Has anyone read the documents on the page, in particular the Nevada Supreme Court ruling and especially the Amicus Brief filed by the ACLU?
The majority opinion of the Nevada Supreme Court is repleat with fallacies for example:
Majority opinion wrote:Judicial notice is taken that in the year 2000, fifty-one officers were murdered in the line of duty.[19] These homicides occurred as follows: thirteen during traffic stops/pursuits, twelve during arrest situations, ten during ambushes, eight during responses to disturbance calls, six during investigations of suspicious persons, and two during prisoner transport.[20] Of the suspects who committed these killings, twenty had been previously arrested for crimes of violence, nine had previously assaulted a police officer, and twelve were on probation or parole.[21] Moreover, 15,915 officers were assaulted that year.[22] If the officers referenced in these statistics had known the identity and history of their attackers prior to being assaulted or killed, perhaps some of these incidents could have been prevented.
and
Most importantly, we are at war against enemies who operate with concealed identities and the dangers we face as a nation are unparalleled. Terrorism is "changing the way we live and the way we act and the way we think."[24] During the recent past, this country suffered the tragic deaths of more than 3,000 unsuspecting men, women, and children at the hands of terrorists; seventeen innocent people in six different states were randomly gunned down by snipers; and our citizens have suffered illness and death from exposure to mail contaminated with Anthrax. We have also seen high school students transport guns to school and randomly gun down their fellow classmates and teachers. It cannot be stressed enough: "This is a different kind of war that requires a different type of approach and a different type of mentality."[25] To deny officers the ability to request identification from suspicious persons creates a situation where an officer could approach a wanted terrorist or sniper but be unable to identify him or her if the person's behavior does not rise to the level of probable cause necessary for an arrest.
The dissenting opinion replied:
Dissenting wrote:Despite the above authority, the majority erroneously affirms Hiibel's conviction by reflexively reasoning that the public interest in police and public safety outweighs Hiibel's interest in refusing to identify himself. I am not persuaded. And I am uneasy about the reasons given by the majority in justifying its holding.
The majority concludes that the governmental interest in police safety outweighs an individual's interest in his right to keep private his identity. The majority relies upon FBI statistics about police fatalities and assaults to support its argument. However, it does not provide any evidence that an officer, by knowing a person's identity, is better protected from potential violence. In Terry, the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of officer safety by carving out an exception to the Fourth Amendment to allow a police officer to make certain that the person being detained "is not armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against him"[20] when the officer reasonably believes "he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual."[21] The purpose of such a search is to ensure the detainee is not armed with a weapon that could be immediately used against a police officer, not to ensure against a detainee's propensity for violence based upon a prior record of criminal behavior.
It is well known that within the context of a Terry stop an officer's authority to search is limited to a pat-down to detect weapons. The officer may investigate a hard object because it might be a gun. An officer may not investigate a soft object he detects, even though it might be drugs. Similarly, an officer may not detect a wallet and remove it for search. With today's majority decision, the officer can now, figuratively, reach in, grab the wallet and pull out the detainee's identification. So much for our right to be left alone or as the majority says—to wander freely and anonymously if we choose.
The majority avoids the fact that knowing a suspect's identity does not alleviate any threat of immediate danger by arguing that a reasonable person cannot expect to withhold his identity from police officers, as we reveal our names to different people everyday. What the majority fails to recognize, however, is that when we give our names to new acquaintances, business associates and shop owners, we do so voluntarily, out of friendship or to complete a transaction. With the heightened security at airports, for example, passengers are required to provide picture identification. But non-passengers are free to wander that portion of the airport that is unsecured without showing an ID. Purchasing an airline ticket is a business transaction, and the airlines may condition the sale on knowing who is the purchaser. In contrast, being forced to identify oneself to a police officer or else face arrest is government coercion—precisely the type of governmental intrusion that the Fourth Amendment was designed to prevent. Furthermore, it is not necessary to have one's name on a credit card or checkbook in order to effect a purchase. A dedicated libertarian, for example, might deliberately eschew financial institutions, credit cards and checkbooks, engaging solely in cash transactions, in order to jealously protect his individual rights, especially his right to be anonymous, to be left alone, to wander freely.
Finally, the majority also makes an emotional appeal based upon fear and speculation by arguing that the police would be powerless to protect innocent children from sex offenders, to enforce restraining orders, and to enforce curfews for minors. What the majority fails to recognize is that it is the observable conduct, not the identity, of a person, upon which an officer must legally rely when investigating crimes and enforcing the law.
The majority further appeals to the public's fear during this time of war "against an enemy who operates with a concealed identity." Now is precisely the time when our duty to vigilantly guard the rights enumerated in the Constitution becomes most important. To ease our guard now, in the wake of fear of unknown perpetrators who may still seek to harm the United States and its people, would sound the call of retreat and begin the erosion of civil liberties. The court must not be blinded by fear.
I included most of the dissenting opinion because it addresses many of the argument made earlier.
The ACLU's
Amicus Brief argues:
ACLU wrote:In enacting and enforcing Section 171.123(3), the State of Nevada has circumvented the Fourth Amendment’s
probable cause requirement by authorizing its law enforcement officers to arrest an individual seized on the basis of reasonable suspicion, and with respect to whom probable cause is lacking, based solely upon the individual’s exercise of his constitutionally protected right to remain silent under such circumstances. By criminalizing the mere refusal to identify oneself, the State impermissibly infringes not only the individual’s Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination, as addressed by other respected amicus, see Brief of Amicus Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation, but also, as discussed below, his right under the Fourth Amendment to remain “secure in his person” by refusing to answer questions posed to him by the police until such time as the police have probable cause to effect his arrest. Moreover, where probable cause is otherwise absent, the Fourth Amendment precludes the State from legislating a regime in which silence alone is sufficient to transform mere reasonable suspicion into the
probable cause necessary to arrest an individual. Because that is both the purpose and effect of Section 171.123(3), the statute is unconstitutional, and the judgment of the Supreme Court of Nevada must be reversed.
The ACLU brief goes on to cite many precedents that support its position under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. I realize that all this precedent citing is a fallacy in of itself but what else can we expect in a situation like this.
I don't believe the officers acted unreasonably in restraining Hiibel and his daughter for their own safety, but arresting him for refusing to provide ID is not right. How would his ID facillitate the officer in determining whether or not this was the person observed by the witness hitting the female passenger? Is his ID even relevant to the situation? While the officer may have had reasonable suspision, Hiibel's silence/refusal cannot turn that into probable cause.
I believe that Hiibel will win his case before the SCOTUS.