemical delivery.

o SCUD technical problems in their long range versions made the use of chemical warheads extremely inexact, and again the speed of the Coalition advance may have precluded their use of the SCUD-B for delivery.

o Damage to the logistics infrastructure may have made their transportation impossible.

This aids my argument in 2003.

The first development was a Newsweek story on March 03, 2003 unveiling, after eight years of suppression, the transcript of Hussain Kamel's debriefing by officials from the IAEA and the U.N. inspection team known as UNSCOM; this debriefing took place after Kamel defected to Jordan in 1995. In it, he affirmed that Iraq had indeed destroyed its entire stockpile of chemical and biological weapons and banned missiles after the Gulf War. All that remained were "hidden blueprints, computer disks, microfiches." The weapons were destroyed secretly, in order to hide their existence from inspectors, in the hopes of someday resuming production after inspections had finished. According to John Barry, who broke the story, the CIA and MI6 were told the same account and "a military aide who defected with Kamel ... backed Kamel's assertions about the destruction of WMD stocks." But these statements were "hushed up by the U.N. inspectors" in order to "bluff Saddam into disclosing still more."

Kemal was out of Iraq in 1995; he can’t speak about what occurred thereafter. And even if you take his own assertions at face value – again, without documentation and on faith alone -, what happened to the documents he claims are still in Iraq? They should have been turned over.

This was the fearsome Lion of Arabia which Kast continues to argue that we had to destroy before they could...what, exactly? Field an even more degraded army several years down the road? Try flying an air force with planes whose wings had been cut off before being simply buried in the sand? Attack the United States with their fearsome SCUD fleet, assuming the missiles didn't disintegrate in the middle of a 650km. flight? Just what sort of war machine was going to be built upon an industrial infrastructure which was ceasing to exist?

Acquire unconventional weapons. All you’ve done is go on and on about conventional issues. Entirely irrelevant.

The thing to remember here is that President Bush knows that the issue is not going away without fairly substantial proof. And that worries him because his job is on the line in 16 months, he's got two active and aggressive challengers snapping at his heels (Howard Dean and John Kerry), and his job approval ratings took a 12-point hit over the last month and are back to where they were immediately pre-9/11. Worse (for him), he's got really nothing to support his policy other than winning Iraq and Afghanistan, because the economy is in a continuing slump with red ink as far as the eye can see in both federal and state budgets (save for Vermont, largely due to the governorship of the aforementioned Dr. Dean), American freedoms have visibly eroded under his presidency, and his foreign policy is rapidly making America the world's biggest pariah state, alienating and frustrating even close friends (like Canada).

If Mr. Bush is getting his marching orders from Machiavelli, he forgot to read the part where Machiavelli advised the princeling that one must be feared, but cannot afford to be hated. Dr. Dean had a campaign rally in Seattle last night that was attended by 15,000 - four months before the first primary, that's a lot of people. There are a lot of people who are not pleased with President Bush's policy, and that's a dangerous thing to have for a president facing re-election.

If he's acted this way in his FIRST term, imagine how much worse it's going to get in his second, when he doesn't have to face re-election again...

Finally. So it’s your opinion that Bush did this solely for purposes of reelection – that is, he wanted an issue on which he could sell himself in 2004?

[Crown]

I am sorry, but the US has not managed to statisfactory support its initial accusations, let alone actually find WMD. Vympel's point stands Axis.

Vympel’s points hold water only as conclusions based on incomplete evidence.

No. The US's Administration's case for war holds water only as a conclusion based on incomplete evidence at best, and as an out-right lie to the public and to the world at worst.

[Axis Kast]

No. The US's Administration's case for war holds water only as a conclusion based on incomplete evidence at best, and as an out-right lie to the public and to the world at worst.

Do you or he have anything but the lack of evidence yet produced by inspections now yet complete to support your evidence? Aside, of course, from your own personal analysis.

It is your opinion that the US administration lied. Very well. Give me a motive. Why would Bush make a case for war on fabricated or incomplete evidence?

[Iceberg]

No. The US's Administration's case for war holds water only as a conclusion based on incomplete evidence at best, and as an out-right lie to the public and to the world at worst.

Do you or he have anything but the lack of evidence yet produced by inspections now yet complete to support your evidence? Aside, of course, from your own personal analysis.

It is your opinion that the US administration lied. Very well. Give me a motive. Why would Bush make a case for war on fabricated or incomplete evidence?

To maintain his power base, create a ready-made market for his various corporate cronies in the oil and military-hardware industries, and create an issue for his re-election.

[SirNitram]

No. The US's Administration's case for war holds water only as a conclusion based on incomplete evidence at best, and as an out-right lie to the public and to the world at worst.

Do you or he have anything but the lack of evidence yet produced by inspections now yet complete to support your evidence? Aside, of course, from your own personal analysis.

It is your opinion that the US administration lied. Very well. Give me a motive. Why would Bush make a case for war on fabricated or incomplete evidence?

That one's easy. Bush has been itching for war since day one, he wanted to get rid of Saddam for his dear ol' dad.

[Axis Kast]

To maintain his power base, create a ready-made market for his various corporate cronies in the oil and military-hardware industries, and create an issue for his re-election.

“Maintenance of his power base” would be, as far as I can tell, massing sufficient public support to gain reelection in 2004?

If your argument is that Bush wanted something on which he could stake his reputation and at the same time divert attention from his domestic budget crisis, I’d like to see some kind of proof. After all, Republicans were already being hailed as the only serious candidates on national defense issues as early as September 12, 2001. Afghanistan (the war; not the reconstruction) only cinched the issue. Even Kerry is often portrayed as lacking the power to stand beside Bush in that arena. Why would Bush have needed anything more than the War on Terrorism to divert attention from domestic issues anyway? Additional media attention to the hunt for Osama Bin Laden would have more than sufficed – not to mention the benefits of taking the “Clintonian approach” and building international consensus for much less time and effort. I don’t see why Bush would have clung to the issue of Iraq if all he hoped to do was find a diversion for his own upcoming reelection campaign. Find me a past president, by the way, who has done something similar. You have no precedent. Why must Bush be any different?

