Re: The Salvation War: Pantheocide. Part Seventeen Up
Posted: 2009-07-10 07:54pm
Those of you getting hung up on manholes not being round may be confusing them with utility boxes, which are usually rounded squares or rectangles.
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That's a straw man argument. Competent officers do not give ludicrous missions.erik_t wrote:So if your superior tells you to move leg infantry a hundred miles across broken terrain by nightfall, it's better to say "yes boss" and then get them a tenth of the way there, rather than tell the boss that it's not doable? What planet are you from?
Culturing a circle of losers does wonders for individual thinking, problem-solving and initiative.I'm sure culturing a circle of yes-men does wonders for individual thinking, problem-solving and initiative.
Except, it wasn't "We can't do it", it was "We can't do it because..." "You're fired." Rather than acknowledging that the cream of the Thai military has been in Hell, and these are dudes hanging out in the wilderness(or close enough for our purposes) and probably relatively undermanned and under supplied with poor morale, we get her targeting her political enemies in a pissing match.Stuart wrote:
In which case, the correct response is "I'll have a movement orders and status report ready in XX minutes" not a knee-jerk "we can't do it."
What're you basing that assessment on?Except, it wasn't "We can't do it", it was "We can't do it because..." "You're fired." Rather than acknowledging that the cream of the Thai military has been in Hell, and these are dudes hanging out in the wilderness(or close enough for our purposes) and probably relatively undermanned and under supplied with poor morale, we get her targeting her political enemies in a pissing match.
As I recall, there is definite rationing in Armageddonverse, and some backwater regiments might not have a substantial supply of fuel. The statement could quite literally have been:That's a straw man argument. Competent officers do not give ludicrous missions.
LTG Asanee is an experienced officer, who moreover, knows the local terrain. You tend to do that when your charge is to defend a small country that is subject to ground attack - a situation the US hasn't really faced since the Mexican War.
She ordered the First Regiment to be in Chong Sadao by dusk, a distance of 73km over all all-weather roads. The unit is mechanized, or at least motorized. This is a two hour drive. It is well before noon. The sun sets at what, 1800?
The Country was at war, under invasion. The unit, every unit, should have been ready to move. There would be no excuse for not having advance elements in Chong Sado in three hours. They could probably achieve it in two.
"Can't" was an admission of defeat. LTG Asanee needed officers who COULD. She also needed to make the point that there was no room in the Army for officers who could not.
Because she was gloating that the ex=Prime Minister was gone because he "pissed in the Army's cereal"?CaptainChewbacca wrote:
What're you basing that assessment on?
It gets you a culture of people who are willing to attack with their teeth and toenails, if that's all they have left.erik_t wrote:So if your superior tells you to move leg infantry a hundred miles across broken terrain by nightfall, it's better to say "yes boss" and then get them a tenth of the way there, rather than tell the boss that it's not doable? What planet are you from?
No, it gets you the stupidity of the Iraq Occupation, where Rumsfeld fired people until he got someone who was willing to say "Yes, Mr. Rumsfeld, we can successfully occupy and rebuild Iraq with maybe a hundred thousand troops".EdBecerra wrote:It gets you a culture of people who are willing to attack with their teeth and toenails, if that's all they have left.erik_t wrote:So if your superior tells you to move leg infantry a hundred miles across broken terrain by nightfall, it's better to say "yes boss" and then get them a tenth of the way there, rather than tell the boss that it's not doable? What planet are you from?
Speaking as a former soldier myself, and quoting a philosopher who spoke on the subject:Darth Wong wrote:No, it gets you the stupidity of the Iraq Occupation, where Rumsfeld fired people until he got someone who was willing to say "Yes, Mr. Rumsfeld, we can successfully occupy and rebuild Iraq with maybe a hundred thousand troops".EdBecerra wrote:It gets you a culture of people who are willing to attack with their teeth and toenails, if that's all they have left.erik_t wrote:So if your superior tells you to move leg infantry a hundred miles across broken terrain by nightfall, it's better to say "yes boss" and then get them a tenth of the way there, rather than tell the boss that it's not doable? What planet are you from?
If that makes makes no sense to you, Darth, then I suppose there's no bridging the mental gap between us. You'll regard me as insane, and I'll feel the same about you. And we'll both probably be right.To stand on the firing parapet and expose yourself to danger; to stand and fight a thousand miles from home when you’re all alone and outnumbered and probably beaten; to spit on your hands and lower the pike, to stand fast over the body of Leonidas the King, to be rear guard at Kunu-ri; to stand and be still to the Birkenhead drill; these are not rational acts.
