Implications of a 4-Star Command in Iraq

[MKSheppard]

Found this, very interesting:

Implications of a 4 star command

The Defense Department floated an interesting idea on Jan. 6. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said that the Pentagon was considering putting a four-star general in charge of Iraq to facilitate the transition to Iraqi rule and to remain in command of U.S. forces in Iraq after the transition.

To understand the magnitude of this idea, it is necessary to understand the senior command structure of the U.S. military. Each area of the world has a four-star general or admiral in command. In addition, there are several functional commands, like the Transport Command. The Transport Command also has four-star generals in charge, who used to be called Commanders in Chief or CINCs, until Donald Rumsfeld changed the name to something we can never remember. We still call them CINCs.

Iraq falls under the command of Central Command, and CENTCOM's CINC is Gen. John Abizaid. U.S. ground forces in Iraq are under the command of a three-star general, Ricardo Sanchez, who reports to Abizaid. Under this proposal, Iraq would be carved out of Abizaid's domain. With a four-star in command, Iraq would become in essence its own regional command, effectively ranking with Pacific Command or Southern Command. The Iraq commander would bypass Central Command and report directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The logic of this appointment would be that not only ground troops, but also air and whatever sea assets were involved in Iraq would be placed under the new general's command.

This is important because this is very much not the way the U.S. military operates. Iraq is part of CENTCOM'S domain, and pulling it out from under CENTCOM means a new headquarters must be created to support the four-star in Iraq. This is not as trivial as it sounds. A regional command has to have a large staff to manage everything from logistics to intelligence. If the new four-star reported to CENTCOM, then he could access that staff. This reshuffle, however, would explicitly cut Iraq out from under CENTCOM, and one four-star would no longer report to another. So the United States is going to go to a lot of effort -- while short on staff officers -- to create a staff suitable to a very active theater of operations. This is not a trivial undertaking.

The question is why? It is possible the answer is political, but this seems wrong. The Defense Department wants to counter the influence of Paul Bremer -- or the influence of his successor -- and sending a four-star to Baghdad reporting to the Joint Chiefs will do that. Not only is this a lot of effort for some bureaucratic gamesmanship, it is also futile. The White House determines who runs Iraq policy. It is a national security issue of the highest order, so slipping an extra star into the deck isn't going to have much influence. Secretary of State Colin Powell is not likely to buckle at the sight of a four-star general.

The other explanation is that the Defense Department is expecting intensifying conflict within CENTCOM's area of responsibility, so that command responsibilities will outstrip the capacity of Abizaid and his staff. CENTCOM has three potential theaters of operation in its area of responsibility. Apart from Iraq, operations are possible against Syria or in Saudi Arabia, should the House of Saud start to totter. CENTCOM is also responsible for Afghanistan, where fighting continues, and Pakistan, where President Pervez Musharraf's survival -- personal and political -- is unclear. We should add that, in the end, U.S. troops will move into northwestern Pakistan to liquidate the remnants of al Qaeda. Lastly, CENTCOM is responsible for Africa, where seriously intensified operations were planned and postponed over the summer due to the situation in Iraq.

At some point, CENTCOM could be involved, for example, in operations in Iraq and Saudi Arabia, counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, an intervention in Pakistan and an African campaign. This will not happen simultaneously -- if Washington can help it -- but even sequential operations require extensive planning that will outstrip the capacity of any single regional command to manage.

Creating a new CINC in Baghdad (a Middle East Command) -- and just as important, creating a suitable staff -- effectively creates a new area of responsibility. If this is confined solely to the countries contiguous to Iraq -- Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, Turkey and Iran -- then this is a huge area of responsibility. Indeed, all of these don't have to be carved out for the new Middle East Command. There can be a standby command in the wings ready to take up the slack if needed.

It seems to us, however, that what the Defense Department envisions is a command responsible for the Afghan-Pakistani theater of operations -- a Southwest Asia Command or Indian Ocean Command; another command responsible for operations between east, west and north Iraq; and the Arabian Peninsula being assigned as events dictate. In other words, the Defense Department is putting forward the idea of another regional command because it anticipates the possibility of intensifying combat operations throughout the region. The war in Iraq might be coming under control, but from the standpoint of the Defense Department, the end of the Iraq campaign is the preface to follow-on campaigns.

If the four-star is appointed in the spring, he will be able to pull his staff together by summer. That will allow him the fall for planning, which would mean that operations under his command could begin by late 2004. Put another way, a bit more crassly, Baghdad Command will be good to go right after the November elections.

Dr. George Friedman
stratfor.com

[Bob McDob]

Hehe, that'll certainly freak out all the antiwarsies who want us to get out of there ASAP.

[Stuart Mackey]

Well, its its interesting, but I suspect such an action would be more for the immedidiate defence/promotion of the US political/economic position in Iraq re Iraqs neighbors rather than offensive operations.
If it did turn out tobe offensive millitar operations against Iraqs neigbors then the US could be somewhat overreached, to say the very least.

