US Economy grows at fastest rate since 1984!!

[phongn]

That's not exactly an insurmountable technical problem.

No, it isn't, but it remains a method to differentiate them. I have no clue how it works, but it may well be that the decoys have a different composition than the RVs, and thus how they interact with the atmosphere causes a different IR signature.

The person I referenced earlier, Stuart Slade, has been asked more speicifcally about the various ways to filter out decoys. Unfortunately for us, the general public apparently isn't privy to that kind of information.

Then that seems rather to confirm my point.

But if your decoy must be the same size, mass and shape of a normal RV to have a good chance of success, why not just put a real one in? Thus, any smaller decoy would be unworkable; any decoy that could work would be a waste of space.

For a start, redundancy requires a seperate system to handle ABM battle-management, so you've already got an added layer of expense to begin with. And the problem isn't the actual number of rockets as much as the number of MIRVs they can carry.

Actually, much of the battle-management seems to overlap, at least how the US is currently doing things. And as for MIRVs, well, that is why I usually refer to RVs rather than actual missiles being fired.

And that's one of the reasons that concept was abandoned in the first place. And EMP effects are still an issue:

They're going to be an issue, yes, but as I noted, the US system is designed to take enormous EMP loads and should be able to deal with it.

The EMP effects on the satellites in space appeared to be a greater worry than on the ground, hence why we are not deploying a system like Safeguard or Sentinal at the moment. Its effects on the C4I systems don't appear to have been considered that risky.

On that point, I stand corrected. But all they did was subdivide the definition of a countervalue strike, so this really is a bit of a nitpick.

Oh, of course it's a nitpick, but arguably yours was originally as well

[Patrick Degan]

That's not exactly an insurmountable technical problem.

No, it isn't, but it remains a method to differentiate them. I have no clue how it works, but it may well be that the decoys have a different composition than the RVs, and thus how they interact with the atmosphere causes a different IR signature.

The person I referenced earlier, Stuart Slade, has been asked more speicifcally about the various ways to filter out decoys. Unfortunately for us, the general public apparently isn't privy to that kind of information.

Then it seems you have a problem backing your position.

But if your decoy must be the same size, mass and shape of a normal RV to have a good chance of success, why not just put a real one in? Thus, any smaller decoy would be unworkable; any decoy that could work would be a waste of space.

Because decoys aid in forcing the defence to waste its missiles and preserves more actual warheads for the attack.

For a start, redundancy requires a seperate system to handle ABM battle-management, so you've already got an added layer of expense to begin with. And the problem isn't the actual number of rockets as much as the number of MIRVs they can carry.

Actually, much of the battle-management seems to overlap, at least how the US is currently doing things. And as for MIRVs, well, that is why I usually refer to RVs rather than actual missiles being fired.

Not to the extent to where the same network is used for both early-warning and battle-management.

And that's one of the reasons that concept was abandoned in the first place. And EMP effects are still an issue:

They're going to be an issue, yes, but as I noted, the US system is designed to take enormous EMP loads and should be able to deal with it.

I see you didn't even bother with reading the information provided.

The EMP effects on the satellites in space appeared to be a greater worry than on the ground, hence why we are not deploying a system like Safeguard or Sentinal at the moment. Its effects on the C4I systems don't appear to have been considered that risky.

And your basis for this assertion is...?

On that point, I stand corrected. But all they did was subdivide the definition of a countervalue strike, so this really is a bit of a nitpick.

Oh, of course it's a nitpick, but arguably yours was originally as well

Cheap.

[phongn]

I think that's what the ICBMs are for, then.

There are three parts to the US nuclear deterrant. ICBMs are only one part of it. SLBMs are another (and may be reloaded) and bombers make up the third leg of the triad. Bombers, of course, can be sent out on many sorties.

I see you still fail to grasp the point. We're not talking about "flattening every city" and killing everybody; we're talking about taking out enough of the fragile pillars upon which this present society rests to collapse the whole thing.