So Bush, unlike every other president before him, is selling out wholesale to the Military-Industrial Complex? Again, this is simple conjecture. Where’s the ink on the document he signed with Halliburton? It was the Army that chose to invite them into Iraq, not the Oval Office. Cheney this, Cheney that. They knew how to fight oil well fires, period. This is nothing but conjecture as a result of personal dislike. Absolutely unfounded. And considering that Rumsfeld is slashing the military’s operational strength – not to mention new weapons plans – increasingly frequently, I have trouble seeing how Bush panders to that side of industry. Why not simply promise more contracts instead? Wasting military forces so they can be rebuilt again at full cost? That’s a flimsy argument, too.

An issue for reelection? Because he didn’t have national security? Because he couldn’t have pointed out the result of so many other issues on which he could have left his mark successfully? Try to remember that until Iraq, he had a very credible record in foreign affairs. Despite Kyoto, Bush was hailed as the unlikely victor in numerous crisis, not least of which was the Chinese Spy Plane disaster.

That one's easy. Bush has been itching for war since day one, he wanted to get rid of Saddam for his dear ol' dad.

Which is why he ran on a campaign of virtual isolationism? Proof that he’s pandering to the interests of his father?

[SirNitram]

He runs on virtual isolationism, then embarks on two foreign wars. Yea, this is a reason to trust the guy, uh huh...

[Axis Kast]

He runs on virtual isolationism, then embarks on two foreign wars. Yea, this is a reason to trust the guy, uh huh...

Oh my, did we forget a little event that occured on September 11th and changed the requirements of American foreign policy overnight ... ?

[Iceberg]

He runs on virtual isolationism, then embarks on two foreign wars. Yea, this is a reason to trust the guy, uh huh...

Oh my, did we forget a little event that occured on September 11th and changed the requirements of American foreign policy overnight ... ?

Ah yes, the eternal chorus of "9/11," which automatically excuses President Bush's many policy mistakes...

[Crown]

No. The US's Administration's case for war holds water only as a conclusion based on incomplete evidence at best, and as an out-right lie to the public and to the world at worst.

Do you or he have anything but the lack of evidence yet produced by inspections now yet complete to support your evidence?

But Axis, that's all I need. To say that the Saddam had WMD, and to justify that for a case of war, than evidence must be produced. In this case there was no evidence before, during or after the war.

Aside, of course, from your own personal analysis.

I think you mean aside from the fact that the Administration has yet to find 'the smoking gun'.

It is your opinion that the US administration lied. Very well. Give me a motive. Why would Bush make a case for war on fabricated or incomplete evidence?

I don't need to. I am an observer, not a psychic that can read the minds of people in power and descern their thoughts and reasons.

All I need to show is that the case they used to try and sell me, you and everyone else on the war is inherently false. QED.

[SirNitram]

He runs on virtual isolationism, then embarks on two foreign wars. Yea, this is a reason to trust the guy, uh huh...

Oh my, did we forget a little event that occured on September 11th and changed the requirements of American foreign policy overnight ... ?

And this required we head to Iraq where, exactly?

[Vympel]

Kast has already conceded the debate. Notice he holds up

"We must attack Iraq to prevent Saddam stopping us from attacking Iraq"

as valid reasoning. He's displayed contempt for logic numerous times, but this marvelous piece of circular reasoning is the icing on the cake. We already knew he was a loon, and I'm not going to bother going round the garden point for point when his argument has collapsed into holding up blatant circular reasoning as valid arguments.

[Patrick Degan]

I see Comical Axi's slipped ever deeper in denial. How predictable.

The point still stands: Hussein did not conduct the defense of Baghdad in a manner approaching sensible, ostensibly because he placed faith in the conduct and potential of Republican Guard units not fully functional since prior to the First Gulf War. If that - after over a decade of sanctions, embargoes, and attrition by time – isn’t delusional behavior, isn’t delusional analysis, I’m not prepared to say what is.

And yet, Saddam Hussein wasn't delusional to the point where he decided to stick around to share the fate of his troops.

It is necessary at this point to address the most tortured tautalogy which has been indulged thus far: the "Bush didn't lie because he stands by Tony Blair's word and Blair stands by his own word" argument. Leaving aside for the moment the truly bizarre attempt by Kast to redefine the word "lie" to make it mean something else entirely, even the developmentally-challenged must be able to pierce this childish bit of "reasoning" —that the truth of a thing cannot be grounded merely on somebody else's say-so (hence the logical fallacy known as the Appeal To Authority). Even if we were to make the assumption that both men believed genuinely the face value veracity of the data they based their case for war on, the fact remains that a)the alledged IAEA report stating existence of an active Iraqi nuclear weapons programme simply did not exist —except in the form of a forged document— and that its utter lack of credibility was well known; and b)the Niger Yellowcake story was known to be baseless by the CIA and the State Department even as Bush et al. continued to state falsehoods regarding the Iraqi nuclear threat. The only conceivable defence is that both Bush and Blair are either complete idiots or so negligent that they cannot be bothered to verify the factual bases for the statements they make in public and in governmental forums in making a case for war.

Nobody ever said Bush wasn’t guilty of an Appeal to Authority. The question here is whether he did so with malignant intentions in mind.

Deliberately using information already known to be baseless and bogus answers that question —that is, for anyone who isn't trying so desperately to redefine the word "lie".

(a) Tony Blair, 30 May 2003: "There is no doubt about the chemical programme, the biological programme, indeed the nuclear weapons programme. All that is well documented by the United Nations."

It can be argued, based on the original source and the context in which the statement was made, that Blair was referring to the long history of Iraq’s programs:

Only for the intellectually dishonest, since it doesn't speak to the threat Iraq posed as of 2003, which was nil.

“And when you say there is no evidence that weapons of mass destruction exist in Iraq, there are 12 years of United Nations resolutions about the weapons of mass destruction found in Iraq. There is no doubt about the chemical programme, the biological programme, indeed the nuclear weapons programme. All that is well documented by the United Nations.”

—as was the ongoing discovery and destruction of prohibited materials through that same period. I'm afraid Mr. Blair's disingenuousness is no defence.

He refers to the extensive period of stalling. Iraq’s behavior made both Blair and Bush increasingly suspicious of the country’s actual motives – and, indeed, the future of the inspections process itself. This ties back into the original assertion of Bush himself: no full accounting was possible while Hussein was still in power, for there was always the risk of orchestrated, ongoing deception.