They are often merely necessary.
Through history, through painful experience, military professionals have built up a specialized knowledge: how to induce men (including most especially themselves) to fight, aye, and to die. To charge the guns at Breed’s Hill and New Orleans, at Chippewa and at Cold Harbor; to climb the wall of the Embassy Compound at Peking; to go ashore at Betio and Saipan; to load and fire with precision and accuracy while the Bon Homme Richard is sinking; to fly in that thin air five miles above a hostile land and bring the ship straight and level for thirty seconds over Regensberg and Ploesti; to endure at Heartbreak Ridge and Porkchop Hill and the Iron Triangle and Dien Bien Phu and Hue and Firebase 34 and a thousand nameless hills and villages.
-- Jerry Pournell, Mercenaries and Military Virtue.
http://www.jerrypournelle.com/reports/j ... irtue.html
*shrugs*Darth Wong wrote:That's a load of bullshit. The idea that one must choose between mindless obedience and complete selfishness is a pure black/white fallacy: as blatant as they come.
Maybe that kind of nonsense flies in whatever venue you're used to arguing in, but this is not one of those venues.
It would be a lot smarter to ask him what method he expects you to use in order to move that mountain. After all, no feasible method exists.If my commander ordered me to move a mountain, I'd report to him with a pick and shovel under one arm, ready to try. I'd express my doubts to him about my ability to succeed, but I'd do so in private and I'd still go out there and try to move that damned mountain.
I don't see that as being mindless. I see it as being loyal to an oath. If, for example, it were myself marching off that bridge, I might have strident objections to doing so. But I'd given my oath to obey. The time to object was before I'd given my oath and signed my contract.Darth Wong wrote:I love the way you use an example of a guy who will obediently walk off a bridge and fall to his death, and then when challenged, immediately say "I never said mindless obedience"! What could be more mindless than obediently marching off a bridge when ordered?
Sorry, but marching off a bridge is mindless obedience. And worse yet, you characterize anyone who objects to this idiocy as unbelievably selfish, such that they would never take up arms to defend anyone or anything. As I said, black/white fallacy.
Actually, that's precisely what I mean by "mindless": a preference for hard-and-fast rules which brook no personal interpretation or judgment.EdBecerra wrote:I don't see that as being mindless. I see it as being loyal to an oath. If, for example, it were myself marching off that bridge, I might have strident objections to doing so. But I'd given my oath to obey. The time to object was before I'd given my oath and signed my contract.
OK, what part of "you are not being hired as an inspirational speaker" do you not understand? I don't really give a damn what your grandfather said, or how folksily you can express your opinions. Save it for the campaign trail and "town hall" meetings, where the yokels eat that shit up.I, personally, see changing one's mind about obeying an order after taking an oath to be rather like changing one's mind about making a parachute jump 30 seconds after leaping out the door. As my grandfather was fond of saying, "You signed the contract, boy. Too late, too bad. If y' didn't like the contract, y' shouldn't've signed it." If that's a black/white division... *shrugs*
Interesting. So you say that you would never violate a contract, then you say that yes, you would violate it, but it's not really violating it because you would accept the consequences of violating it. You are merely playing games here. It gets even worse when you say that you could not trust me because I refuse to declare that I would obey an oath under any circumstances, even though you just admitted that you would potentially violate an oath yourself. The only difference between the two of us, therefore, is that I don't bullshit about how I would never violate an oath under any circumstances, while you clearly do.Using Iraq as an example, I'd inform my commander, report to be arrested, testify that yes, I'm willfully disobeying orders, and plead guilty at my court-martial, then wait quietly to be sentenced.
Brevity is not your strong suit, is it? BTW, I checked, and the words "I", "I'd", or "I'm" appeared no less than 27 times in your last post. You talk about yourself quite a bit; this is not a good way to discuss a general philosophical or moral issue.<snip more long-winded rambling>
Am I the only one who's thinking maybe Michael is giving the Myanmarese a hand with the logistics? The "send the stuff to Hell, then send it back to Earth" trick could work just as well with Heaven, assuming the portal-physics is the same and Michael has access to a sufficient number of portal-makers (Angelic equivalent of Naga?).Stuart wrote:The logistics officer gulped. "Well, Ma'am, its our best-guess estimate of….."
"How will the Myanmar Army supply 100,000 men over a stretch of country that has only a handful of roads when they have no air transport, no available railway and shift supplies using manpacks? If you can't see the blatant impossibility of that number, you've no right to wear this uniform. You're relieved of your post, report to Supreme Command Headquarters for reassignment. General Senawith?"