Ah, I misinterpreted your original post then. However, I still don't quite see the US collapsing completely from the loss of select urban areas. Obviously, the US won't be in good health, but total collapse?

Translation: you don't.

I indeed understand the diference. The YAL-1 is in no way an experimental program, it is entirely intended to deploy. The experimental laser testbeds were working towards the deployable ABL system. Experimental programs would be something like the X-planes.

Putin as yet has no reason to react to an ABM system that does not as yet exist, and no, the Clinton administration was not pursuing anything more than continued experimentation —not deployment.

IIRC, Clinton was seriously considering going to deployment and I fail to see how the accelerated pace of testing in his second term was only experimentation. I saw that as testing towards an operational system.

Because your equation here merits no more refutation than laughter, given how totally out of scale the analogy is to the reality.

Is it really? What makes ballistic missiles and their defense so special in this case that they're somehow exempt from what normally occurs? Did the US and USSR go forth on an unending arms race for bombers and SAMs? After all, bombers going over the pole in either direction most likely would have been carrying nuclear munitions on them.

[phongn]

Then it seems you have a problem backing your position.

Yet I have given at least one example of a way to filter out decoys, yes? Furthermore, those kinds of decoys are unlikely to be fielded by the less sophisticated threats the proposed American system is intended to defeat.

To be a bit more clear: I have not argued for the deployment of a massive NMD designed to defend against, say, Russia. What I have argued is a defense to buy time against accidential launch scenarios and those launched by the so-called rogue states should be implemented.

Because decoys aid in forcing the defence to waste its missiles and preserves more actual warheads for the attack.

But as I stated earlier, at the expense in throw weight. Perhaps more warheads will get through, but you can't hit as many targets, either. IMO, that's a victory for the defense right there. And, as noted earlier, not all of them will be counter-value/industrial/population strikes.

Not to the extent to where the same network is used for both early-warning and battle-management.

I never said the same network is used for EW and ABMBM, but that much of it overlaps.

I see you didn't even bother with reading the information provided.

You mean the articles that noted that unshielded electronics are likely to be fried upon the release of an EMP? I fail to see their relevance relating to the military network.

And your basis for this assertion is...?

Firstly, the assumption that satellites are generally unshielded against EMP, or at the very least, the many commercial satellites we have in orbit.

Secondly, the fact that Safeguard/Sentinal command-guided their ABMs for some distance should be a good indicator of the expectations against EMP issues.

[Patrick Degan]

I think that's what the ICBMs are for, then.

There are three parts to the US nuclear deterrant. ICBMs are only one part of it. SLBMs are another (and may be reloaded) and bombers make up the third leg of the triad. Bombers, of course, can be sent out on many sorties.

This of course assumes a perfect postwar environment.

I see you still fail to grasp the point. We're not talking about "flattening every city" and killing everybody; we're talking about taking out enough of the fragile pillars upon which this present society rests to collapse the whole thing.

Ah, I misinterpreted your original post then. However, I still don't quite see the US collapsing completely from the loss of select urban areas. Obviously, the US won't be in good health, but total collapse?

Quite possible. We'd be talking about asset-losses in the trillions of dollars just for a start, in addition to the sudden population loss in the tens of millions.

I indeed understand the diference. The YAL-1 is in no way an experimental program, it is entirely intended to deploy. The experimental laser testbeds were working towards the deployable ABL system. Experimental programs would be something like the X-planes.

No, a deployable, practical sydtem is one which has actually completed the testing and experimentation phases. Prototypes are not operational weapons.

IIRC, Clinton was seriously considering going to deployment and I fail to see how the accelerated pace of testing in his second term was only experimentation. I saw that as testing towards an operational system.

He was not considering a full-scale ABM system for deployment. At most, what was up for implementation was a theatre defence system and we already had that, sort of, in the form of the Patriot.

Because your equation here merits no more refutation than laughter, given how totally out of scale the analogy is to the reality.