Using the premise of the argument as proof of the argument, eh? Nobody was "trusting" Saddam Hussein —particularly the UN inspectors. Inspections were not going to stop as long as suspicion remained, and in the interim, Saddam was firmly in the box.

Hans Blix, Briefing to the Security Council, 15 February 2003: "To take an example, a document, which Iraq provided, suggested to us that some 1,000 tonnes of chemical agent were "unaccounted for". One must not jump to the conclusion that they exist."

… Blix just confirmed it. Nowhere did Blair suggest in the previous quotation that their existence was fact – merely that they were unaccounted for. Considering that the United Kingdom wanted to be certain of Iraq’s complete disarmament, this is hardly suspect.

Blix confirmed no such thing, or do you not understand the meaning of the phrase "One must not jump to the conclusion that they exist"?

(d) Tony Blair, Statement to the House of Commons, 25 February 2003: "Is it not reasonable that Saddam provides evidence of destruction of the biological and chemical agents and weapons the UN proved he had in 1999? So far he has provided none."

Where was Hussein’s evidence – i.e. the documents – regarding the destruction of those same items? Again, from the context of somebody concerned with total disclosure, it is an entirely legitimate question.

And this necessitated war over continuing deterrence and inspections how? Trusting Saddam's word for anything is not an issue and never was an issue.

"We know that this man has got weapons of mass destruction. That sounds like a slightly abstract phrase, but what we are talking about is chemical weapons, biological weapons, viruses, bacilli and anthrax—10,000 litres of anthrax—that he has. We know that he has it, Dr. Blix points that out and he has failed to account for that."

Jack Straw is referring to Iraq’s lack of evidence regarding self-destruction. He clearly takes this to mean that they possess the weapons. I am willing to admit that this is standing and running with personal conclusions, despite the precedents he might have for such analysis.

Only you can read that meaning into Jack Straw clearly asserting as fact the existence of an alledged WMD arsenal while twisting Hans Blix's statements to suit his own purposes. And I quote:

Hans Blix, Briefing to the Security Council, 15 February 2003: "To take an example, a document, which Iraq provided, suggested to us that some 1,000 tonnes of chemical agent were "unaccounted for". One must not jump to the conclusion that they exist."

Hans Blix, statement of 10 September 2002: "this is not the same as saying there are weapons of mass destruction. If I had solid evidence that Iraq retained weapons of mass destruction or were constructing such weapons I would take it to the Security Council."

What is not the same? Remind Iraq that it has not properly accounted for large stockpiles? All right, I’ll bite – but that still doesn’t absolve Saddam. The question still needs to be answered, and the items’ history made public.

More bullshit obsfucation on your part.

"the only conclusion that can be drawn is that there is a high risk that Iraq purchased [items and materials required to produce biological warfare agents] and used them at least in part for proscribed purposes - the production of agents for biological weapons".

A “high risk” – not factual evidence. Blair is correct on the part of a technicality. There was no full confirmation until after Kemal.

Who testified that the stockpiles had been destroyed. Knocks another pin from under your case.

Really: inspectors never found any anthrax stocks, which Iraq declared were destroyed in 1991. The factory at which the anthrax was made, al-Hakam, had been under investigation since 1991:

How did the inspectors reach their earlier conclusion about “high-risk items” if nothing was there at all?

Um, their mission charter was to look for "high risk items", Mr. Clueless.

Also – are you referring only to his statement as regards “a factory to make more,” or the 8,000 litres as well? Only your statement and Blair’s refer to “anthrax stocks.”

And yet more obsfucation from you. Let's review:

Blair: Only then did the inspectors find over 8,000 litres of concentrated anthrax and other biological weapons, and a factory to make more."

Really: inspectors never found any anthrax stocks, which Iraq declared were destroyed in 1991. The factory at which the anthrax was made, al-Hakam, had been under investigation since 1991:

"The first UNSCOM biological team arrived in Iraq, in early August 1991, and inspected the facility at Al Salman that had been destroyed by bombing in the Gulf War. Inspections of Al Hakam, Al Fudhaliyah, Al Daura and other sites followed in September and October 1991. By the time of its first inspection, Al Hakam had been stripped of any obvious signs of its former role, and had been converted into a civilian facility."

Yes, UNMOVIC was unable to discover anything. As you pointed out however, they were required to “act in the face of Iraqi intransigence and obfuscation.” President Bush’s assertions should therefore not be forgotten so easily: no full accounting was possible while Hussein was still in power, for ongoing contravention was then still a possibility. You’ve also yet to cover the gap in Vympel’s argument: the stockpiles still unaccounted for when Blix left, and which the Iraqis claim they destroyed – without, of course, having done their paperwork. The full extent of their infrastructure – or lack thereof – is also not as persuasive as you would have us believe. Conventional degradation may have forced Iraq’s chemical warfare units into terrific decline; the attrition would certainly have been great. It is too much to say that nothing exists because nothing was used. It’s merely a statement of faith.

On the contrary, UNMOVIC inspections uncovered further documentation of Saddam's former programmes, interviewed nuclear scientists, uncovered the Al-Samoud missile programme, and determined the inactivity of Iraq's nuclear weapons programme through the telltale lack of radiological trace materials in the environment which are the fingerprint of such a project. And your argument about the degredation of what chemical stockpiles may have been left only reinforces Vympel's arguments regarding Iraq's de-facto disarmament.

First, operations did not begin with the decapitating strikes, nor with the much-touted "shock and awe" bombing campaign, nor with the multipronged thrust into Iraq by British, Australian, and US ground and special operations forces. The foundation for every success that the coalition has enjoyed to date stems from an intense information-gathering campaign that relied on air and space power, human intelligence, and intelligence-gathering efforts by special operations personnel. The precision strikes against strategic and operational targets during Iraqi Freedom stand as evidence of predictive battlespace awareness (PBA). This unprecedented capability to fuse intelligence data from various sources and make it useful to combatant commanders is one of the cornerstones of the transformation of air and space power.

And yet they missed the planes at al-Taqqadum, buried just below the surface. Similar efforts were also in place during the Gulf War – the SCUD launchers still escaped in full. I agree that coverage was comprehensive. This does not however indicate that forces will limited equipment could not have escape. Droves in the Iraqi military managed to do so during the war. This also doesn’t speak to the question of whether the weapons could have remained hidden throughout.

