WMD not expected to be found

[The Duchess of Zeon]

The ISG's predecessor, the 75th Survey Group (or whatever) searched the ammunition storage depots, found nothing, and went home. There are statements from a Lt. General to that effect.

The commander of the 75th Exploitation Task Force was a Colonel. Who is this Lt. General and what was his relevance to the search?

[Vympel]

The commander of the 75th Exploitation Task Force was a Colonel. Who is this Lt. General and what was his relevance to the search?

See the edit I made before you posted again- the 1st MEU was also searching. Besides, what do you think the 75th was doing? Scratching it's arse? They were the ones that did the real searching- it was handed over to Kay's 'Iraq Survey Group' when they realized there was sweet fuck all there. Only 550 shells of mustard gas would be even worth hiding for fuck's sake, the rest of it, if hidden, is useless now- this talk of not looking at '120 ammunition storage points' is just laughable bullshit; a bone tossed to the administration to keep them treading water- UNSCOM and UNMOVIC performed routine inspections of ammunition points as well- once, UNMOVIC even found a whopping 12 mustard gas shells, never opened, in a box covered in bird shit in an empty hangar, that had been previously tagged by UNSCOM for destruction before they left (Iraq was requested not to destroy them without UNSCOM being there, for the obvious reasons that they would then become 'unaccounted for'). Huge finds expected, hmmm ...

[The Duchess of Zeon]

See the edit I made before you posted again- what do you think the 75th was doing? Scratching it's arse? There are no weapons. Only 550 shells of mustard gas would be even worth hiding for fuck's sake, the rest of it, if hidden, is useless now.

I saw it. It changes nothing; the exact quote is "We've been to virtually every ammunition supply point between the Kuwaiti border and Baghdad, but they're simply not there." Virtually every supply point between the Kuaiti border and Baghdad is not every one in the whole country and you know it. In fact that might be a considerable minority if the supply dumps are still arrayed along the Iranian border.

Only approximately 150 sites were searched by the 75th; are all but twenty of these supposed to be ammo dumps when there were 82 other high priority sites?

[Vympel]

Bugger, another edit.

I saw it. It changes nothing; the exact quote is "We've been to virtually every ammunition supply point between the Kuwaiti border and Baghdad, but they're simply not there." Virtually every supply point between the Kuaiti border and Baghdad is not every one in the whole country and you know it. In fact that might be a considerable minority if the supply dumps are still arrayed along the Iranian border.

And you expect chemical weapons to just be sitting there amongst the convetional ones, never mind that you have

a: zero evidence of any chemical weapons being produced since 1998, since the infrastructure was all gone

b: none of the 'unaccoutned for' material alleged destroyed by every Iraqi who opens his mouth (who are all lying, I suppose) is viable except for a paltry 550 shells of mustard gas and a few aerial bombs

c: the inspections of ammunition dumps by both UNSCOM and UNMOVIC, and the 75th.

Only approximately 150 sites were searched by the 75th; are all but twenty of these supposed to be ammo dumps when there were 82 other high priority sites?

The 75th went in there with the expectation (as you can see in the Washington Post article) that they'd find the stuff at the ammunition dumps. As did the other military units involved, like the 1st MEU. To suggest that nothing would be found along any of the invasion routes, but hey, there might be stuff along the border with Iran (if there's anything at all) which might not have been searched, despite the factors I have already laid out, is just desperate water treading.

[The Duchess of Zeon]

a: zero evidence of any chemical weapons being produced since 1998, since the infrastructure was all gone

This is a ridiculous claim, since it's well-documented that the infrastructure for chemical weaponry and for common pesticides is effectively identical. Any country capable of 1930s agriculture can manufacture chemical weaponry.

b: none of the 'unaccoutned for' material alleged destroyed by every Iraqi who opens his mouth (who are all lying, I suppose) is viable except for a paltry 550 shells of mustard gas and a few aerial bombs

One has to admit that the argument in this regard is not entirely implausible; with a continuing guerrilla war the people who relied on the regime might be unwilling to completely abandon their chances under the old regime should it be restored to power. Especially since they know what it could do.

The 75th went in there with the expectation (as you can see in the Washington Post article) that they'd find the stuff at the ammunition dumps. As did the other military units involved, like the 1st MEU. To suggest that nothing would be found along any of the invasion routes, but hey, there might be stuff along the border with Iran (if there's anything at all) which might not have been searched, despite the factors I have already laid out, is just desperate water treading.