Is it really? What makes ballistic missiles and their defense so special in this case that they're somehow exempt from what normally occurs? Did the US and USSR go forth on an unending arms race for bombers and SAMs? After all, bombers going over the pole in either direction most likely would have been carrying nuclear munitions on them.

The ICBM and SLBM supplanted the bomber in strategic importance. And for your information, we were indeed in an arms race and a hugely expensive one with the Soviets as soon as the Nixon administration announced the MIRV. The only reason that arms race didn't proceed at a geometric scale was because of the ABM Treaty. Now stop making yourself ridiculous.

[phongn]

Arguably, they didn't defeat it at all, they just went around it.

I hate to tell you this, but that was defeating it.

The purpose of the Maginot Line was to defend France against an attack by Germany in a specified direction. In that, it failed to protect France since Germany completely bypassed it.

I understand what your original point was to it, I simply thought it was a bad analogy.

At any rate, I concede this point of the debate; it's not really relevant to the rest of it.

[phongn]

This of course assumes a perfect postwar environment.

Obviously the bombers are going to eventually run out of fuel and bombs if the infrastructure to create them fails. However, there are existing stocks for multiple sorties. I certainly wasn't arguing that Oak Ridge was going to mass produce nukes for long-term bombardment of whoever happens to be nuking us.

Since your target strike has ignored the multitude of airfields able to support the bomber force, they're free to operate as long as they can.

Quite possible. We'd be talking about asset-losses in the trillions of dollars just for a start, in addition to the sudden population loss in the tens of millions.

It could lead to collapse, yes, but OTOH, they may be enough surviving infrastructure in less-hit areas (or areas that were missed because their RVs were shot down) to keep some semblance of the US going while the massive rebuild project goes ahead. What happens if, say, those 500 warheads happen to hit mostly the East Coast (it's a lot of places to hit, even to knock out critical parts)? Much of the US is still intact; despite the depression that will hit the US will likely be down, but not out.

No, a deployable, practical sydtem is one which has actually completed the testing and experimentation phases. Prototypes are not operational weapons.

But they are not merely experimental, either, which is my contention. We are not 'far' from an operational ABL. Your original statement made it seem like the program would go nowhere.

He was not considering a full-scale ABM system for deployment. At most, what was up for implementation was a theatre defence system and we already had that, sort of, in the form of the Patriot.

Are you sure? It looked like he was mulling over a NMD system towards the end of his term; the TMD programs had been in the works for some time already.

The ICBM and SLBM supplanted the bomber in strategic importance.

Supplanted, but did not entirely replace.

And for your information, we were indeed in an arms race and a hugely expensive one with the Soviets as soon as the Nixon administration announced the MIRV. The only reason that arms race didn't proceed at a geometric scale was because of the ABM Treaty. Now stop making yourself ridiculous.

According to the NRDC, US arsenals did not appreciablly move around during the Nixon Administration (staying around 26000-28000 warheads) while the Soviet arsenal drastically increased despite the signing of the ABM Treaty. And wasn't it SALT (of which the ABM Treaty was the first part of, but did not have to be the whole part) what attempted to limit the number of warheads, not the ABM Treaty in and of itself?

[Patrick Degan]

Then it seems you have a problem backing your position.

Yet I have given at least one example of a way to filter out decoys, yes?

A theoretical one, for which a theoretical solution has also been advanced in this discussion.

Furthermore, those kinds of decoys are unlikely to be fielded by the less sophisticated threats the proposed American system is intended to defeat.

Who are unlikely to employ an ICBM attack of any sort and therefore is another strike against the dubious logic behind an ABM system.

To be a bit more clear: I have not argued for the deployment of a massive NMD designed to defend against, say, Russia. What I have argued is a defense to buy time against accidential launch scenarios and those launched by the so-called rogue states should be implemented.

The accidental launch scenario would not involve one or a small handful of missiles —Positive Launch Control very much rules that out. And rogue states will employ methods of attack against which an ABM defence will be useless.

