Just because Germany, to date, with the full knowledge of American support, has backed Eastern Europe when pressured by Russia does not mean it will continue to do so if left on its own. Especially if the Poles remain troublesome over EU issues, and Russian gas supplies become ever more vital, and constituencies favoring expanding German ties to Russia at the expense of the rest of Europe grow. Gerhard Schroeder did nothing to suggest that German-Russian rapprochement at the expense of the middle powers is impossible.Thanas wrote:Hahaha. But no.MarshalPurnell wrote:Russia will have a much stronger hand in its near-abroad, seriously damaging the interests of countries like Poland, the Baltic States, and Romania. Germany is likely to become more and more economically dependent on Russian gas supplies, so one might see a decoupling of Eastern Europe from the orbit of Western Europe as the Germans fail to support the former Warsaw Pact nations against Russian pressure.Everytime the Russians have tried to seriously move against them, we helped the Eastern Europeans.
A great power needs to be able to use military force to defend its vital interests. Europe does not have the will to, for example, replace the United States as a guarantor of Middle Eastern oil supplies, or to preserve a balance of power in Asia. It frankly would be unable to operate in any significant way outside its own continent, with exceptions for France acting alone in a peripheral fashion.Thanas wrote:What are, in your opinion, the ways to act for a Great Power?but the rest of Europe is demilitarizing and does not have a collective will to act like a Superpower or even a Great Power.
http://www.cbo.gov/doc.cfm?index=2976&type=0&sequence=1Thanas wrote:I would be interested in sources for that.Europe does not even come close to paying a fair share of the alliance's military budget (and never has, not even at the height of the Soviet threat)
I do not have the time or inclination to do significant research for the entire 40 year span of NATO's Cold War existence, but I have seen a great many sources reference the disparity in military spending as a percentage of GDP. The 3.5% of collective European GDP hides significant disparities between European countries, with the British and French typically spending higher and the smaller countries of NATO barely getting to 3%, or even going lower. West Germany, despite being the most threatened state, rarely spent more than 3% of GNP according to figures here.CBO wrote:Defense spending as a percentage of GDP, which measures the share of a country's national income devoted to defense, is a widely cited measure of defense burdensharing. Throughout NATO's 50-year history, the United States has spent a larger share of its GDP on defense than have most of its allies. In 1985, at the height of the Cold War arms buildup, the United States spent 6.7 percent of its GDP on defense, compared with the European allies' 3.5 percent of their collective GDP spent on defense. By 1999, those figures declined to 3.0 percent and 2.3 percent, respectively.
Two conclusions can be drawn from those figures. First, with the exception of Greece and Turkey, Europeans on the whole spend considerably less on defense than does the United States. Second, the spending gap has narrowed since 1985. All of the NATO allies came closer to matching the U.S. defense commitment in 1999 than they did in 1985.
Could Europe have brought about the resolution to Bosnia by itself? Could it have faced down Serbia, flush with at least rhetorical Russian support, with its own resources? I think it very unlikely.Thanas wrote:I dispute that, seeing as to how the Americans had little to do with the following occupation once the bombing had stopped. Besides sheltering Mladic, that is.and has proven to be of limited use providing auxiliary formations for American aims, even in their own backyard of the Balkans.
And meh. The French have also been implicated in protecting Serbian war criminals, and Srebrenica showed just how effective European "peacekeepers" are by themselves when it comes to facing down an enemy more formidable than African tribal militias.