Or perhaps not, since it's unclear what sort of strategic planning went on in the Ba'athist regime. If they thought it safe to deploy chemical weaponry against Iran but likely to result in severe retaliation against U.S. or Arab forces, the weapons might be primarily concentrated along the Iranian border. That is just one possibility. Also, one must remember that General Franks estimated 2,000 - 3,000 sites to be searched; the lower end estimate was 1,500. If we assume that there are 2,000 -- Well, we've covered a few hundred so far. It could take ten times as long as the search has been going on for now before we've entirely scoured the country. I won't make up my mind on the issue for a long, long time.

[Vympel]

This is a ridiculous claim, since it's well-documented that the infrastructure for chemical weaponry and for common pesticides is effectively identical. Any country capable of 1930s agriculture can manufacture chemical weaponry

No, *there is no evidence of any such production*. All of Iraq's sites that produced chemical weapons were either dismantled or converted. You cannot hide it. None of the accusations of resumed activity ever panned out. Fact. In light of this, the argument for hidden weapons fails on it's face.

One has to admit that the argument in this regard is not entirely implausible; with a continuing guerrilla war the people who relied on the regime might be unwilling to completely abandon their chances under the old regime should it be restored to power. Especially since they know what it could do.

*sigh*

Yes, they're all lying, they're all party loyalists etc etc ....

Or perhaps not, since it's unclear what sort of strategic planning went on in the Ba'athist regime. If they thought it safe to deploy chemical weaponry against Iran but likely to result in severe retaliation against U.S. or Arab forces, the weapons might be primarily concentrated along the Iranian border. That is just one possibility. Also, one must remember that General Franks estimated 2,000 - 3,000 sites to be searched; the lower end estimate was 1,500. If we assume that there are 2,000 -- Well, we've covered a few hundred so far. It could take ten times as long as the search has been going on for now before we've entirely scoured the country. I won't make up my mind on the issue for a long, long time.

It is clear that everyone else already has, even Kay to an extent, and for good reason, The 'Iraq's a big country' defense gets lamer with each passing day- and the empty claims about what sites need to be searched I don't buy for a second. You'll never see UNMOVIC or UNSCOM saying that they needed to search thousands of sites- it's political damage control, nothing more. Also, 'interim' report or not, I warrant this'll to be the last report you ever hear of.

[The Duchess of Zeon]

No, *there is no evidence of any such production*. All of Iraq's sites that produced chemical weapons were either dismantled or converted. You cannot hide it. None of the accusations of resumed activity ever panned out. Fact. In light of this, the argument for hidden weapons fails on it's face.

Okay, then how did Iraqi agriculture survive?

I'm afraid you don't understand.

Effectively any such plant to produce pesticide could be used to manufacture a chemical weapon. This is not a case of weaponization or de-weaponization; the equipment is the same. It's a question of the chemicals being used.

I agree that makes the entire idea of banning chemical weapons production exceptionally silly--it's almost unenforceable. Scratch that--it is. But one can, of course, find the manufactured stockpiles from such production.

*sigh*

Yes, they're all lying, they're all party loyalists etc etc ....

No, I'm just saying the possibility potentially exists. And "lying" and "not saying" are two different things at any rate.

It is clear that everyone else already has, even Kay to an extent, and for good reason, The 'Iraq's a big country' defense gets lamer with each passing day- and the empty claims about what sites need to be searched I don't buy for a second. You'll never see UNMOVIC or UNSCOM saying that they needed to search thousands of sites- it's political damage control, nothing more. Also, 'interim' report or not, I warrant this'll to be the last report you ever hear of.

We'll see.

[Vympel]

Okay, then how did Iraqi agriculture survive?

Converted and/or dismantled does not preclude the use of Iraqi agriculture.

I'm afraid you don't understand.

Effectively any such plant to produce pesticide could be used to manufacture a chemical weapon. This is not a case of weaponization or de-weaponization; the equipment is the same. It's a question of the chemicals being used.

Evidence of which can be detected. Of which there is none.

I agree that makes the entire idea of banning chemical weapons production exceptionally silly--it's almost unenforceable. Scratch that--it is. But one can, of course, find the manufactured stockpiles from such production.