Because decoys aid in forcing the defence to waste its missiles and preserves more actual warheads for the attack.

But as I stated earlier, at the expense in throw weight. Perhaps more warheads will get through, but you can't hit as many targets, either. IMO, that's a victory for the defense right there. And, as noted earlier, not all of them will be counter-value/industrial/population strikes.

Once more for the class: more missiles with more warheads and decoys.

I never said the same network is used for EW and ABMBM, but that much of it overlaps.

Then that's not really answering the question.

I see you didn't even bother with reading the information provided.

You mean the articles that noted that unshielded electronics are likely to be fried upon the release of an EMP? I fail to see their relevance relating to the military network.

The FAS article specifically addresses that issue:


HEMP can pose a serious threat to military systems when even a single high-altitude nuclear explosion occurs. In principle, even a new nuclear proliferator could execute such a strike. In practice, however, it seems unlikely that such a state would use one of its scarce warheads to inflict damage which must be considered secondary to the primary effects of blast, shock, and thermal pulse. Furthermore, a HEMP attack must use a relatively large warhead to be effective (perhaps on the order of one mega-ton), and new proliferators are unlikely to be able to construct such a device, much less make it small enough to be lofted to high altitude by a ballistic missile or space launcher. Finally, in a tactical situation such as was encountered in the Gulf War, an attack by Iraq against Coalition forces would have also been an attack by Iraq against its own communications, radar, missile, and power systems. EMP cannot be confined to only one “side” of the burst.

Source Region Electro-magnetic Pulse [SREMP] is produced by low-altitude nuclear bursts. An effective net vertical electron current is formed by the asymmetric deposition of electrons in the atmosphere and the ground, and the formation and decay of this current emits a pulse of electromagnetic radiation in directions perpendicular to the current. The asymmetry from a low-altitude explosion occurs because some electrons emitted downward are trapped in the upper millimeter of the Earth’s surface while others, moving upward and outward, can travel long distances in the atmosphere, producing ionization and charge separation. A weaker asymmetry can exist for higher altitude explosions due to the density gradient of the atmosphere.


As did the Casual Discussion article:


The military has begun shielding or "hardening" its equipment against EMP. The Department of Defense is now buying fiberoptic cables to replace the old ones for its ground-based communications network. Computers, power, and communications are the basic systems affected by EMP. Old fashioned electronic equipment (high-voltage motors and vacuum tubes) are EMP resistant; however, the types of computer chips in military and civilian telecommunications systems are EMP fragile. No one knows whether the "red alert" network (the president's wartime communications network) will function in a nuclear attack .


Ignoring inconvenient facts does not help your position.

And your basis for this assertion is...?

Firstly, the assumption that satellites are generally unshielded against EMP, or at the very least, the many commercial satellites we have in orbit.

Which doesn't address the issue.

Secondly, the fact that Safeguard/Sentinal command-guided their ABMs for some distance should be a good indicator of the expectations against EMP issues.

Under ideal conditions, not battle conditions. Neither Safeguard nor Sentinel faced any such test.

[MKSheppard]

Exactly what do you think we have? Star Trek sensors which can simply look through anything and determine its composition? What do we have which is more sophisticated than RADAR? And how difficult do you really imagine it would be to build a decoy RV with the same mass and flight characteristics as a genuine warhead?

Oh god, words cannot explain how much I laughed at this, considering
that if you put decoys with the same mass as a warhead onto an ICBM,
thats less MIRVs that can be thrown at us.

[MKSheppard]

On the very first intended interception test of the GBI system:

IFT-3, on 02 October 1999, successfully demonstrated "hit to kill technology" to intercept and destroy the ballistic missile target. The target was simplied to include a single decoy, rather than the multiple decoys used in the two previous fly-by tests. Despite a failure in the star tracker, the inertial measurement unit [IMU] of the interceptor oriented the EKV [built by Boeing], which detected the decoy and based on this detection subsequently detected the target warhead, which was destroyed on impact.

