On the Enola Gay debate

Post by **Vympel** » 2003-12-22 04:08am

An interesting piece, from back when the debate on the exhibit started waaaaaaaaaaaaaayyyy back in 94ish

Glocksman · Post by **Glocksman** » 2003-12-22 11:24am

But there are many indications that an invasion would never have been necessary--that U.S. officials knew that Japan was on the verge of surrendering. (See Gar Alperovitz, Washington Post op-ed, 10/16/94.)

I read Alperovitz's book years ago and I thought he was full of shit then and I still think he's full of shit today.

"The use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan," declared Adm. William Leahy, who presided over the Joint Chiefs of Staff (I Was There, p. 441).

Leahy isn't exactly an expert on atomic weapons. He once said that "That is the biggest fool thing we have ever done. The bomb will never go off, and I speak as an expert in explosives".

He disapproved of the A-bombing because he favored dropping the unconditional surrender policy.

It's kind of funny that his concern about civilian casualties didn't extend to those killed in the fire raids.

Much higher numbers were later put forward by officials involved with the bombing decision, but without documentary evidence; these numbers are hardly credible, since the planned U.S. invasion force was only scheduled to include some 190,000 combat troops (New York Times, 1/31/95).

Heh. The New York Times.
Did Jayson Blair write the article?

Noted Historian D.M Giangreco put the size of the invasion force at 2.5 million.

Source.

Here's a prize winning article where Giangreco discusses casualty estimates.

CASUALTY PROJECTIONS FOR THE U.S. INVASIONS OF JAPAN, 1945-1946: PLANNING AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

What can be stated as fact, is that the estimate that American casualties could surpass the million mark was set in the summer of 1944 and was never changed. In the spring of 1945 various planners and senior officers quibbled over the estimate, or facets of it relating to specific operations, but the statistical possibility of a million casualties, combined with the <page 581> experience of combat attrition of line infantry units in both Europe and the Pacific, had already prompted the Army and War Department manpower policy for 1945, and thus, the pace for the big jump in Selective Service inductions and expansion of the training base in the U.S. even as the war in Europe was winding down. Japan had lost its navy, and its cities were being essentially destroyed by U.S. airpower, but this was largely irrelevant to their ability to inflict casualties on American forces with the aim of forcing the U.S. into a negotiated peace.

Researchers look at the forest of documents created over fifty years ago and almost immediately become lost during their hunt for extreme comments and inconsistencies. The fundamental truth, however, was that the Army and War Department manpower policy of 1945--- in all its aspects--- was established in such a way that the Army could sustain an average of 100,000 casualties per month from November 1945 through the fall of 1946 and still retain relatively fully manned and combat-effective units through its use of new Selective Service inductees and reassigned soldiers from demobilized units. That casualties would be massive was so basic an understanding, that it was functionally a "self-evident truth" held by decision makers at virtually all levels. Little or no paper discussion was required or conducted within the Army, and events beyond its purview rendered an invasion unnecessary.

The Army, as an institution, believed its soldiers would suffer extreme losses during an invasion of Japan, and all its actions in 1945 were based on that assumption. When Specialist Martin J. Begosh of the 1st Armored Division was wounded by a land mine in Bosnia on 29 December 1995, he, like every soldier, airman, sailor, and Marine wounded in Korea, Vietnam, and the Persian Gulf War, received a Purple Heart for valor, a medal minted in preparation for the invasion of Japan in 1945.

Sometimes FAIR gets it right, other times they're full of shit.

In this instance, they've packed 50 pounds of bovine excrement into a 40 pound sack.

Stravo · Post by **Stravo** » 2003-12-22 11:41am

WHY is this its own thread and not in the main debate thread?

HemlockGrey · Post by **HemlockGrey** » 2003-12-22 12:35pm

I think the main debate thread died. I don't actually think my points were ever refuted...

Bob McDob · Post by **Bob McDob** » 2003-12-22 06:51pm

The first bomb was probably inevitable, seeing how it led to the Soviet Union entering the war against Japan, and right up until then the Soviets had been Japan's best hope for ending the war short of unconditional surrender. If Truman had waited only one more day, though, before dropping the bomb on Nagasaki, it's possible Japan may have decided to capitulate in the meeting started only half an hour before.

It would have been an easier choice for them if they had received assurance in Potsdam that the Emperor would be allowed to remain on the throne. Of course, back then we really didn't know how cuplable he was - I guess we still don't.