No, it can be enforced, by inspecting the sites and seeing what's gone on there. It's a gross oversimplification to state that any 1930s country can make chemical weapons. It's not nearly that simple. There are specific items of equipment, and processes, as well as residue, that can be examined to determine whether anythign was actually produced.

Here's an example

Many of the most detailed claims made about Iraq since 1998 have been related to the rebuilding of facilities that were formerly associated with chemical and biological weapons. It is noticeable that few of these claims are that a specific facility is currently being used for the production of chemical or biological warfare agents. Instead, the facilities are identified as being capable of producing such agents as well as civilian products, or that the material that is being produced could be used in the development of illicit weapons.

Unless there is a reliable assessment that the production undertaken at these facilities is part of a chemical and biological warfare programme, the information presented in these claims cannot be taken as demonstrating that Iraq has recently produced illicit chemical and biological agents. Indeed, UNMOVIC inspections have not discovered any facilities in Iraq currently engaged in the production of chemical or biological weapons. A significant example is the description provided by UNMOVIC for the facilities required to produce mustard agents:

"Iraq does not appear to have a dedicated facility capable of producing Mustard and its key precursors. Significant modifications would be required to convert existing chemical production facilities for this purpose. Iraq would have to utilize ?corrosion resistant? equipment (for the processing of the chlorinating agent), which it possesses in limited quantities. However, Iraq had some items of dual-use equipment distributed all over the country at legitimate facilities that could be removed and assembled for the construction of a dedicated Mustard production plant".

("Unresolved Disarmament Issues", 6 March 2003, p.77).

The example of mustard is significant because, according to UNMOVIC, "Mustard would be the easiest agent for Iraq to produce indigenously.

No, I'm just saying the possibility potentially exists. And "lying" and "not saying" are two different things at any rate.

No, they have explicitly said the programs were abandoned- they're not just keeping mum.

[Alex Moon]

Here's a transcript of David Kay's report:
http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/s ... 22003.html

[The Duchess of Zeon]

No, it can be enforced, by inspecting the sites and seeing what's gone on there. It's a gross oversimplification to state that any 1930s country can make chemical weapons. It's not nearly that simple.

Which is why chemical weapons were deployed several decades prior to that? Pesticide research and chem research are virtually identical fields and a marginal but complete (emphasis on the later) industrial support structure--which Iraq did have--is more than enough to produce either. Iraq did so and continue to do so.

There are specific items of equipment, and processes, as well as residue, that can be examined to determine whether anythign was actually produced.

I would not presume to think otherwise. However; there are several methods I, at least, could think of to safeguard against detection in a so-called "dual-use" chemical plant. Any of these might have been used; or something else.

No, they have explicitly said the programs were abandoned- they're not just keeping mum.

Yes, like every single bureaucrat and scientist in Iraq has talked to the press?

Well, it's really no matter. We'll all have our opinions on this.

[The Duchess of Zeon]

Mustard gas? Who cares about mustard gas; there are several nerve agents (Tabun among them, and another that the Russians liked), which are nearly identical to common pesticides in basic structure. Oh, and don't forget that Chlorine is a chemical weapon.

[AdmiralKanos]

Duchess, I can go to the grocery store right now, buy the appropriate combinations of cleaners and other household ingredients, and produce lethal noxious chemical fumes. If you are using the potential ability to make chemical weapons as a criterion rather than evidence of the appropriate chemicals actually being prepared along with viable delivery systems, then prepare to invade every nation on Earth.

[The Duchess of Zeon]

Well, it's really no matter. We'll all have our opinions on this.

What I mean by this, incidently, is that I find it supinely amusing that anyone can claim to come to an authoritative conclusion on this issue with the available data. This is a situation in which nobody has access to anything conclusive; being asked to make a determination about Iraq as a civilian is like being asked to drive a car blind.

Perhaps that is part of the problem, or simply the perception of such is.

[The Duchess of Zeon]

Duchess, I can go to the grocery store right now, buy the appropriate combinations of cleaners and other household ingredients, and produce lethal noxious chemical fumes. If you are using the potential ability to make chemical weapons as a criterion rather than evidence of the appropriate chemicals actually being prepared along with viable delivery systems, then prepare to invade every nation on Earth.

I quite understand that--I believe I even stated it. I'm just commenting that Iraq certainly had this potential, and thus the existence of (at least chemical) weaponry cannot be immediately discounted on production factors alone.

