The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor
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The Journal of Interdisciplinary History (Vol. XVIIII, Num. 4) of Spring 1988 offers an interesting dialogue on “The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars.”
Scott D. Sagan argues that both sides made grievous errors in analysis. They are as follows:
(a) the Tokyo government of July 1940 “panicked”, apparently over the question of whether Great Britain would seek a separate peace with Germany before the Imperial Japanese Navy could mount offensives against British Indian Ocean outposts;
(b) war-games of May 1940 involving a preemptive Japanese occupation of the Dutch East Indies (to be packaged as a method of guaranteeing the island chain’s status of neutrality) continually ended with an American fleet steaming from Pearl Harbor into direct action with the Imperial fleet;
(c) from the point of a complete embargo of American petroleum shipments, the Japanese estimated a four month timeframe before war would be impossible unless the Dutch East Indies could be secured and its mineral oil shipped to the Home Islands;
(d) the Japanese could prosecute war for twelve months, expectant of victory conditions or a draw ending in negotiation; any conflict lasting more than one year would inevitably result in a Japanese failure;
(e) while the Japanese Army was probably correct in asserting that the United States would not seek war if only British and Dutch possessions were seized, the Navy presumed otherwise, insisting that any aggressive action against Europe’s colonies was likely to result in war with the United States; and
(f) new research has confirmed that the Liaison Conference between Army and Navy officials was never privy to knowledge of the choice of “a surprise Sunday morning attack” planned merely by senior Navy officials.
(a) the United States assumed that the Japanese Army would acquiesce a general withdrawal from its Chinese outposts, unaware that Tokyo considered such action akin to forfeiture of great power status as well as matter of the highest national honor;
(b) the United States believed it was obvious that they were hamstrung in the Pacific militarily; American commanders were, before the war even began, admitting major logistical difficulties and denied having prepared for any war with Japan;
(c) while confident the Japanese would perceive no direct threat to the United States, Americans were nevertheless confident of their victory potential in the long-term, and assumed the Japanese would not choose aggression against an American target on this basis alone; and
(d) Dean Acheson unilaterally froze, via the Federal Finance Committee, Japanese assets, and compounded matters by strongly pushing for a full embargo on oil shipments to the Japanese; Roosevelt’s short absence in Argentina left Acheson with a free hand to avoid fulfilling policy commitments, obliging Roosevelt to adopt, upon his return, the hard line set up by Acheson’s stalling.
Scott D. Sagan argues that both sides made grievous errors in analysis. They are as follows:
(a) the Tokyo government of July 1940 “panicked”, apparently over the question of whether Great Britain would seek a separate peace with Germany before the Imperial Japanese Navy could mount offensives against British Indian Ocean outposts;
(b) war-games of May 1940 involving a preemptive Japanese occupation of the Dutch East Indies (to be packaged as a method of guaranteeing the island chain’s status of neutrality) continually ended with an American fleet steaming from Pearl Harbor into direct action with the Imperial fleet;
(c) from the point of a complete embargo of American petroleum shipments, the Japanese estimated a four month timeframe before war would be impossible unless the Dutch East Indies could be secured and its mineral oil shipped to the Home Islands;
(d) the Japanese could prosecute war for twelve months, expectant of victory conditions or a draw ending in negotiation; any conflict lasting more than one year would inevitably result in a Japanese failure;
(e) while the Japanese Army was probably correct in asserting that the United States would not seek war if only British and Dutch possessions were seized, the Navy presumed otherwise, insisting that any aggressive action against Europe’s colonies was likely to result in war with the United States; and
(f) new research has confirmed that the Liaison Conference between Army and Navy officials was never privy to knowledge of the choice of “a surprise Sunday morning attack” planned merely by senior Navy officials.
(a) the United States assumed that the Japanese Army would acquiesce a general withdrawal from its Chinese outposts, unaware that Tokyo considered such action akin to forfeiture of great power status as well as matter of the highest national honor;
(b) the United States believed it was obvious that they were hamstrung in the Pacific militarily; American commanders were, before the war even began, admitting major logistical difficulties and denied having prepared for any war with Japan;
(c) while confident the Japanese would perceive no direct threat to the United States, Americans were nevertheless confident of their victory potential in the long-term, and assumed the Japanese would not choose aggression against an American target on this basis alone; and
(d) Dean Acheson unilaterally froze, via the Federal Finance Committee, Japanese assets, and compounded matters by strongly pushing for a full embargo on oil shipments to the Japanese; Roosevelt’s short absence in Argentina left Acheson with a free hand to avoid fulfilling policy commitments, obliging Roosevelt to adopt, upon his return, the hard line set up by Acheson’s stalling.