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This makes for extremely interesting reading.

Sidewinder wrote:

The Duchess of Zeon wrote:

MKSheppard wrote:There's a big difference between mobilization and actually marching across someone's boarder in a hail of shellfire and crushing of boarder guards, etc. Otherwise, Operation RYAN in 1983 would have ended with a Soviet nuclear first strike on NATO.

Not in the Tsarist Army of 1914. Their mobilization was staged such that if an advance did not begin, they'd start to have massive clogging in the supply pipeline to the troops, such that an advance would be impossible for logistical reasons.

Can you explain why the Russian Army's mobilization plans and logistics systems would end up fucking itself like that? Lack of storage facilities for
supplies, maybe?

The vogue in Europe after the Franco-Prussian War was the creation of staff colleges who would plan out mobilization to the last minute based on Railway timetables. I stress that last part, timetables. Everything was planned out to the minute, when troops would board trains, where they would go, when they would get off, when the train would come back, etc. Flexibility was never a part of these plans, so every timetable for mobilization involved troops crossing over to sieze enemy territory. Organizing on the fly would have been damn near impossible because of the massive amount of men who were being moved and the massive reworking of scheduling which would have to be done in a matter of days if not hours, by hand.

To give you an idea of how bad it was: when the Germans were on the verge of mobilizing and were brainstorming how to keep Britain out of the war long enough for Germany to defeat Russia the Kaiser and the Chancellor of the Reich called in the German chief of staff Von Moltke. They asked him to rework the mobilization so that German troops wouldn't violate Belgian neutrality. Moltke promptly had a nervous attack and almost flew into hysterics because they were asking him the impossible. Samething went for Russia only worse because, due to their immense size, they had to mobilize days earlier than Germany to be able to meet the Germans at the border. So when the Tsar and his circle were talking about maybe putting off mobilization their generals could tell them "Every day you wait you give up X miles of Russian soil, soil we have to take back at the cost of Russian lives."

The worst thing about this was in the past (and the present once more) mobilization was a the international prelude to war. It showed that you were damn well serious about your position and there better be a compromise now or there'd be one of force later. Because of the time-tabling this was lost. Declaring Mobilization was de facto declaring war and took the entire affair completely out of the hands of the diplomats. (It's telling that a major concern of a lot of generals was that the other countries might secretly start to mobilize. Giving them a precious day or two head start on everyone else and an incalculable advantage.)


As for responsibility. Everyone was idiotic. Austo-Hungary moved slower than a sloth and was utterly dependent on Germany, Germany was run a vacillating buffoon, Britain was "neutral" but had been in close cahoots with France and Russia for so long that it was impossible for them to stay out of war.

I personally recommend Lions of July, it's a great book which goes through the events of the lead-up to World War one on a day by day basis. It paints a picture of well-meaning incompetence all around, and a horrificly damning portrait of the French Ambassador in St. Petersburg and the Russian Foreign Minister who, if they had acted the least bit responsibly, could probably have forestalled the War or at least made sure their governments knew how serious it was turning out days (if not weeks) earlier.

Would greater flexibility have been available if motorization of logistics had been done earlier (eg, using trucks and tractors for off-rail supply buildup)?

montypython wrote:Would greater flexibility have been available if motorization of logistics had been done earlier (eg, using trucks and tractors for off-rail supply buildup)?

Very unlikely as even as late as the 1940s the US Army was the only fully motorized army in the world. I say that to point out that no matter how early motorized logistics come into play there simply isn't the technical or economic likelyhood of this happening. Even then you run into the very real problem of being able to fit only so many troops in so much space. If the German Army of WW1 was fully motorized they may very well have been able to carry out Schlieffen's plan but they would not have been able to do so if they had spent a week locked up in logistics bases. Moreover had they sat in depots on the German/Belgian border they would have been discovered and the whole of the German operational plan would have been fataly revealed.

CmdrWilkens wrote:

montypython wrote:Would greater flexibility have been available if motorization of logistics had been done earlier (eg, using trucks and tractors for off-rail supply buildup)?

Very unlikely as even as late as the 1940s the US Army was the only fully motorized army in the world. I say that to point out that no matter how early motorized logistics come into play there simply isn't the technical or economic likelyhood of this happening. Even then you run into the very real problem of being able to fit only so many troops in so much space. If the German Army of WW1 was fully motorized they may very well have been able to carry out Schlieffen's plan but they would not have been able to do so if they had spent a week locked up in logistics bases. Moreover had they sat in depots on the German/Belgian border they would have been discovered and the whole of the German operational plan would have been fataly revealed.