[Vympel]

Mustard gas? Who cares about mustard gas; there are several nerve agents (Tabun among them, and another that the Russians liked), which are nearly identical to common pesticides in basic structure. Oh, and don't forget that Chlorine is a chemical weapon.

UNMOVIC specifically stated that mustard gas is the easiest for Iraq to produce, and they lacked that capability. I've already shown what a simplification it is to argue that they can produce anything they want without trace or evidence of it- they can't. Not to mention it's certainly not up to me to prove that they *didn't* produce anything.

[CelesKnight]

After GWI, Hussein complied with the UN mandate to remove his weapons of mass destruction. When inspectors were forced out by the US in 1998, Hussein was left with two medium-range missiles, no launchers, and two unfilled warheads.

In retrospect, it appears that that is correct. However, one question that, for me at least, remains is if it was reasonable for the US and UN to believe that Iraq possessed more WMD, or was still covering up or pursuing more WMD. According to a summary from UNSCOM, it looks like Iraq was ordered to destroy it's WMD in 1991. This was followed by Iraq's stalling of weapon's inspectors, interference with their work, and veiled threats to their safety. Eventually, weapons would be found and destroyed. Iraq would offer a "Full, Final and Complete Disclosure" (I presume that that means exactly was it says, and was not intended as a half-measure), and demand that inspections and sanctions end. Iraq would continue interfering with the weapons inspectors and the process would start all over again. Is that, in general, correct? If so, the phrase "Hussein complied" seems rather generous.

The stalling continued on through the end of inspections. 1997 seemed particularly egregious.

21 Jun 1997 Iraq again blocks UNSCOM's teams from entering certain sites, which have been designated by UNSCOM for inspection.

21 Jun 1997 Security Council resolution 1115 (1997), condemns Iraq's actions and demands that Iraq allow UNSCOM's team immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to any sites for inspection and officials for interviews by UNSCOM. The Council also calls for an additional report on Iraq's cooperation with the Commission and suspends the periodic sanctions reviews.

Sep 1997 Iraq provides fifth Full, Final and Complete Disclosure for its prohibited biological weapons programme. An international panel of experts is convened in New York to discuss Iraq’s declaration. The panel unanimously finds Iraq’s declaration to be incomplete, inadequate and technically flawed.

13 Sep 1997 One of UNSCOM's personnel is manhandled by an Iraqi officer on board one of the Commission's helicopters while the inspector was attempting to take photographs of the unauthorized movement of Iraqi vehicles inside a site declared by Iraq to be "sensitive", that was designated for inspection. Two days later, Iraq again failed to freeze movement inside another "sensitive site" designated for inspection.

17 Sep 1997 While seeking access to a site for inspection declared by Iraq to be "sensitive", UNSCOM inspectors witness and videotape the movement of files, the burning of documents and dumping of ash-filled waste cans into a nearby river.

Oct 1997 UNSCOM completes the destruction of additional, large quantities of chemical weapons related equipment and precursors chemicals. Iraq had previously denied that part of the equipment had been used for CW production. Only in May 1997, on the basis of UNSCOM's investigations, did Iraq admit that some of the equipment had indeed been used in the production of VX.

13 Jan 1998 The Executive Chairman reports to the Council that during the first day of an inspection, Iraq announced that it was withdrawing its cooperation with the inspection team on the pretext that the team had too many individuals of US or UK nationality (S/1998/27 of 13 January 1998).

14 Jan 1998 Iraq continues to block the work of the inspection team.

I've snipped some and added emphasis. I simply wanted to illistrate that Iraq was interferring with inspections up to the end. In light of that, why was it unreasonable for the US and UN to assume that Iraq still possesed WMD and/or had the capacity and resolve to create more?

Saddam Hussein had destroyed 817 missiles, 14 mobile launchers, 56 fixed launchers, 73 chemical-potential warheads, 163 conventional warheads, 88000 chemical munitions (combined filled and unfilled), 600 tons of chemical agents, 4000 tons of precursor chemicals, and 980 pieces of equipment. Even the best of the early 1980s weapons Hussein may have still possessed would be incredibly weak by today's standards. The best we've been able to find is traces of mustard gas, a World War I weapon, in old shells buried in the desert. While it would be theoretically possible for another delivery system to be developed, it would require new labs to be built to produce the chemical, biological, or bacteriological weapons. Such labs would have to be capable of being disguised against satellite imagery, which is highly difficult.