Lol, it was capable of discriminating between the real thing and the decoy.

[Patrick Degan]

This of course assumes a perfect postwar environment.

Obviously the bombers are going to eventually run out of fuel and bombs if the infrastructure to create them fails. However, there are existing stocks for multiple sorties. I certainly wasn't arguing that Oak Ridge was going to mass produce nukes for long-term bombardment of whoever happens to be nuking us.

Since your target strike has ignored the multitude of airfields able to support the bomber force, they're free to operate as long as they can.

And when did I say that? I said no enemy would waste warheads on empty silos.

Quite possible. We'd be talking about asset-losses in the trillions of dollars just for a start, in addition to the sudden population loss in the tens of millions.

It could lead to collapse, yes, but OTOH, they may be enough surviving infrastructure in less-hit areas (or areas that were missed because their RVs were shot down) to keep some semblance of the US going while the massive rebuild project goes ahead. What happens if, say, those 500 warheads happen to hit mostly the East Coast (it's a lot of places to hit, even to knock out critical parts)? Much of the US is still intact; despite the depression that will hit the US will likely be down, but not out.

My, my, but we are Leaping that Logic, aren't we? The infrastructure in less-hit areas won't be sufficent to support a system with huge gaps blasted out of it. You seem to think a nuclear war won't be any worse than the 1929 stock market crash.

But they are not merely experimental, either, which is my contention. We are not 'far' from an operational ABL. Your original statement made it seem like the program would go nowhere.

Because I've seen too many of these experimental projects go nowhere; projects that went right up to the prototype stage. And until the thing actually tests out, we are no closer to a practical weapon.

Are you sure? It looked like he was mulling over a NMD system towards the end of his term; the TMD programs had been in the works for some time already.

"Mulling over" and commiting to actual construction and deployment are two entirely different things.

According to the NRDC, US arsenals did not appreciablly move around during the Nixon Administration (staying around 26000-28000 warheads) while the Soviet arsenal drastically increased despite the signing of the ABM Treaty. And wasn't it SALT (of which the ABM Treaty was the first part of, but did not have to be the whole part) what attempted to limit the number of warheads, not the ABM Treaty in and of itself?

Same site, different page comparing strategic warhead levels —which was the direct subject of the superpower arms race.

And this:



charts buildup in ICBM launchers in that period.

[Patrick Degan]

Exactly what do you think we have? Star Trek sensors which can simply look through anything and determine its composition? What do we have which is more sophisticated than RADAR? And how difficult do you really imagine it would be to build a decoy RV with the same mass and flight characteristics as a genuine warhead?

Oh god, words cannot explain how much I laughed at this, considering that if you put decoys with the same mass as a warhead onto an ICBM, thats less MIRVs that can be thrown at us.

Once more for the class: more missiles with more warheads and decoys.

[phongn]

A theoretical one, for which a theoretical solution has also been advanced in this discussion.

I actually had come to understand that IR recognition was an actual method.

Who are unlikely to employ an ICBM attack of any sort and therefore is another strike against the dubious logic behind an ABM system.

They may force the "access denial" scenario irregardless of if they launch or not; ABM allows us the luxury of not being forced to deal with such a demand.

The accidental launch scenario would not involve one or a small handful of missiles —Positive Launch Control very much rules that out. And rogue states will employ methods of attack against which an ABM defence will be useless.

PLC also implies an expensive, sophisticated C4I network that may not be in place in some nations (India, Pakistan). Accidential launch also refers to misidentification.

An alternative means of attack, such as an attempt to smuggle a warhead in, is also less likely to succeed than an attempted ICBM attack via an ABM-less US.

Once more for the class: more missiles with more warheads and decoys.

More missiles + more decoys = more money. Furthermore, the US is more readily able to absorb the extra costs of an ABM shield than other countries may absorb the extra costs of fielding more missiles.

Then that's not really answering the question.

You argued that we needed a totally separate system for EW and BM. I then said that the US was having as much overlap as possible (various upgrades) and then procuring the rest as needed.