Not just that but, as with the old adage, everyone prepares to refight the last war. The time tables of World War I were a direct outgrowth of the Prussian railway time-tables in 1870. Just as the concentration on mobility found in some parts of the German Army and the Maginot Line in the French Army were outgrowths of World War I. I'd hazard a guess that unless experience in mobilization could be learned elsewhere first having mobilization in World War I wouldn't make much of a difference at the outset.

The last book I read on World War I, American Heritage History of World War I by S.L.A. Marshall placed the blame for the war squarely with the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, Leopold Berchtold.

Certainly Germany didn't deserve what it got in terms of war responsibility at Versailles, but neither was it entirely blameless (no one was).

TC Pilot wrote:The last book I read on World War I, American Heritage History of World War I by S.L.A. Marshall placed the blame for the war squarely with the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, Leopold Berchtold.

Certainly Germany didn't deserve what it got in terms of war responsibility at Versailles, but neither was it entirely blameless (no one was).

Brechtold certainly was agitating for war but he was also smart enough to know just how limited a war he wanted to fight. If he could have moved the A-H court faster into action against Serbia it remains much more likely that the war will not become general. I would hold Tisza far more responsible than Brechtold for vacillating at all the wrong times, worried more about Hungarian power in the empire than the results of his actions on the empire as a whole.

TC Pilot wrote:The last book I read on World War I, American Heritage History of World War I by S.L.A. Marshall placed the blame for the war squarely with the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, Leopold Berchtold.

He was certainly a major proponent for the war, but he wanted to get the invasion launched immediately. If they'd done that, in retrospect, it would most certainly have never snowballed like it did.

What benefits did the Germans expect would come from taking the French military and government by means of the Schlieffen Plan?

Did the Germans want European territory, to enforce the claim to Alsace-Loraine, trade perogatives, to loot, to install a puppet government, to quikly destroy the French threat for a few years, or something else?

Vehrec wrote: Yes, Kaiser Wilhelm had built a fleet with the exact intention of it rivaling England's. [snip] It was a stupid decision

Why was it stupid?

Jeremy wrote:What benefits did the Germans expect would come from taking the French military and government by means of the Schlieffen Plan?

Did the Germans want European territory, to enforce the claim to Alsace-Loraine, trade perogatives, to loot, to install a puppet government, to quikly destroy the French threat for a few years, or something else?

They just wanted the French out of the war. The Germans were probably envisioning that the Schieleffen Plan would let them rapidly conclude a white peace with France and move on to serious business in the East. About the only thing they were probably expecting to get out of the West was de facto dominion over Belgium.

Jeremy wrote:

Vehrec wrote: Yes, Kaiser Wilhelm had built a fleet with the exact intention of it rivaling England's. [snip] It was a stupid decision

Why was it stupid?

Because it added to the list of Germany's enemies without gaining them anything.

To quote Massie (Dreadnought, pg XXIV):

Geography dictated confrontation. German merchant ships, leaving the Baltic or the North Sea harbours of Hamburg or Bremen, could reach the Atlantic and other oceans of the world only by steaming through the Channel or around the coast of Scotland. A German Navy strong enough to protect German merchant shipping in these waters and guarantee unimpeded passage to the oceans meant, in the last resort, a German fleet able to defeat the British Navy. This Great Britain would never permit, for it meant also a German fleet strong enough to screen an invasion of England, to sweep from the seas all British merchant shipping, to strip Britain of her colonies and empire.

That's not the whole of things - it's much more complicated than that - but, at its most basic, the above is why the High Seas Fleet being built up to try and match the RN was a bad idea.

The stupidity was further increased by the German diplomatic assumption that Britain would somehow not interpret the German building program as a direct challenge to the Royal Navy, if I remember Massie correctly.

Simplicius wrote:The stupidity was further increased by the German diplomatic assumption that Britain would somehow not interpret the German building program as a direct challenge to the Royal Navy, if I remember Massie correctly.

I think blunt honesty, and the expectation that people would take it as such, was a big problem with German foreign policy.

How else would Germany be able to secure its shipping and colonial empire?

A U-Boat fleet would be viewed with the same ire.

Jeremy wrote:How else would Germany be able to secure its shipping and colonial empire?

One would be tempted to ask, "What tangible benefits did Germany gain from her colonial possessions that are worth adding the British Empire to her enemies".

EDIT - Also, the battleships of the High Seas Fleet were not at all suited for protecting an empire scattered across the globe; due to the way they were built, they sacrificed a great deal in operational range.

Jeremy wrote:How else would Germany be able to secure its shipping and colonial empire?

A U-Boat fleet would be viewed with the same ire.

I can all but garuntee that a U-boat fleet built with the same money invested int eh German battleship building program would not have been viewed with the same ire. I won't get into too many reasons but here are a few:

1) Prestige. A dominant navy was a critical component in the penis envy that was internaitonal diplomacy in the early 20th century. However Navies were not measured in total terms of combat capability but rather how heavy its line of battle was. Investing money into a U-boat fleet means that Britain's prestige as master of the sea is not at stake.