Post by **Vympel** » 2003-12-23 02:43am

WHY is this its own thread and not in the main debate thread?

Because I haven't mastered necromancy.

As it is, FAIR uses the media's own articles, so anything they did wrong is based on the mistakes of others. A 190,000 strong invasion force for Japan sounds ridiculous, of course.

Col. Crackpot · Post by **Col. Crackpot** » 2003-12-23 09:48am

Vympel wrote:
WHY is this its own thread and not in the main debate thread?
Because I haven't mastered necromancy.

As it is, FAIR uses the media's own articles, so anything they did wrong is based on the mistakes of others. A 190,000 strong invasion force for Japan sounds ridiculous, of course.

190,000 troops couldn't hold New South Wales, never mind the entire country of Japan. As for the Emperor my impression from reading Hiroshima was that the Japanese viewed him as almost godlike. When he adressed Japan and said 'the war is over' his 'wisdom' wasn;t even questioned....by the people anyway. The impression i took away from that was that if Hirohito told the average person to throw himself at invaders, then millions would have.

HemlockGrey · Post by **HemlockGrey** » 2003-12-23 04:15pm

If Truman had waited only one more day, though, before dropping the bomb on Nagasaki, it's possible Japan may have decided to capitulate in the meeting started only half an hour before.

Extremely doubtful, considering that the debate over surrender continued to rage even after Nagasaki.

It would have been an easier choice for them if they had received assurance in Potsdam that the Emperor would be allowed to remain on the throne. Of course, back then we really didn't know how cuplable he was - I guess we still don't.

The Japanese idea of an acceptable peace did not merely include allowing the Empire to remain on the throne. It also stipulated such outrageous provisions like self-supervised disarmament and no occupation.

Joe · Post by **Joe** » 2003-12-23 04:25pm

Col. Crackpot wrote:
Vympel wrote:
WHY is this its own thread and not in the main debate thread?
Because I haven't mastered necromancy.

As it is, FAIR uses the media's own articles, so anything they did wrong is based on the mistakes of others. A 190,000 strong invasion force for Japan sounds ridiculous, of course.
190,000 troops couldn't hold New South Wales, never mind the entire country of Japan. As for the Emperor my impression from reading Hiroshima was that the Japanese viewed him as almost godlike. When he adressed Japan and said 'the war is over' his 'wisdom' wasn;t even questioned....by the people anyway. The impression i took away from that was that if Hirohito told the average person to throw himself at invaders, then millions would have.

He was considered a living God; he was infallible.

Post by **Darth Wong** » 2003-12-23 04:36pm

HemlockGrey wrote:
If Truman had waited only one more day, though, before dropping the bomb on Nagasaki, it's possible Japan may have decided to capitulate in the meeting started only half an hour before.
Extremely doubtful, considering that the debate over surrender continued to rage even after Nagasaki.

Ah, so a failure to achieve complete unanimity must mean that they would never have surrendered without the second bombing, eh? Interesting "logic".

The Japanese idea of an acceptable peace did not merely include allowing the Empire to remain on the throne. It also stipulated such outrageous provisions like self-supervised disarmament and no occupation.

Egads, they proposed unrealistic demands! No one has ever done that before! It must mean they were insane and would never have capitulated to the nuclear threat unless they were hit twice in quick succession!

Oh wait, that smells an awful lot like a non sequitur, doesn't it? I made this point the last time, and you simply ignored it by repeating the aforementioned facts (and the accompanying non sequiturs) as if you thought no one noticed them the first time.

Post by **Sea Skimmer** » 2003-12-23 04:47pm

The whole thing is mostly bullshit. Olympic was to use over 250,000 ground troops, Coronet more then twice that. The absolute lowest estimates for US losses where 80,000 dead out of a total 370,000 casualties, an increase in American losses for the whole war by more then a quarter. The thing is, that figure was based of several very flawed assumptions. The first was that combat would be identical to that in the Philippines (pretty dammed absurd) and the second was that Japan had no more then around 200,000 troops on Kyushu. In fact that had nearly 400,000, and there own planning expected to bring in as many as 200,000 more should the situation look favorable to there expenditure. There where also major discrepancies in the estimated Japanese strength on Honshu, though not by such wide margins. Overall more then 25% of the entire Japanese population was in the military or local militias, though not all had guns or where being counted. Peasants with spears wouldn't have been too big an issue. As the true level of Japanese strength, and there possession of far more heavy weapons then ever before encountered, became apparent US figures where revised and did creep up to around 225,000 dead. Post war information does support total casualties, though not dead, getting near the one million mark and the invasion might well have to be halted. Though that was all pretty unlikely, far more likely was that an invasion would simply not be launched, the US Army would be largely demobilized and a lift-exterminating blockade conducted.