The planes were buried before the beginning of the scouting phase of operations (and rendered totally inoperable). Secondly, the example of Gulf War I does not apply to Gulf War II, due to the vast qualitative improvements in our scouting and surveillance technologies in the intervening twelve years. And I really have to question your definition of "light equipment", or do you seriously believe that missile launchers and chemical shells qualify as "light" equipment?

BTW , the "droves" who did desert left behind all equipment —anything that couldn't be carried by hand and in many cases not even the uniforms on their backs.

Some veterans thought that Iraq launched more Scuds at coalition forces than actually occurred. Scuds broke up on re-entry or after Patriot missile intercepts and debris hit the ground in separate areas. This, together with numerous false alarms, and Patriot missile fire on false targets, contributed to this impression.

And yet the plans still made it into circulation regarding Israel. It was always more likely that the U.S. would target a military formation rather than a city. Remember that Hussein had little personally to loose from the use of his weapons – at least against the United States - unless he was caught after the fact.

And yet the damage wreaked was haphazard and minimal. Nor did Hussein even think of employing chemicals against Israel in fear of American nuclear retaliation.

You’ve also managed to skirt the fact that the launches against Israel were a contingency rather than a foregone conclusion from the start.

That's because we'rer talking about what actually occurred and not your bullshit "What-if" scenarios which you think take the place of fact.

So they were unreliable. They still might have managed to hit targets of the size we’re speaking about.

How, exactly? Magick?

Casualty rates for Scuds carrying nonconventional chemical or biological payloads are more difficult to estimate. The technical challenges involved in effectively disseminating a biological weapon in this way are many, and it is not clear that the Iraqis have the know-how to surmount these challenges. Scuds carrying chemical weapons can be expected to kill dozens of people per warhead depending on variables such as weather conditions, type of agent used, civil defense preparations, and degree of advanced warning.

Evidence I used earlier to remind Vympel of the limited impact the chemical strikes might have – and thus their relatively minimal political reverberation.

And which only serves to undermine your arguments regarding the SCUD threat.

Initially, it was believed that the Patriot Advanced Capabilities 2 (PAC-2) systems deployed in Saudi Arabia and Israel achieved close to a 100 percent success rate in intercepting incoming Iraqi missiles. But even before the end of the conflict Israeli analyses were pointing to a much lower success rate – around 20 percent. Later analyses lowered the success rate still, and some questioned whether any Scuds had been intercepted by PAC-2 systems. Because Iraqi Scud variants are poorly designed and constructed, they have a tendency to disintegrate as they fall to their target.

Again, this puts more nails in the coffin of the Israeli argument. It’s got more strikes against it than the Saudi plan. And then you haven’t even approached the Special Forces issue – which, come to think of it, would have been the best option for Saddam overall – and the least likely to cause him grief after the fact.

The only coffin being nailed shut is your own. Saddam's political strategy failed utterly, and he didn't take any action which opened the door to American nuclear retaliation —or Israeli. The remainder is your cherished "What-if"=Fact formulation and has no relevance.

There has been no military equipment procurement from recognised sources since August 1990.

As a consequence of the 1990-91 Gulf conflict and resulting destruction of large amounts of equipment, the Iraqi armed forces are in need of a complete range of modern equipment for all three services. Once UN sanctions end, this area will become an extremely attractive market for the majority of the world's defence manufacturers.

This is all irrelevant. We’re not speaking about their conventional capabilities except as a compliment to WMD use in any regard.

Entirely relevant, as it speaks to the non-threat of Iraq 2003.

As for the Jane’s report, it’s dated 1996.

The late war has demonstrated that Iraq's military capabilities deteriorated, not increased, in the intervening seven years; a fact which was clearly observable in that time as well.

And what are “recognized sources,” exactly?

Now you're being deliberately obtuse. Jane's has had longstanding association with the UK 's Defence Ministry, the Pentagon, defence contractors, and the defence and intelligence agencies of the West. They have been the accurate guide to the world's militaries since 1896. Furthermore, the extant facts on the ground in Iraq only confirm, not contradict, the 1996 report.

Much of the problems facing the Iraqi military stem from poor training. Years of U.N.-imposed sanctions have had an effect. "Equipment shortages and manpower shortages, we believe, affect the quality and quantity of their training," the official said.
Even when they do train, training methods are ineffective by Western standards. They don't often conduct live-fire exercises, and training lacks realism, complexity and intensity, he explained.

The Iraqi military is considerably smaller than the force that opposed coalition troops in the Gulf War. The Iraqi army had 70 divisions in 1991, but only 23 today. Its elite Republican Guard is half the 12 divisions it was in 1991.

"Not only do they have fewer divisions, but the divisions tend to be more hollow than they were in 1991, because they lost a lot of equipment in 1991," the official said. Trucks, in particular, are in critically short supply, making it difficult for Iraqi forces to move equipment, ammunition and personnel.

And this makes Hussein’s confidence in his men – to the point that he’d order certain defensive measures be left untaken – how much more justifiable?

A non-issue, as far as I'm concerned, since the thrust of my argument is of capability or lack thereof.

The good news is that Iraq no longer really has an offensive capability. The bad news is that it may not be able to defend itself after Saddam is gone.

Except that we’re there … Anyway, relevance? As for the command-and-control issues, their poor quality is worthless as a point of argument since we’re discussing something that clearly came down from Hussein (on the issue of Baghdad’s defense).

It is not worthless since it underscores the fact that Iraq was a non-threat, with a toothless and declawed military machine incapable of mounting any sort of aggression against anyone.

However, the issue of whether Iraq has weapons of mass destruction completely misses the more important and fundamental question relative to U.S. security. If mere possession of WMD is the criteria for pre-emptive U.S. military action, then Iraq should not be the only target. After all, according to the Pentagon, existing and emerging threats to the United States include 12 countries with nuclear weapons' programs, 13 countries with biological weapons, and 16 with chemical weapons.

The relevant issue should be whether Iraq directly threatens the United States requiring pre-emptive U.S. military action. The litmus test to use military force must be that the territorial integrity, national sovereignty, or liberty of the United States is at risk. To begin, although Iraq has chemical and biological weapons, it does not have any military capability to directly attack the United States. None. Zero. Artillery shells capable of carrying chemical munitions possibly tens of miles do not constitute a threat. The longest range weapons Iraq has are a handful of Scud missiles with a range of several hundred kilometers -- again, not enough to reach the United States. And the Iraqi military is about half of what it was when the United States defeated it in less than one week in the first Gulf War. Thus, the threat that has been conjured up by the administration is the merging of two disparate notions: WMD and terrorism. Playing on the public's sense of fear and vulnerability in the aftermath of September 11, the administration's argument comes down to the assertion that Iraq will give weapons of mass destruction to al Qaeda terrorists.