I have no real comment on the effectiveness of Iraq's alledged WMD program. You may be right that it would be "increadibly weak" by today's standards. I don't know, nor particularly care. My interest is in the issues above. However, let me just say one thing on it: If those weapons were not useful and effective, why did S.H. go to such lengths, and risk so much, to protect them?

[The Duchess of Zeon]

UNMOVIC specifically stated that mustard gas is the easiest for Iraq to produce, and they lacked that capability. I've already shown what a simplification it is to argue that they can produce anything they want without trace or evidence of it- they can't. Not to mention it's certainly not up to me to prove that they *didn't* produce anything.

UNMOVIC is smoking crack. Mustard gas is not as easy to produce as Chlorine. Even assuming they're ignoring Chlorine because it's believed to be ineffective on the modern field of combat (I doubt an Iranian teenager would care), the specific production requirements for Mustard gas--a blister agent--are different from those of tabun, for example; and tabun, a nerve agent, is quite similiar to some pesticides.

I'm not asking you to prove they didn't prove anything. I'm just trying to demonstrate that the situation is uncertain. My sole purpose in posting to this thread is to make sure that data and opinions offering an alternate view are appropriately heard.

[Vympel]

UNMOVIC is smoking crack. Mustard gas is not as easy to produce as Chlorine.

You're joking, right? Do you really think they'd make such a determination without knowledge of what Iraq was capable of doing?

Even assuming they're ignoring Chlorine because it's believed to be ineffective on the modern field of combat (I doubt an Iranian teenager would care), the specific production requirements for Mustard gas--a blister agent--are different from those of tabun, for example; and tabun, a nerve agent, is quite similiar to some pesticides.

Iraq's Tabun was also of notoriously poor quality- and a non issue.

The main G-agents produced by Iraq were Tabun, Sarin and Cyclosarin. It is generally accepted that Iraq stopped producing Tabun in 1986 (UNMOVIC accept that this account "is plausible and appears to be supported by UNSCOM?s findings", in "Unresolved Disarmament Issues", 6 March 2003, p.68), in favour of concentrating on the producing of Sarin and Cyclosarin.

These agents deteriorate rapidly, especially if impurities are present in their manufacture. This seems to have been the case with Iraq's nerve agents. The Persian Gulf War Illnesses Task Force of the US Department of Defense gave the following assessment in March 2001:

"Impure or improperly stored sarin is unstable and degrades over time. US experts consider chemical warfare agents less than 50 percent pure to be militarily ineffective. Western sources estimate the sarin Iraq produced never exceeded 60 percent purity, and Iraq reported that poor operating practices at Al Muthanna limited the purity of sarin to between 20 and 50 percent. Since it contained at least 40 percent impurities when manufactured, sarin produced at Al Muthanna had a short shelf life. The CIA estimates the chemical warfare agent in the rockets stored at Al Muthanna had deteriorated to approximately 18 percent purity by the time that Bunker 2 was destroyed, leaving about 1600 kilograms (1.6 metric tons) of viable sarin."

"The Gulf War Air Campaign - Possible Chemical Warfare Agent Release at Al Muthanna, February 8, 1991", 19 March 2001; at: http://www.gulflink.osd.mil/al_muth/al_muth_s02.htm

The taskforce of the Department of Defense attributed the high level of Iraqi cooperation in revealing the scale of its earlier chemical programme to the fact that the Iraqi government realised that the nerve agents it had produced were no longer viable:

"We believe Iraq was largely cooperative on its latest declarations because many of its residual munitions were of little use - other than bolstering the credibility of Iraq's declaration - because of chemical agent degradation and leakage problems."

"Chemical Warfare Agent Issues During the Persian Gulf War", Persian Gulf War Illnesses Task Force, April 2002; at: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/gul ... paper1.htm

A similar assessment was made by the CIA in a memorandum from January 1991:

"Iraq is not able to make good-quality chemical agents. Technical failures have reduced their purity and caused problems in storage and handling. This is a particular problem for the sarin- type nerve agents (GB and GF). These both contain hydrofluoricacid (HF), an impurity that attacks metal surfaces and catalyzes nerve agent decomposition. This leads to metal failure and leaks in the ammunition, increasing handling hazards. [...] Lower purity significantly limits shelf life and reduces toxic effects when the munition is employed. [...] The nerve agent should have already begun to deteriorate, and decomposition should make most of the nerve agent weapons unserviceable by the end of March 1991."