The military has begun shielding or "hardening" its equipment against EMP.

"Begin?" They've been doing it for decades. Furthermore, while the article asserts that the existing C4I network is vulnerable to EMP, it doesn't actually say why, other than that transistors are more vulnerable than vacuum tubes. Of course, they've never been tested (and hopefully will never be tried) in an actual situation, but if it is spec'ed to load n, isn't that enough?

Under ideal conditions, not battle conditions. Neither Safeguard nor Sentinel faced any such test.

Ideal? Are you arguing that the planners for the system had not anticipated that massive EMP loads in the event of nuclear war and only hoped for "ideal" situations where they could fire missiles at their leisure to minimize EMP effects on their radars and C4I?

[MKSheppard]

http://www.paineless.id.au/missiles/NikeZeus.html

19 July 1962
Intercepted an Atlas D RV. Zeus launched from Kwajalein, Atlas from Vandenberg. Passed within 2km of RV.

22 December 1962
Nike Zeus intercepted an RV and passed within 22 metres.

End 1963
A total of 13 RVs had technically been destroyed. Number of launches is unknown.

That was in the 1960s, with the much less advanced technology
we have today; course a 400kt warhead means you only
have to be close

http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/syste ... -specs.htm

$70 million cost for the Peacekeeper ICBM, in 1986.

http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul1998 ... 98-98.html

The Department of Defense announced today the selection of booster rocket motors for the National Missile Defense (NMD) Ground-based Interceptor (GBI). Jacques Gansler, under secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology and the Defense Acquisition Executive, selected a booster configuration that incorporates commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) stages. The other booster considered included stages of the Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).

The COTS booster will be assembled by the Boeing Corp., the lead system integrator contractor for the NMD program. Alliant Tech Systems, Magna, Utah, and United Technologies Chemical Systems Division, San Jose, Calif., are the subcontractors for the booster stages and motors. The complete booster stack is estimated to cost $3 million each. The basic contract will acquire five booster stacks for test flights, plus additional static and ground test assets.

$70 million for the ICBM, plus a shitload more for the decoys AND the
nukes, versus at best $5 million for a GBI missile.

[MKSheppard]

Once more for the class: more missiles with more warheads and decoys.

Except a Peackeeper costs 70 million and GBI only costs $3 million for the
booster.

[Patrick Degan]

On the very first intended interception test of the GBI system:

IFT-3, on 02 October 1999, successfully demonstrated "hit to kill technology" to intercept and destroy the ballistic missile target. The target was simplied to include a single decoy, rather than the multiple decoys used in the two previous fly-by tests. Despite a failure in the star tracker, the inertial measurement unit [IMU] of the interceptor oriented the EKV [built by Boeing], which detected the decoy and based on this detection subsequently detected the target warhead, which was destroyed on impact.

Lol, it was capable of discriminating between the real thing and the decoy.

Yes, hopefully our enemies will be nice enough to inform us in advance of the war how many missiles will be launched, from where they'll be launched, their exact flight-paths, the profiles of the decoys, and will provide GPS transponders on board each missile to help us locate them.

[Patrick Degan]

Once more for the class: more missiles with more warheads and decoys.

Except a Peackeeper costs 70 million and GBI only costs $3 million for the
booster.

Except the GBI is only the least expensive part of the system.

[MKSheppard]

Except the GBI is only the least expensive part of the system.

Except everything else in GBI system is reusable, the interceptor
is cheep and can be expended in mass attacks to eliminate ICBMs through
look-shoot-shoot-look

[MKSheppard]

Yes, hopefully our enemies will be nice enough to inform us in advance of the war how many missiles will be launched, from where they'll be launched, their exact flight-paths, the profiles of the decoys, and will provide GPS transponders on board each missile to help us locate them.

Yes, hopefully our enemies will be nice enough to cover their main battle
tanks in heater griddles so that our IR missiles can find them.