HemlockGrey · Post by **HemlockGrey** » 2003-12-23 05:47pm

Ah, so a failure to achieve complete unanimity must mean that they would never have surrendered without the second bombing, eh? Interesting "logic".

The chief council of Japan was split three-three after the bombing of Nagasaki. It required the Emperor's direct intervention to bring about the surrender; however, before Nagasaki but after Hiroshima, when the high command continued to insist on fighting on, he raised no objection. There is precisely zero evidence to suggest that the council would ever have surrendered after just Hiroshima.

Egads, they proposed unrealistic demands! No one has ever done that before! It must mean they were insane and would never have capitulated to the nuclear threat unless they were hit twice in quick succession!

We went over this before. Anami killed himself rather than submit to unconditional surrender. The council did not even consider unconditional surrender after Hiroshima and almost did not surrender Nagasaki. This alone provides a compelling reason to believe that without the use of atomic bombs on large targets they never would have surrendered.

I'll ask you this: Do you have any evidence, any at all, suggesting that the Japanese were prepared to surrender after Hiroshima, or that they would have done so given time? Any at all? Or is your entire argument predicated on "Well, anything's possible?"

Bob McDob · Post by **Bob McDob** » 2003-12-23 07:45pm

HemlockGrey wrote:The chief council of Japan was split three-three after the bombing of Nagasaki. It required the Emperor's direct intervention to bring about the surrender; however, before Nagasaki but after Hiroshima, when the high command continued to insist on fighting on, he raised no objection. There is precisely zero evidence to suggest that the council would ever have surrendered after just Hiroshima.

That was because, like I said, they were still hoping against all hope that the Soviets would grant them more acceptable terms.

We went over this before. Anami killed himself rather than submit to unconditional surrender.

That's not quite accurate according to what I've read - Anami was quite willing in the end to accept the same surrender as the rest of the council, and his seppuku was part of his quixotic sense of honor - his 'Jesus complex' that by killing himself he could redeem his people from the horrors of the war, and simultaniously inspire them to live on and rebuild Japan. That by dying with honor he could compensate for the 'dishonorable' surrender (and there were many, many Japanese who initially refused to accept the Emperor's decision - witness the attempted coup d'tat of the morning of August 15, or Atsuki AFB). Not that he would have surrendered if he had a choice, of course, and he couldn't bear to hear the Emperor's announcement.

Bob McDob · Post by **Bob McDob** » 2003-12-23 07:47pm

He was considered a living God; he was infallible.

The Emperor himsel;f was incorruptable - but his decisions were; if the military officers faced a decision they didn't like, they blamed it on his "corrupt" advisors and revolted.

The Emperor, like most incorruptible figures, wasn't exactly incorruptible.

HemlockGrey · Post by **HemlockGrey** » 2003-12-23 07:48pm

That's not quite accurate according to what I've read - Anami was quite willing in the end to accept the same surrender as the rest of the council, and his seppuku was part of his quixotic sense of honor - his 'Jesus complex' that by killing himself he could redeem his people from the horrors of the war, and simultaniously inspire them to live on and rebuild Japan. That by dying with honor he could compensate for the 'dishonorable' surrender (and there were many, many Japanese who initially refused to accept the Emperor's decision - witness the attempted coup d'tat of the morning of August 15, or Atsuki AFB). Not that he would have surrendered if he had a choice, of course, and he couldn't bear to hear the Emperor's announcement.

Of course, regardless of the interpretation, it still comes down to the fact that he would never have voted to surender.

Incidentally, Downfall includes several accounts of Hiroshima survivors who were actually angered to hear of the surrender, if that counts for anything (which it, likely, does not).

Post by **Darth Wong** » 2003-12-23 08:02pm

HemlockGrey wrote:The chief council of Japan was split three-three after the bombing of Nagasaki. It required the Emperor's direct intervention to bring about the surrender; however, before Nagasaki but after Hiroshima, when the high command continued to insist on fighting on, he raised no objection.