"Iraq: Potential for Chemical Weapon Use", 25 January 1991; at: http://www.fas.org/irp/gulf/cia/970825/ ... _0001.html

This assessment is repeated in the IISS strategic dossier of 9 September 2002: "As a practical matter, any nerve agent from this period [pre-1991] would have deteriorated by now.." (p.51)

UNMOVIC have also acknowledged this conclusion with regard to specific substances:

Tabun: "documentary evidence suggests that Tabun was produced using process technology and quality control methodologies that would result in the agent being degraded to a very low quality through the action of a resulting by-product." ("Unresolved Disarmament Issues", 6 March 2003, p.68).

[The Duchess of Zeon]

You're joking, right? Do you really think they'd make such a determination without knowledge of what Iraq was capable of doing?

No, I am absolutely serious. Take a look at the history of Chlorine and of Mustard Gas respectively and at their composition and at what is required to produce them. You will find that, in fact, Mustard Gas is a chemical compound of which chlorine is a component. You must have Chlorine to have Mustard Gas--and Chlorine is itself a chemical weapon.

Wiki article on Chlorine

Wiki article on Mustard Gas

Here, I'll provide those; if you wish, do more research on your own.

For whatever reason, UNMOVIC decided that an element discovered a century before Mustard Gas and used as part of its production--besides that, the first gas used in warfare--was harder to produce than Mustard Gas.

[Vympel]

You're joking, right? Do you really think they'd make such a determination without knowledge of what Iraq was capable of doing?

No, I am absolutely serious. Take a look at the history of Chlorine and of Mustard Gas respectively and at their composition and at what is required to produce them. You will find that, in fact, Mustard Gas is a chemical compound of which chlorine is a component. You must have Chlorine to have Mustard Gas--and Chlorine is itself a chemical weapon.

Wiki article on Chlorine

Wiki article on Mustard Gas

Here, I'll provide those; if you wish, do more research on your own.

For whatever reason, UNMOVIC decided that an element discovered a century before Mustard Gas and used as part of its production--besides that, the first gas used in warfare--was harder to produce than Mustard Gas.

You do realize that UNMOVIC, and UNSCOM before it, was looking at the Iraqi weapons *in context* of what it was known to have done before, not in a vacuum of which there was no prior history or knowledge of what the Iraqi military-industrial complex had done? This is a useless nitpick, especially considering that chlorine isn't even an effective chemical weapon. I also fail to see what relevance this nitpick has to UNMOVIC's statement: Iraq didn't have the equipment to produce even mustard gas. In addition, their nerve agent was also complete shit, sufficient for short-term battlefield use only, not long term storage. The Iraqi 'threat' was a bad joke, as is the idea that they hid anything.

And just to drive the nail in the coffin:

Fallujah II was inspected by UNMOVIC inspectors on 9 December 2002. In contrast to the extensive claims of the CIA and the State Department, UNMOVIC found that the chlorine plant was not even in use:

Two separate chemical plants are in the factory area and their major activity is the production of phenol and chlorine. The chlorine plant is currently inoperative. The site contains a number of tagged dual-use items of equipment, which were all accounted for. All key buildings were inspected in addition to the chlorine and phenol plants. The objectives of the visit were successfully achieved.

Joint IAEA / UNMOVIC press statement, 9 December 2002 (emphasis added).

[Stuart Mackey]

There were perfectly valid political and economic reasons for invading Iraq, but the public will not accept such things. They must feel as though the barbarians are at the very gates before they will approve a march to war; ergo, we get this absurd Abbot and Costello routine about WMDs in order to fire up the public's blood.

Political and economic reasons to start a war? this whole affair is starting to stink more and more like the reasons for a certain set of invasions 1938-1939 when I hear statements like that.

[The Duchess of Zeon]

How is a dual-use item tagged and accounted for, if I may ask? That would satisfy my interest in the matter if I could be referred to a relevant explanation of the process.

[Vympel]

How is a dual-use item tagged and accounted for, if I may ask? That would satisfy my interest in the matter if I could be referred to a relevant explanation of the process.

I assume, from what they're saying, is that they mark with some sort of identification marker, so that if they see it again they can 'account' for it, so to speak. I don't know the specifics though.