To be sure, Saddam and al Qaeda share a common hatred for the United States. However, that is hardly an overwhelming incentive for Iraq to hand over weapons of mass destruction, especially if it knows that it would be at the top of the suspect list and the target of decisive U.S. retaliation. Indeed, the lesson of the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan is that such an association is a prescription for regime change.

And there is no history of Iraq giving weapons of mass destruction to terrorists. Saddam has had more than a decade to arm Palestinian suicide terrorists with chemical and biological weapons to use against Israel, a country hated as much as the United States. Yet he has not done so. On the contrary, Saddam trusts only a few loyal officers with such weapons. There just isn't a mountain of evidence supporting the administration's position. Indeed, it's more like a molehill. According to Powell, alleged linkages to al Qaeda involve connecting Abu Mussab al-Zarqawi to the Ansar al-Islam terrorist group operating in northeastern Iraq. But this is Kurdish-controlled territory protected by U.S.-led enforcement of the no-fly zone, and collaboration between Ansar al-Islam and the Iraqi regime is not proven. Furthermore, no case has been made that Iraq supported al Qaeda in the planning, financing, or operation of the 9/11 attacks.

Their “litmus test” lacks a fourth – and vital – element: national security interest. This is clearly isolationist opinion.

Entirely relevant, since Iraq was in no position to threaten anything and certainly not the national security of the United States.

And, in case you haven’t noticed, al-Qaeda isn’t an issue in this debate.

A sidebar, since the Administration kept making the not-subtle inference of an Iraq/al-Qaeda link —one you flogged in our prewar debate, as I recall.

If Iraq did not deploy its chemical weapons to the KTO, two possible explanations are likely. First, Iraq believed that both Israel and the Coalition had chemical and nuclear weapons and would use them if provoked. Iraqi leaders also realized that these weapons could be delivered anywhere in Iraq with accuracy. Saddam probably concluded that the consequences of attacking with chemical weapons would be too severe to justify their use, and this may have led to an early decision not to use them. Saddam may also have assumed that Iraqi use of CW weapons would cause Coalition forces to seek his removal as a top priority including the liberation of Kuwait.

Second, it is just as likely that the leadership made a fundamental miscalculation about how the Coalition would prosecute the war and how effectively its own forces would be able to respond. Baghdad may have expected the Coalition forces to fight much like the Iranians did (attacking first with infantry followed by mobile armor). They perceived that this would have given them days or even weeks to move chemical munitions into the KTO once the offensive had begun.

… hence why they weren’t used in 1991 (and, for the last quotation, in 2003). That does not however vindicate the man for having entertained such ludicrous contingency plans. You and Vympel are furthermore no closer to proving Saddam Hussein less-than-delusional as far as Kuwait – or his orders this time around.

Vympel's been arguing the mental stability of Saddam more than I have. But I'll make this observation: arguments that Saddam was delusional aren't served by his having the apparent good sense to bugger out of the capitol and not share the fate of the army he was leaving behind.

Other factors which could have deterred their use are:

o Loss of their ability to be delivered by air due to Coalition air supremacy.

o Artillery and MRL losses were extremely high by the time the ground offensive began limiting their use fcr chemical delivery.

o SCUD technical problems in their long range versions made the use of chemical warheads extremely inexact, and again the speed of the Coalition advance may have precluded their use of the SCUD-B for delivery.

o Damage to the logistics infrastructure may have made their transportation impossible.

This aids my argument in 2003.

I'm not responsible for your fantasies.

The first development was a Newsweek story on March 03, 2003 unveiling, after eight years of suppression, the transcript of Hussain Kamel's debriefing by officials from the IAEA and the U.N. inspection team known as UNSCOM; this debriefing took place after Kamel defected to Jordan in 1995. In it, he affirmed that Iraq had indeed destroyed its entire stockpile of chemical and biological weapons and banned missiles after the Gulf War. All that remained were "hidden blueprints, computer disks, microfiches." The weapons were destroyed secretly, in order to hide their existence from inspectors, in the hopes of someday resuming production after inspections had finished. According to John Barry, who broke the story, the CIA and MI6 were told the same account and "a military aide who defected with Kamel ... backed Kamel's assertions about the destruction of WMD stocks." But these statements were "hushed up by the U.N. inspectors" in order to "bluff Saddam into disclosing still more."

Kemal was out of Iraq in 1995; he can’t speak about what occurred thereafter. And even if you take his own assertions at face value – again, without documentation and on faith alone -, what happened to the documents he claims are still in Iraq? They should have been turned over.

We don't need him to "speak about" what occurred after 1995 (others are already doing that). His testimony provides a benchmark as to the degraded state of Iraq's WMD programmes and pointed to further lines of investigation for UNSCOM and UNMOVIC. The evidence to date does not support assertions that vast WMD arsenals still exist or that Saddam had any access to such weapons.

This was the fearsome Lion of Arabia which Kast continues to argue that we had to destroy before they could...what, exactly? Field an even more degraded army several years down the road? Try flying an air force with planes whose wings had been cut off before being simply buried in the sand? Attack the United States with their fearsome SCUD fleet, assuming the missiles didn't disintegrate in the middle of a 650km. flight? Just what sort of war machine was going to be built upon an industrial infrastructure which was ceasing to exist?

Acquire unconventional weapons. All you’ve done is go on and on about conventional issues. Entirely irrelevant.

Totally relevant, as it undermines utterly any support for the theory that Saddam Hussein posed any realistic threat either regionally or internationally. He was boxed in, unable to mount an aggression against any neighbouring state, was unable to dislodge our control over the region or his own airspace, and was forced to submit to inspections with the plain threat of war at the back of the UNMOVIC regime. Iraq was not only deterred but neutralised in fact. War was not justified in terms of either overt action nor imminent threat from Iraq, and as evidence for Saddam's alledged vast WMD arsenal fails to pile up, it becomes increasingly clear that the war was a lie; based upon exaggerated arguments backed by "evidence" which was falsified or hopelessly out of date and known to be so by the two men who made the case for war —Tony Blair and George Bush. The only conceivable defence against the charge of malice is either negligence or incompetence, if they couldn't be bothered to verify the "facts" before leading the charge to the battlefield.