No objection yet. The rapidity of Nagasaki merely accelerated the process; it did not actually change any of the strategic information available to anyone in the inner circle.

Illuminatus Primus · Post by **Illuminatus Primus** » 2003-12-23 08:15pm

Darth Wong wrote:
HemlockGrey wrote:The chief council of Japan was split three-three after the bombing of Nagasaki. It required the Emperor's direct intervention to bring about the surrender; however, before Nagasaki but after Hiroshima, when the high command continued to insist on fighting on, he raised no objection.
No objection yet. The rapidity of Nagasaki merely accelerated the process; it did not actually change any of the strategic information available to anyone in the inner circle.

Sure it did. Our procurement and deployment abilities with the new weapons.

acesand8s · Post by **acesand8s** » 2003-12-23 08:17pm

Bob MacDob wrote:The first bomb was probably inevitable, seeing how it led to the Soviet Union entering the war against Japan, and right up until then the Soviets had been Japan's best hope for ending the war short of unconditional surrender. If Truman had waited only one more day, though, before dropping the bomb on Nagasaki, it's possible Japan may have decided to capitulate in the meeting started only half an hour before.

IIRC, there was supposed to be a longer wait between the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings. The Air Force, however, forecasted a period of poor weather (as it was, bad weather nearly made the Nagasaki drop impossible). The decision was made to drop before the new weather set in, rather than wait until after.

Bob McDob · Post by **Bob McDob** » 2003-12-24 12:39am

HemlockGrey wrote:Of course, regardless of the interpretation, it still comes down to the fact that he would never have voted to surender.

Actually, he did, in the sense that he was willing to go along with the surrender faction of the government. Anami could easily have resigned from the cabinet, which would have effectively dissolved the governmental entity and doomed the Japanese to fight on until death - the fact he did not clearly implies he was willing to go along with it for the future of Japan, whatever he thought of it personally. And he did believe there would be a future - he successfully persuaded his subordinates to avoid following him to the grave because he believed they were the future of the nation, while Anami himself was not.

Darth Wong wrote: No objection yet. The rapidity of Nagasaki merely accelerated the process; it did not actually change any of the strategic information available to anyone in the inner circle.

I still believe that Nagasaki, at least, could have been avoided if the Japanese had been given only one more day to deliberate. Their options were cut off to solely surrender and annihilation, and they knew they'd get better terms from the US than the Soviets by then. It was as much the knowledge that there were more in the way of Hiroshima as the individual destructive power of the bomb (and, probably, the rumor that the next bomb was destined for the ruins of Tokyo and the Imperial Palace).

RedImperator · Post by **RedImperator** » 2003-12-24 01:15am

If I recall correctly, years later General Marshall said he thought after the fact that it was a mistake to drop the Nagasaki bomb so quickly after Hiroshima. He believed that we'd underestimated how badly damaged communications was in Japan, and of course no information at all was coming out of the center of Hiroshima for several days. He said he believed the Japanese might have surrendered if they'd been given more time to assess what had happened at Hiroshima, and even if they didn't, the US would have only lost a few days. I wish I hadn't thrown out all my notes from military history now, because included among them was, I believe, a transcript of this interview. Hemlock, ask your dad about this--it was his class where I heard it.

Stormbringer · Post by **Stormbringer** » 2003-12-24 04:01am

Darth Wong wrote:
HemlockGrey wrote:The chief council of Japan was split three-three after the bombing of Nagasaki. It required the Emperor's direct intervention to bring about the surrender; however, before Nagasaki but after Hiroshima, when the high command continued to insist on fighting on, he raised no objection.
No objection yet. The rapidity of Nagasaki merely accelerated the process; it did not actually change any of the strategic information available to anyone in the inner circle.

Actually, we were putting Japanese cities to the torch with fire raids long before Hiroshima, and with results that were comprable if not greater than Hiroshima and Nagasaki, so the strategic equation was already plainly obvious. The only thing that was changed by the A-Bombs was the price the Japanese could hope to exact in defeat.

RedImperator wrote:He said he believed the Japanese might have surrendered if they'd been given more time to assess what had happened at Hiroshima, and even if they didn't, the US would have only lost a few days.

It's possible and it's also possible that giving them time would have allowed the hardliners to mount a coup and drag the war on. It was certainly a fluid enough situation.