[Vympel]

Stratfor used to be free- ahhh those were the days I tell ya. I wonder if this page has the permission to post it?

IRAQCOM eh? Sounds stupid. It's kind of sad that one small geographic area could draw so much of the US' time that they need a four-star command there.

Now would be a perfect time to start shit though. The US doesn't have the manpower to invade anyone else right now.

[grayburst]

It also raises the question of why bother with the additional creation of battle staffs and headquarter units when the political situation might force US troops completely out of Iraq even before the end of 2004 due to the government policies of any new Iraqi polity.

[revprez]

It also raises the question of why bother with the additional creation of battle staffs and headquarter units when the political situation might force US troops completely out of Iraq even before the end of 2004 due to the government policies of any new Iraqi polity.

It would definitely make more sense to spin off a separate unified command than to relive the relationship MACV had with USPACCOM.

Rev Prez

[jegs2]

The Transport Command also has four-star generals in charge, who used to be called Commanders in Chief or CINCs, until Donald Rumsfeld changed the name to something we can never remember. We still call them CINCs.

They are now called "Combantant Commanders." Mr. Rumsfeld made the switch about two years ago, and yeah, most still refer to them as CINCs who rule their various "CINCdoms."

[Stormbringer]

Well, its its interesting, but I suspect such an action would be more for the immedidiate defence/promotion of the US political/economic position in Iraq re Iraqs neighbors rather than offensive operations.

As the article points out, it has a number of benefits both political and military. I think it might well be political games as much as anything but that doesn't mean there aren't other reasons.

If nothing else the potential for CENTCOM to get swamped (and the lively nature of the Middle East) means that an new command isn't unreaonable.

If it did turn out tobe offensive millitar operations against Iraqs neigbors then the US could be somewhat overreached, to say the very least.

It doesn't necessarily have to turn to offensive operation for it to be necessary. Any number of governments in the Middle East, friendly and otherwise, are unstable and we might well wind up intervening in them.

[revprez]

As the article points out, it has a number of benefits both political and military. I think it might well be political games as much as anything but that doesn't mean there aren't other reasons.

There's nothing political to be gained by renovating the unified command structure, it's one of the most dry examples of governance I can think of. Nobody remembered that we'd created Northern Command two days after it was announced. Fewer people remember when Atlantic Command became Joint Forces Command. Nobody's ever gotten elected for giving a four star a new post. On the other hand, there is a political dimension for Abizaid to spinning off a theater command for Iraq. He might end up looking like a chump who couldn't hack it after Franks threw him a grand old party at the Palace.

If nothing else the potential for CENTCOM to get swamped (and the lively nature of the Middle East) means that an new command isn't unreaonable.

Despite the high op-tempos in Iraq and Afghanistan and the potential for confrontation with Syria, Iran and Sudan, is there really a pressing need to relieve CENTCOM? Sure, PACCOM doesn't have nearly as much spicy stuff on its plate, but it does have a whole lot more to deal with and does so regularly with its Pearl Harbor staff not significantly larger (though better situated) than MacDill. And if the American troop presence in both Iraq and Afghanistan isn't going to exceed 200,000 (and will drop by June 23), then why take the risk Abizaid's credibility and career by making him look overworked?

It doesn't necessarily have to turn to offensive operation for it to be necessary. Any number of governments in the Middle East, friendly and otherwise, are unstable and we might well wind up intervening in them.

Anybody else notice the spike in commentator speculation about Saudi and other GCC state stability? Has anyone picked up on any juicy bits of information coming from the Mideast?

Rev Prez

[Bob McDob]

They are now called "Combantant Commanders." Mr. Rumsfeld made the switch about two years ago, and yeah, most still refer to them as CINCs who rule their various "CINCdoms."

What does that make them now? CompComs?

[revprez]

They are now called "Combantant Commanders." Mr. Rumsfeld made the switch about two years ago, and yeah, most still refer to them as CINCs who rule their various "CINCdoms."

What does that make them now? CompComs?

Well, they don't get off the letterhead until you run out of stock. People still call them CINCs, though.

Rev Prez

[CaptainChewbacca]

What are the different CINCdoms? I didn't even know CINCLANT had disappeared?

[revprez]

What are the different CINCdoms? I didn't even know CINCLANT had disappeared?

Right here.

http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/almanac/unified.html

BTW, if anybody's in the Boston area...

http://student.mit.edu/searchiap/iap-4028.html

It's free and open to the public. I've done it each IAP for the past five years (if I have time, I'll do it again) and it's damned fun, but there's two days of really dry lectures about DoD and service mission and organization. But the game at the end is worth the wait. If you're a junkie for this kind of stuff, come on by.

Rev Prez

[CaptainChewbacca]

So that's European, Pacific, Joint Forces (Atlantic), Southern, Central Command, Northern Command, Special Operations, Transportation, and Strategic Command.