*points to anyone who can tell wherre this reference is from*

[phongn]

And when did I say that? I said no enemy would waste warheads on empty silos.

It looked like you had also said that the airfields would be knocked out. However, doesn't this help my argument? There are a lot of airbases that are capable of staging bombers from (along with perhaps a pre-war dispersal of munitions, since its unlikely these hostilities would come straight out of the blue), diluting the "500 RV" strike. The infrastructure looks like it won't be hit so hard now.

My, my, but we are Leaping that Logic, aren't we? The infrastructure in less-hit areas won't be sufficent to support a system with huge gaps blasted out of it. You seem to think a nuclear war won't be any worse than the 1929 stock market crash.

And where did I say that? I only said we'd be knocked into a rather severe depression; I didn't say that it'd only match the 1929 crash. Furthermore, it also depends on what gets hit. Target distribution is important, if it's all spread around on critical targets then we're in deep trouble, if it's concentrated due to the way the warheads were intercepted we're better off.

Because I've seen too many of these experimental projects go nowhere; projects that went right up to the prototype stage. And until the thing actually tests out, we are no closer to a practical weapon.

Then are we at an impasse? You argue that based on past history, too many of these types of projects fail, utterly, while I see based on past airborne laser research that it looks like we're going to have a succesful product. I'll eat crow in 2004 if the test fails.

"Mulling over" and commiting to actual construction and deployment are two entirely different things.

I never said that Clitnon was comitting to actual deployment, did I? Only that he seemed to be seriously considering it/mulling it over towards the end of his term.

Same site, different page comparing strategic warhead levels —which was the direct subject of the superpower arms race.

Ah, how strategic warhead levels increased even after the ABM Treaty was signed until the end of the Cold War?

charts buildup in ICBM launchers in that period.

Soviet force increases continued until well after the ABM Treaty was signed, no? Isn't that as I said earlier?

[Patrick Degan]

Who are unlikely to employ an ICBM attack of any sort and therefore is another strike against the dubious logic behind an ABM system.

They may force the "access denial" scenario irregardless of if they launch or not; ABM allows us the luxury of not being forced to deal with such a demand.

In a word, bullshit. A poor rogue state which doesn't have an ICBM force to begin with will not even bother with that method of attack, and a serious enemy will simply work on an arsenal large enough to swamp the system as well as methods for attacking the vulnerabilities.

The accidental launch scenario would not involve one or a small handful of missiles —Positive Launch Control very much rules that out. And rogue states will employ methods of attack against which an ABM defence will be useless.

PLC also implies an expensive, sophisticated C4I network that may not be in place in some nations (India, Pakistan). Accidential launch also refers to misidentification.

PLC at a 1950s level is sufficent for nations such as India or Pakistan, who in any case are far more a threat to each other than us. And if Russia let loose an accidental launch on misidentification, it would involve far more missiles than a mere handful.

An alternative means of attack, such as an attempt to smuggle a warhead in, is also less likely to succeed than an attempted ICBM attack via an ABM-less US.

In point of fact, it is more likely to succeed, and the point still stands: it is a method of attack against which an ABM system would be useless.

More missiles + more decoys = more money. Furthermore, the US is more readily able to absorb the extra costs of an ABM shield than other countries may absorb the extra costs of fielding more missiles.

And this Leap of Faith is based on...?

You argued that we needed a totally separate system for EW and BM. I then said that the US was having as much overlap as possible (various upgrades) and then procuring the rest as needed.

It's the "rest as needed" which is going to be the financial and technical bitch.

The military has begun shielding or "hardening" its equipment against EMP.

"Begin?" They've been doing it for decades.

Apparently not.

Furthermore, while the article asserts that the existing C4I network is vulnerable to EMP, it doesn't actually say why, other than that transistors are more vulnerable than vacuum tubes. Of course, they've never been tested (and hopefully will never be tried) in an actual situation, but if it is spec'ed to load n, isn't that enough?