That much is painfully clear —that is, to anyone not in eyes-shut denial who makes a hobby of trying to redefine the word "lie" to suit his purposes.

[Axis Kast]

Ah yes, the eternal chorus of "9/11," which automatically excuses President Bush's many policy mistakes...

Nice try. Hand-waving won’t save you here. The point stands: Bush made very clear as early as 2000 exactly what he thought constituted decent foreign policy. That changed virtually overnight after the World Trade Center collapsed. Even you must acknowledge the extraordinary circumstances.

But Axis, that's all I need. To say that the Saddam had WMD, and to justify that for a case of war, than evidence must be produced. In this case there was no evidence before, during or after the war.

No. It’d be all you needed assuming the investigation has run its course – but that hasn’t happened yet, and so it’s still conjecture. You’re really speaking more on faith than fact.

I don't need to. I am an observer, not a psychic that can read the minds of people in power and descern their thoughts and reasons.

All I need to show is that the case they used to try and sell me, you and everyone else on the war is inherently false. QED.

If there was no motive for malignant behavior, it changes fully the context of the situation. While the President might be guilty of having acted on false intelligence, it wouldn’t carry the kind of implications you’re now presenting. You’ve also yet to prove that he lied on very many occasions, all of which can themselves easily explained as mistakes or common gaffes – certainly nothing that fully scuttles his original arguments.

And this required we head to Iraq where, exactly?

You’re changing the qualifications of the argument now, Nitram. Only minutes ago, you questioned the face value of the President’s original promises before September 11th – brushing, of course, that fateful day from mind while making your accusation.

Kast has already conceded the debate. Notice he holds up

"We must attack Iraq to prevent Saddam stopping us from attacking Iraq"

as valid reasoning. He's displayed contempt for logic numerous times, but this marvelous piece of circular reasoning is the icing on the cake. We already knew he was a loon, and I'm not going to bother going round the garden point for point when his argument has collapsed into holding up blatant circular reasoning as valid arguments.

Why is it, Vympel, that you always seem to harp on only one justification for war every time we debate, and then fall into the trap of assuming it stands completely alone?

Part of the reasoning behind the American position was doubtless fear that Hussein’s reconstitution would make him difficult to face down in the future – i.e. that he could expand his capability to approach that of a nation such as North Korea.

And yet, Saddam Hussein wasn't delusional to the point where he decided to stick around to share the fate of his troops.

Self-preservation on its own does not a fully rational individual make. Interesting that you refuse to address the actual situation at hand, too.

Deliberately using information already known to be baseless and bogus answers that question —that is, for anyone who isn't trying so desperately to redefine the word "lie".

Were the British also aware of the charge’s “bogus” nature before the SOTU address? Were Tony Blair still impressed with its supposed authenticity, mightn’t Bush have chose to believe the word of British intelligence over American organizations?

Only for the intellectually dishonest, since it doesn't speak to the threat Iraq posed as of 2003, which was nil.

He’s speaking as to the history – the precedents – behind the current situation. Not intellectually dishonest at all. The problem here is that everyone hears what he or she wants to hear. Some find a clear warning in the context of the past, others a series of what they honestly believe can be nothing but lies.

—as was the ongoing discovery and destruction of prohibited materials through that same period. I'm afraid Mr. Blair's disingenuousness is no defence.

I deal with this above.

Using the premise of the argument as proof of the argument, eh? Nobody was "trusting" Saddam Hussein —particularly the UN inspectors. Inspections were not going to stop as long as suspicion remained, and in the interim, Saddam was firmly in the box.

Regardless of whether or not you believe Saddam’s initial stalling was a bad indicator, Bush and Blair are firmly within their rights to harbor suspicions. That they transmitted these to the public is no crime.

Blix confirmed no such thing, or do you not understand the meaning of the phrase "One must not jump to the conclusion that they exist"?

He just confirmed it: they were “unaccounted for.” Blair isn’t jumping to the conclusion that they exist – simply reminding the world that Iraq has yet to credibly account for their disappearance.

And this necessitated war over continuing deterrence and inspections how? Trusting Saddam's word for anything is not an issue and never was an issue.

From the point of view of the British and American governments, inspections wouldn’t have worked because Blix could never be sure of anything even approaching complete, simultaneous coverage of the entire nation of Iraq. Deterrence was also considered flawed since one could never fully confirm whether or not it was actually effective in the first place without full, intrusive inspections (which themselves couldn’t be acknowledged as fully comprehensive unless there wasn’t a régime potentially capable of ongoing deception in the first place). Many “if then” requirements, but fully rational nonetheless.

Only you can read that meaning into Jack Straw clearly asserting as fact the existence of an alledged WMD arsenal while twisting Hans Blix's statements to suit his own purposes. And I quote:

Hans Blix, Briefing to the Security Council, 15 February 2003: "To take an example, a document, which Iraq provided, suggested to us that some 1,000 tonnes of chemical agent were "unaccounted for". One must not jump to the conclusion that they exist."

Did I not acknowledge that Straw had stood and run with his own interpretation of events? I believe I did. This is however at least somewhat forgivable; Iraq does indeed have yet to provide satisfactory data regarding its unilateral disarmament process.

More bullshit obsfucation on your part.

It’s now “bullshit obfuscation” to assert that Hussein needs to provide some kind of evidence regarding self-disarmament if the claim is to be taken as truth?

Who testified that the stockpiles had been destroyed. Knocks another pin from under your case.

Word of mouth from a man whose overhead view of the program ended in 1995. Even the United Nations was unable to do anything more than confirm that something had taken place – not to what extent. Kamel is no be-all, end-all. One can form opinions as a result of his statements, not write factual histories without further investigation.

Um, their mission charter was to look for "high risk items", Mr. Clueless.

Reread the quotation. Only you have said anything regarding anthrax stocks. You did add the “really,” did you not? If you didn’t, who did? The quotation itself doesn’t bear that part out.