Boo-ya! We got the WHOLE WORLD covered. Can't wait until there's a CINC-Space.

[revprez]

So that's European, Pacific, Joint Forces (Atlantic), Southern, Central Command, Northern Command, Special Operations, Transportation, and Strategic Command.

It should be noted that USJFCOM is now a supporting command whereas USACOM was a supported command. It is responsible largely for working up and providing forces and resources to other unified commands (or government agencies). It's point operational responsibility under SACLANT (Commander, USJFCOM's other hat) has essentially been downgraded to sea traffic control with the absence of a threat in the Atlantic AOR.

Boo-ya! We got the WHOLE WORLD covered. Can't wait until there's a CINC-Space.

There was. USSPACECOM was folded into USSTRATCOM in October 2002.

Rev Prez

[Shinova]

Strategic Command has a nice....ring to it.


*imagines rows of nuclear missiles lined up*

[revprez]

Strategic Command has a nice....ring to it.

*imagines rows of nuclear missiles lined up*

Yep, life is great in the Chair Force.

Rev Prez

[Stuart Mackey]

It doesn't necessarily have to turn to offensive operation for it to be necessary. Any number of governments in the Middle East, friendly and otherwise, are unstable and we might well wind up intervening in them.

The question on one hand is ability to intervene, then there is the question of Should the US intervence..Afganistan is a mess and so is Iraq. The US does not exactly have a good track record with regards to intervening in other nations affairs and it wont get better when a large chunk of the US army is tied up in occupation duties for which it is poorly trained for.

[Stofsk]

The Transport Command also has four-star generals in charge, who used to be called Commanders in Chief or CINCs, until Donald Rumsfeld changed the name to something we can never remember. We still call them CINCs.

They are now called "Combantant Commanders." Mr. Rumsfeld made the switch about two years ago, and yeah, most still refer to them as CINCs who rule their various "CINCdoms."

Why was the term changed from Commander-in-Chief to Combatant Commanders? The latter sounds dodgy.

[Dargos]

Why was the term changed from Commander-in-Chief to Combatant Commanders? The latter sounds dodgy.

If I remember correctly, the logic behind the name change is because there is only ONE Commander-in-Chief. The President of the United States.

[revprez]

The question on one hand is ability to intervene, then there is the question of Should the US intervence..Afganistan is a mess and so is Iraq. The US does not exactly have a good track record with regards to intervening in other nations affairs and it wont get better when a large chunk of the US army is tied up in occupation duties for which it is poorly trained for.

Oh come off it now. It's been less than three years in Afghanistan and we only started reconstruction in Iraq last April. We didn't end the occupation of Japan until 1952. I think our track record's been pretty damned good. As for what the US Army's trained for, we've spent ten years rewriting Joint Operations doctrine just to do this kind of thing. I hate to say it, but Clinton may have actually done the service a favor by emphasizing OOTW during his watch.

Rev Prez

[revprez]

Why was the term changed from Commander-in-Chief to Combatant Commanders? The latter sounds dodgy.

Rumsfeld has always called the CINCs "combatant commanders" or "unified commanders." He's really big on the President being the only Commander in Chief. I personally prefer not calling the unified commanders "Commander in Chief," but then CINC (pronounced "sink") is rolls off the tongue nicely.

Rev Prez

[Stuart Mackey]

The question on one hand is ability to intervene, then there is the question of Should the US intervence..Afganistan is a mess and so is Iraq. The US does not exactly have a good track record with regards to intervening in other nations affairs and it wont get better when a large chunk of the US army is tied up in occupation duties for which it is poorly trained for.

Oh come off it now. It's been less than three years in Afghanistan and we only started reconstruction in Iraq last April. We didn't end the occupation of Japan until 1952. I think our track record's been pretty damned good. As for what the US Army's trained for, we've spent ten years rewriting Joint Operations doctrine just to do this kind of thing. I hate to say it, but Clinton may have actually done the service a favor by emphasizing OOTW during his watch.

Rev Prez

This is most amusing. The US has no control outside of Kabul and outside of Kabul the Taliban has defacto control over a great deal of the country. As for Iraq, granted it does take quite sometime to rebuild a nation, the manner in which you are doing things is idiotic, no sence of PR and you are ailientating a good chunk of the population then complain when the locals lash out at your troops.
As to the Training standards of the American army {I point out that I do not refer to the USMC} I have spoken to numerous NCO's/Officers of Assie, NZ and Britian and the uniform opinion of your army is that it very poorly trained for the kind of work being asked of it in situations like this.
This may sound like an appeal to authority, but when such opinions are voiced by millitary types with experience of the US army in these places, one has to wonder what your army thinks its doing. One NZ army NCO I met mentioned that his chaps only operated with US soldiers out of nessiety as they could not be trusted to act properly in any given situation in Afganistan.