No, actually. Without actual performance data, the uncertainty remains, no matter what the specs may say.

Under ideal conditions, not battle conditions. Neither Safeguard nor Sentinel faced any such test.

Ideal? Are you arguing that the planners for the system had not anticipated that massive EMP loads in the event of nuclear war and only hoped for "ideal" situations where they could fire missiles at their leisure to minimize EMP effects on their radars and C4I?

Take a look, mate; the present ABM tests are being conducted under wholly artificial experimental conditions and the present administration is proposing to begin deployment on a system which will have very little experimental verification behind it. The thinking is clearly not geared toward what would actually be faced in a warfighting environment.

[Patrick Degan]

And when did I say that? I said no enemy would waste warheads on empty silos.

It looked like you had also said that the airfields would be knocked out. However, doesn't this help my argument? There are a lot of airbases that are capable of staging bombers from (along with perhaps a pre-war dispersal of munitions, since its unlikely these hostilities would come straight out of the blue), diluting the "500 RV" strike. The infrastructure looks like it won't be hit so hard now.

Ever changing the goalposts, aren't you?

My, my, but we are Leaping that Logic, aren't we? The infrastructure in less-hit areas won't be sufficent to support a system with huge gaps blasted out of it. You seem to think a nuclear war won't be any worse than the 1929 stock market crash.

And where did I say that? I only said we'd be knocked into a rather severe depression; I didn't say that it'd only match the 1929 crash.

The tenor of your statement, for a start. You seriously imagine a depression is comparable to a nuclear strike?!

Furthermore, it also depends on what gets hit. Target distribution is important, if it's all spread around on critical targets then we're in deep trouble, if it's concentrated due to the way the warheads were intercepted we're better off.

For which you have nothing beyond "wishful thinking" as a support.

Because I've seen too many of these experimental projects go nowhere; projects that went right up to the prototype stage. And until the thing actually tests out, we are no closer to a practical weapon.

Then are we at an impasse? You argue that based on past history, too many of these types of projects fail, utterly, while I see based on past airborne laser research that it looks like we're going to have a succesful product. I'll eat crow in 2004 if the test fails.

Past history is actually a very good gauge on which to base hypothetical models of the future.

"Mulling over" and commiting to actual construction and deployment are two entirely different things.

I never said that Clitnon was comitting to actual deployment, did I? Only that he seemed to be seriously considering it/mulling it over towards the end of his term.

A difference which makes no difference and therefore meaningless.

Same site, different page comparing strategic warhead levels —which was the direct subject of the superpower arms race.

Ah, how strategic warhead levels increased even after the ABM Treaty was signed until the end of the Cold War?

No, how they increased from the advent of MIRV to the onset of START.

charts buildup in ICBM launchers in that period.

Soviet force increases continued until well after the ABM Treaty was signed, no? Isn't that as I said earlier?

That was not the FUCKING POINT —the point was that the one reason why strategic force levels did not increase at a far greater pace was because of foregoing an ABM race alongside the arms race.

[Patrick Degan]

Except the GBI is only the least expensive part of the system.

Except everything else in GBI system is reusable, the interceptor
is cheep and can be expended in mass attacks to eliminate ICBMs through
look-shoot-shoot-look

Which is why the idea would be to swamp the system.

[Vympel]

Decoys don't work, the probules involved with separating them from the real warheads where solved decades ago.

When? Where? With what? They certainly haven't tested the interceptors against them in any sort of remotely realistic environment.

Of course most decoys don't work period. They're a video floating around of an ICBM attempting to deploy inflatable decoys, which all of which got stuck on the warhead.

Slothful generalization.

All of which will cost far more then building more interceptors.

An interceptor designed to hit a warhead falling from space dead-on will cost far more than a warhead aboard an ICBM, I guarantee you.

[MKSheppard]

Which is why the idea would be to swamp the system.

Funny that, we've been able to deal with mass attacks since we
introduced Phased Array Radars in the 1970s with PAVE PAWS