I'm with this guy. If I was a military commander I'd want a subordinate who'd be unafraid to give me an accurate assessment of the feasibility of my orders, not one who, confronted with impossible orders, tap-dances around their impossibility like some weasel trying to please some pointy-haired dipshit who cares more about how you say things than what you say. "You're fired because saying 'it's impossible' is defeatist" sounds to me like textbook style-over-substance bullshit. I wouldn't care whether the phrasing is sufficiently hoo rah or not, I'd care about whether what the person has to say has value.erik_t wrote:So if your superior tells you to move leg infantry a hundred miles across broken terrain by nightfall, it's better to say "yes boss" and then get them a tenth of the way there, rather than tell the boss that it's not doable? What planet are you from?
I'm not saying that one should say "Can't." and then sit there with a smug look on one's face. That's not what happened. The Thai general cut the guy off when he was trying to explain why what she wanted was not feasible in his eyes.
I'm sure culturing a circle of yes-men does wonders for individual thinking, problem-solving and initiative.
And the LTG Asanee had already assessed the situation in Kanchanaburi. With a couple of phone calls, she already knew the officers there and had a pretty good idea of what they were up to. Thailand is a small country. The officer corps, particularly at the General Officer level, all know one another. So she knew who was in command, their capabilities, and what they would probably be their disposition. The smaller the country, the closer the Generals are to being politicians, and the Thai know how to play politics. Thy draw it in with their mothers' milk. So they intimately know who is playing on their court.Darth Wong wrote:Well that's the trick, isn't it? She knows that the entire division has been sitting on its ass this whole time, doing nothing while the Myanmar army is rampaging through the countryside. This makes its command staff guilty until proven innocent, and they will not be getting any benefit of the doubt.
Most of this can be gleaned from inference. Stuart was illustrating instead of narrating what happened, and I thought it worked rather nicely.erik_t wrote:It goes without saying that such knowledge is about three levels beyond what the typical reader of this story could be expected to know.
Stuart had the choice of writing this story with this level of knowledge implicit for the reader, but he did not. We aren't expected to know that Petraeus likes his steaks medium-rare with a side of spicy mustard; likewise, this level of awareness of force structure within NW Thailand is not (or, at least, shouldn't be) relevant to the story.
This is where paying attention helps. In chapter fifteen, Asanee admits to Petraeus that the command staff at Kanchanaburi is not their best. One doesn't need detailed knowledge of the organizational structure of the Thai army to understand the implications of that.erik_t wrote:It goes without saying that such knowledge is about three levels beyond what the typical reader of this story could be expected to know.
Stuart had the choice of writing this story with this level of knowledge implicit for the reader, but he did not. We aren't expected to know that Petraeus likes his steaks medium-rare with a side of spicy mustard; likewise, this level of awareness of force structure within NW Thailand is not (or, at least, shouldn't be) relevant to the story.
Now THAT is an interesting question. Should an author write "down" for the people he believes will be his audience? Or should he write as he pleases and the audience be damnned?JN1 wrote:Are you arguing that Stu should write for the lowest common denominator, or have I misinterpreted your post?
That simply tells us that the people at that post are known for general incompetence. It still leaves open the possibility that she just fired the guy simply for starting a sentence with "we can't do it", which as has already been pointed out is the sort of action more suited to a comic book supervillain than a competent commander.Morilore wrote:This is where paying attention helps. In chapter fifteen, Asanee admits to Petraeus that the command staff at Kanchanaburi is not their best. One doesn't need detailed knowledge of the organizational structure of the Thai army to understand the implications of that.
Oh come on, is a bunch of kludgy exposition really necessary? You have a division which is literally sitting around with their thumbs up their asses while their country is being invaded. Even if she did not know anything about the individual personalities of the command staff, it would hardly be out of line to shitcan the entire leadership for this fact alone, because she doesn't really have time to carefully sift through them for salvageable personnel while they make excuses and point fingers at each other.Junghalli wrote:Personally I think it might be a good idea for Stuart to stick in a little bit of exposition explaining the logic behind firing that particular guy in the final draft. Maybe have one of the General's subordinates object to it and her point out that A) she already knew he was incompetent and B) she knew enough about the situation to know he was exagerrating the difficulty of it, giving her the excuse she needed to sack him. It could easily be inserted smoothly into the narrative and would prevent any possible misunderstandings by readers.