On the contrary, UNMOVIC inspections uncovered further documentation of Saddam's former programmes, interviewed nuclear scientists, uncovered the Al-Samoud missile programme, and determined the inactivity of Iraq's nuclear weapons programme through the telltale lack of radiological trace materials in the environment which are the fingerprint of such a project. And your argument about the degredation of what chemical stockpiles may have been left only reinforces Vympel's arguments regarding Iraq's de-facto disarmament.

My mistake; I meant, “Yes, UNCOM was able to uncover some things.”

As for chemical degradation, nobody can be certain of the absolute extent of unaccounted stockpiles, if they remain. That means that any estimation of chemical lifespans – and that’s all they’d have, estimations – aren’t necessary on-target. Then there’s also the issue that if Saddam retained any of his stockpiles – even after their usefulness was extinguished -, he was committing the kind of contravention initially accused.

The planes were buried before the beginning of the scouting phase of operations (and rendered totally inoperable). Secondly, the example of Gulf War I does not apply to Gulf War II, due to the vast qualitative improvements in our scouting and surveillance technologies in the intervening twelve years. And I really have to question your definition of "light equipment", or do you seriously believe that missile launchers and chemical shells qualify as "light" equipment?

BTW , the "droves" who did desert left behind all equipment —anything that couldn't be carried by hand and in many cases not even the uniforms on their backs.

If the planes were buried before the war, why were those at al-Taqqadum simply discarded rather than placed in hardened bunkers such as aircraft found by the Australian SAS early on, in April?

Ah, so the nebulous “vast qualitative improvements in our scouting and surveillance technologies” scatter all potential error, camouflage, or successful evasion to the wind, do they? It’s why the planes outside al-Taqqadum showed up, right?

We don’t know if Iraq’s chemical stockpiles required missile launchers at this point in time. Artillery shells were a possibility. If they began their mission but never finished it, launchers might not have been an issue whatsoever. Not to mention that all the SCUDs escaped detection during the first Gulf War.

As for the mass abandonment of equipment, I’d love a source that can verify that it was and would have been utterly universal rather than merely common.

And yet the damage wreaked was haphazard and minimal. Nor did Hussein even think of employing chemicals against Israel in fear of American nuclear retaliation.

The first statement speaks to likelihood; it wasn’t impossible that missiles fired at Saudi Arabia would prove effective however. The second statement is a lie. We know that Hussein produced a contingency plan for the launch of a chemical warhead at Israel – and that its precursor, a Coalition march on Baghdad, was never met.

That's because we'rer talking about what actually occurred and not your bullshit "What-if" scenarios which you think take the place of fact.

The plans were there. The troops were ordered to make preparations. That much is plain fact. To ignore the fact that other strikes might have taken place – in fact, were readied to take place – is the height of willful ignorance.

How, exactly? Magick?

Luck. Israel was an equally as unlikely gambit.

And which only serves to undermine your arguments regarding the SCUD threat.

If Hussein was going to carry out an assault on Israel in the hope of provoking a response, it would have been a long shot. Thus the plan doesn’t hold any water at all.

The only coffin being nailed shut is your own. Saddam's political strategy failed utterly, and he didn't take any action which opened the door to American nuclear retaliation —or Israeli. The remainder is your cherished "What-if"=Fact formulation and has no relevance.

He didn’t take action because certain precursors weren’t met. We know the preparations were made.

Entirely relevant, as it speaks to the non-threat of Iraq 2003

In a conventional sense only.

The late war has demonstrated that Iraq's military capabilities deteriorated, not increased, in the intervening seven years; a fact which was clearly observable in that time as well.

We’re speaking about items acquired illegally, not about the actual improvements made to Iraq’s fighting potential – or lack thereof.

Now you're being deliberately obtuse. Jane's has had longstanding association with the UK 's Defence Ministry, the Pentagon, defence contractors, and the defence and intelligence agencies of the West. They have been the accurate guide to the world's militaries since 1896. Furthermore, the extant facts on the ground in Iraq only confirm, not contradict, the 1996 report.

We know they acquired items from China and Yugoslavia, among others. I’m not questioning the validity of Jane’s reports – simply the definition of their term.

A non-issue, as far as I'm concerned, since the thrust of my argument is of capability or lack thereof.

And I’m bringing up the issue as relevant to the man’s dangerous intellectual failings.

It is not worthless since it underscores the fact that Iraq was a non-threat, with a toothless and declawed military machine incapable of mounting any sort of aggression against anyone.

But not that Hussein wasn’t delusional.

Again, the lack of adequate command-and-control isn’t proof that Iraq had no stockpiles or could not have conspired to utilize them at some point. Effectiveness and intent are two different creatures entirely.

Entirely relevant, since Iraq was in no position to threaten anything and certainly not the national security of the United States.

This editorial – and that’s what it is, somebody else’s gift-wrapped opinion – doesn’t take into account that we have and will continue to make foreign policy – and engage in war – for the benefit of national security interests beyond our own borders. That makes it incomplete and presumptive on an even greater level than it was already, being somebody’s glorified opinion in the first place.

A sidebar, since the Administration kept making the not-subtle inference of an Iraq/al-Qaeda link —one you flogged in our prewar debate, as I recall.

Irrelevant to this debate.

Vympel's been arguing the mental stability of Saddam more than I have. But I'll make this observation: arguments that Saddam was delusional aren't served by his having the apparent good sense to bugger out of the capitol and not share the fate of the army he was leaving behind.

Serial killers run, too, Deegan. Does that mean they aren’t in fact mentally infirm? Self-preservation isn’t a total vindication of mental health.

I'm not responsible for your fantasies.

All of the factors you listed aid in explaining why if Saddam had something, we didn’t see it.

We don't need him to "speak about" what occurred after 1995 (others are already doing that). His testimony provides a benchmark as to the degraded state of Iraq's WMD programmes and pointed to further lines of investigation for UNSCOM and UNMOVIC. The evidence to date does not support assertions that vast WMD arsenals still exist or that Saddam had any access to such weapons.

The evidence to date is incomplete.

Totally relevant, as it undermines utterly any support for the theory that Saddam Hussein posed any realistic threat either regionally or internationally. He was boxed in, unable to mount an aggression against any neighbouring state, was unable to dislodge our control over the region or his own airspace, and was forced to submit to inspections with the plain threat of war at the back of the UNMOVIC regime. Iraq was not only deterred but neutralised in fact. War was not justified in terms of either overt action nor imminent threat from Iraq, and as evidence for Saddam's alledged vast WMD arsenal fails to pile up, it becomes increasingly clear that the war was a lie; based upon exaggerated arguments backed by "evidence" which was falsified or hopelessly out of date and known to be so by the two men who made the case for war —Tony Blair and George Bush. The only conceivable defence against the charge of malice is either negligence or incompetence, if they couldn't be bothered to verify the "facts" before leading the charge to the battlefield.