The most profound effect of the A-bombs was the phsycological value and the raids were designed to get the most out of it. The US commanders at the time did the absolute best they knew how to do given the limitations of what they knew. We have a little more luxury in hindsight.

CaptainChewbacca · Post by **CaptainChewbacca** » 2003-12-24 04:23am

Correct me if I'm wrong, but Anami did sign the surrender order, didn't he? He may not have wanted it, but he didn't get what he wanted.

I think the most chilling thing about a possible invasion is that Olympic and Coronet were to be augmented by using atomic weapons to clear military formations and to wipe out fortifications in preparation of an advancing allied force.

What would the casualties be to a 40,000 man force rolling through ground zero of an Hiroshima-sized bomb a day after it hit? Would 60% get lethal exposure in an open flat-bed? 40%? I think that would cause a lot of after-conflict casualties.

Bob McDob · Post by **Bob McDob** » 2003-12-24 05:04am

CaptainChewbacca wrote:Correct me if I'm wrong, but Anami did sign the surrender order, didn't he? He may not have wanted it, but he didn't get what he wanted.

Not only that, he personally announced it to the Ministry of War and fought to make the phrasing of the surrender rescript more acceptable. To him, loyalty to the Emperor outweighed any personal feelings he may have felt on the matter.

"When the Emperor made his decision of Friday to accept the enemy proclamation, provided the structure of the country [i.e., the preservation of the Emperor and the crown] was guarenteed, no one could say what the future held, or whether Japan was to surrender or continue fighting. Our decision was dependent on the enemy's decision. I ordered you, therefore, to await developments and to be prepared for either eventuality.

"However, the situation is now clear and definate. Three hours ago the Emperor commanded that Japan accept the Emperor's terms. The Army will obey the Emperor's command. He offered to come here and speak to you himself. I replied to him that that would not be necessary.

"The Army, I said, will, like the rest of the country, obey the Emperor's command. That is Japan's only hope of salvation. The Emperor is convinced that our national polity will be preserved, and he has expressed that convicion to the Field Marshals. Accordingly, the three leaders of the Army and the Marshals swore, a few minutes ago in this building, to follow the Emperor's lead. No officer in the Imperial Army will disobey the Emperor's command. No officer in the Army will presume to know, better than the Emperor and the government of the country, what is best for the country.

"Conditions today are, I agree, extraordinary, but that does not alter the fact that one of a soldier's chief virtues is obedience. The future of Japan is no longer in doubt. You officers must realize that death cannot absolve you of your duty. Your duty is to stay alive and to do your best to help your country along the path to recovery - even if it means chewing grass and eating earth and sleeping in the fields".

- General Anami Korechika, to the Ministry of War, 14 August, 1945

Post by **Sea Skimmer** » 2003-12-24 05:11am

CaptainChewbacca wrote:Correct me if I'm wrong, but Anami did sign the surrender order, didn't he? He may not have wanted it, but he didn't get what he wanted.

I think the most chilling thing about a possible invasion is that Olympic and Coronet were to be augmented by using atomic weapons to clear military formations and to wipe out fortifications in preparation of an advancing allied force.

What would the casualties be to a 40,000 man force rolling through ground zero of an Hiroshima-sized bomb a day after it hit? Would 60% get lethal exposure in an open flat-bed? 40%? I think that would cause a lot of after-conflict casualties.

Even if the bomb were groundbursted its unlikely any troops would receive an outright lethal dosage, though later life cancer rates would skyrocket. The effect of an airburst would be greatly reduced.

But really I don't think things would be all that bad, espically compared to the conventional and chemical bloodbath. While the effect of radioactivity weren't fully understood, we did know that there would be major dangers from it, and steps would have been taken to keep troops away from the worst of it. Anyway, overall the nukes wouldn't have worked very well. Coronet had nine beaches, and while some where of secondary important certainly no beach would get more then two nukes. A 15-20 kiloton bomb will only defeat heavy fortifications with a direct hit and groundburst, and field fortifications will be highly resistant as well.

Still, everything helps. The level of firepower needed for the preinvasion bombardments was simply immense, perhaps not on the level of the greatest barrages of 1917 and 18 but absurdly huge considering that it was to be delivered mainly by warships and heavy bombers, though the USAAF was also intending to use tens of thousands of Loon missiles (an improved V-1 copy) to help pound the beeches.