2) Law of War at Sea. Unrestricted submarine warfare was just that, unrestircted by the rules of war. In Europe of the time period nobody was really thinking of the sort of drastic effect such a choice would have. Beforehand subs were restricted to the same rules that governed surface combatants which meant stopping and detaining merchant vessels (and consequently spending vastly greater times surfaced and stationary). In such an environment the thin skinned and rather slow submarine could easily be seen as incredibly vulnerable to the enemy.

3) Tactical versus Strategic value. Subs are great (we now know) for denying access to Sea Lanes of Communication however at the time their range was short, theirarmaments limited, their viability in commerce raiding limted as above. Basically they were percieved as being useful for tactical operations only (strikes at ports or at night). As such oeprating them in a strategic role as a war winner wasn't crossing anyone's minds and in turn assembling a large fleet would be seen as a threat of tactical operation rather than a threat of strategic strangulation. Britain would not have invested in massive Battleships but rather a larger Destroyer and Cruiser fleets.

Black Admiral wrote:One would be tempted to ask, "What tangible benefits did Germany gain from her colonial possessions that are worth adding the British Empire to her enemies".

Even securing all of southern Africa and centeral west Africa doesn't seem worth the effort.

Great Britain really puts a road block in for North/Baltic Sea countries.

Thanl you CmdrWilkins.

CmdrWilkens wrote: 1) Prestige. A dominant navy was a critical component in the penis envy that was internaitonal diplomacy in the early 20th century. However Navies were not measured in total terms of combat capability but rather how heavy its line of battle was. Investing money into a U-boat fleet means that Britain's prestige as master of the sea is not at stake.

Still, considering Lord Fisher investment in Britain own submarines, wouldn't this also be viewed as a threat?

PainRack wrote:

CmdrWilkens wrote: 1) Prestige. A dominant navy was a critical component in the penis envy that was internaitonal diplomacy in the early 20th century. However Navies were not measured in total terms of combat capability but rather how heavy its line of battle was. Investing money into a U-boat fleet means that Britain's prestige as master of the sea is not at stake.

Still, considering Lord Fisher investment in Britain own submarines, wouldn't this also be viewed as a threat?

Yes but they weren't a matter of naval prestige. Fisher was happy to be outclassed in the number of subs so long as he held dominance in the Battleship race. That attitude would also be prevelant amongst most all members of the financial committies who allocated money to the RN. They didn't see the subs as anything mroe than a tactical threat and thus they would invest in protecting their harbors against an increased prescence but they would not interpret the move to be one which threatened their Strategic dominanc of the ocean. German Battleships were viewed (as were all Battleships) as a strategic resource and a threat to Britain's naval dominance.

Did the Germans develop a long range submarine for the war or did they have to sneak surface tenders out past GIUK Gap?

CmdrWilkens wrote: Yes but they weren't a matter of naval prestige. Fisher was happy to be outclassed in the number of subs so long as he held dominance in the Battleship race. That attitude would also be prevelant amongst most all members of the financial committies who allocated money to the RN. They didn't see the subs as anything mroe than a tactical threat and thus they would invest in protecting their harbors against an increased prescence but they would not interpret the move to be one which threatened their Strategic dominanc of the ocean. German Battleships were viewed (as were all Battleships) as a strategic resource and a threat to Britain's naval dominance.

The RN had the largest number of submarines in WW1 and Lord Fisher had already moved away from the big gun Dreadnaughts to Battle-cruisers and submarines for fulfilling Britain needs for a battle line and trade protection.

As it was, the naval threat were viewed as battleships, however, if Germany had went for a naval race via submarines, wouldn't this similarly be viewed as dangerously as a dreadnought race? While battleships had defensive capabilities, submarines were then viewed as nothing more than offensive weapons. This would had led to the British asking the same question of who else but the RN the Germans were likely to attack.

CmdrWilkens wrote:2) Law of War at Sea. Unrestricted submarine warfare was just that, unrestircted by the rules of war. In Europe of the time period nobody was really thinking of the sort of drastic effect such a choice would have. Beforehand subs were restricted to the same rules that governed surface combatants which meant stopping and detaining merchant vessels (and consequently spending vastly greater times surfaced and stationary). In such an environment the thin skinned and rather slow submarine could easily be seen as incredibly vulnerable to the enemy.

Considering that Fisher was willing to break the laws of the sea if it would favor England's position and quite bluntly stated that opinion at several international conference, I would be hesitant to say that Fisher would not consider the notion of unrestricted warfare when he quite openly argued for it. And since Fisher was an excellent manipulator of the press, I doubt that he wouldn't use the giant thread of u-boats to further his political aims of whipping the RN into fighting shape.