That much is painfully clear —that is, to anyone not in eyes-shut denial who makes a hobby of trying to redefine the word "lie" to suit his purposes.

Unconventional weapons and reconstitution represent a threat or a threat-in-the-making. By your terms, Afghanistan was no threat to us, either. There’s a difference between being unable to mount aggression against a neighbor and then being unable to mount aggression against a neighbor without suffering consequences. It’s important for us to take Saddam’s history and state-of-mind into account in that regard. We had total air superiority in 1991; Saddam still launched missiles at his neighbors. The UNMOVIC inspections régime was not sufficient intrusive according to its critics – all of whom are as entitled to their opinions as you to yours. It is your opinion that Iraq was no imminent threat to the national security interests of the United States of America – although Vympel’s admission of Saddam’s long-term goals speak clearly to that issue. Once more, the investigation is not yet complete. It is too early to draw anything more than a cursory conclusion without having the entire picture open before us.

[Crown]

But Axis, that's all I need. To say that the Saddam had WMD, and to justify that for a case of war, than evidence must be produced. In this case there was no evidence before, during or after the war.

No. It’d be all you needed assuming the investigation has run its course – but that hasn’t happened yet, and so it’s still conjecture. You’re really speaking more on faith than fact.

No. It is the other way around, it is conjecture to assume that Iraq has WMD before the investigation runs it's course, something which the Administration did when it launced the war.

I don't need to. I am an observer, not a psychic that can read the minds of people in power and descern their thoughts and reasons.

All I need to show is that the case they used to try and sell me, you and everyone else on the war is inherently false. QED.

If there was no motive for malignant behavior, it changes fully the context of the situation. While the President might be guilty of having acted on false intelligence, it wouldn’t carry the kind of implications you’re now presenting. You’ve also yet to prove that he lied on very many occasions, all of which can themselves easily explained as mistakes or common gaffes – certainly nothing that fully scuttles his original arguments.

The intelligence dosier he presented was a 12 year old graduate student's report, forged Niger papers that he was informed of in October in '02 and told was false, that he later presented in Feburary of '03.

The Administration flat out lied.

[Axis Kast]

No. It is the other way around, it is conjecture to assume that Iraq has WMD before the investigation runs it's course, something which the Administration did when it launced the war.

It's conjecture from all angels, given that neither of us has entirely solid proof.

The intelligence dosier he presented was a 12 year old graduate student's report, forged Niger papers that he was informed of in October in '02 and told was false, that he later presented in Feburary of '03.

The Administration flat out lied.

On some counts, yes - but were either Bush or Blair aware that they were in fact distributing false information at the time? Also try to keep in mind that there were numerous other justifications for war.

[Vympel]

Why is it, Vympel, that you always seem to harp on only one justification for war every time we debate, and then fall into the trap of assuming it stands completely alone?

Because you've asserted that Iraq's capability to carry out any attacks is irrelevant, which is absurd. That you hold up circular reasoning as valid is evidence of what your position is- a tautology. The validity of attacking Iraq is assumed from the start in your position, and is the reason for all your hypothetical rationalizations for why the administration's doomsday pronouncements were not all bullshit. The point doesn't stand alone, and it doesn't stand with anything else either. It's fallacious.

Furthermore, to answer your North Korea falsehoods, which really demonstrate how little on this subject you actually know:

Explain to me how it was possible for North Korea to reconstitute its own weapons capability despite being under observation itself. It is simply your personal opinion that anything but fissile material needn’t set off an alarm.

Reconstitue? Last I checked, it's capability was never dismantled. Unlike Iraq. Dumbass.

I want you to explain to me how North Korea’s facilities escaped detection by satellite but why Saddam Hussein’s couldn’t possibly remain hidden from two hundred or so persons in a country the size of Texas.

What?! North Korea's facilities escape detection by satellite? Perhaps you'd care to explain where the fuel rods (you know, that they were afraid were going to be weapon enriched) the IAEA was monitoring were kept if the facilities escaped detection. Idiot.

Tell me, Vympel, if the Iraqi stockpiles missing since 1998 were so large in the first place, how exactly would unilateral destruction have been possible while still evading detection?

Stockpiles since 1998 were so large? Excuse me? Where did anyone make that claim? And also, you do know that unilateral destruction DID NOT escape detection. The inspectors know it happened.

To lay out the North Korea facts for the THIRD time:

as laid out in the May 3rd-9th issue of the Economist:

- Before 1994, the CIA suspected that NK had material with which to make two nuclear bombs.

- When this latest crisis started in October 2002, America had surprised North Korea with the evidence that it was secretly starting up a second weapons program, and North Korea surprised everyone by owning up to it.

Most importantly:

- The IAEA observers job was watching over a stash of spent fuel-rods at North Korea's single working nuclear reactor at Yongbyon. Only after it kicked out the IAEA observers did it restart the mothballed reactors, removed the seals on the stored fuel rods, and is either about to start or about to finish (depending on which translation of its recent statement on the subject you choose to believe) extracting their bomb-useable plutonium, sufficient for another five or six bombs.

[SirNitram]

[

And this required we head to Iraq where, exactly?

You’re changing the qualifications of the argument now, Nitram. Only minutes ago, you questioned the face value of the President’s original promises before September 11th – brushing, of course, that fateful day from mind while making your accusation.

No, retard. I never advocated isolationism.. I pointed out a man who goes from extreme isolationism to launching attacks, unprovoked, on other nations is a lying sack of shit, much like yourself. What you may not realize, Axis, is that Osama has been ignored while your boys have been playing in Iraq. As much as I hate trivializing the hard work of the Royal and American armed forces, they've been dicking around in a place no politician with a grudge and an agenda should have sent them.

Now, shiteater, why did 9/11 demand us to go into Iraq? Especially when the jackass running the show was pushing for isolationism. A logical thinker would think if he wasn't lying, he'd be keeping with isolationism once the immediate threat was dealt with; that's what American Isolationism means, after all.