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Hannibal, having studied Alexander, seems to have made the tactic of encirclement his life's philosophy. He used it in his battles as the main tactic, as an overall military strategy, and as a grand strategy. After Cannae, he wanted to continue braking up Roman allies and encircle the city of Rome completely and force them to surrender. While he encircled them militarily, he would also do so politically, by allying himself with Macedonians in the east, Syracuse in the south, there were already hostile tribes in the north who defeated a Roman army only days after Cannae, and minimal Roman presence in Spain, one battle away from being kicked out. There was a new wave of optimism about the war from senate in Africa. Cannae made all this possible, and looking at it from his perspective, it must have seemed like the right strategy. Risking all the political momentum gained on a single battle against a heavily fortified city was too risky.

ExarKun wrote:Risking all the political momentum gained on a single battle against a heavily fortified city was too risky.

But oh so tempting...with one fell swoop winning the war. I really do wonder what history would have turned out like if Carthage had won.

Bilbo wrote:Hannibal had no chance at all to seige Rome. The city was too large and Hannibal had no real seige forces with him. The cities he took in the south of Italy were generally gained through subversion. He would find some way to get the gates open from the inside.

It's not impossible to imagine Rome being betrayed from the inside. You point out that Hannibal didn't sway as many allies as he needed, what better way of doing that then marching on Rome herself?

hongi wrote:

ExarKun wrote:Risking all the political momentum gained on a single battle against a heavily fortified city was too risky.

But oh so tempting...with one fell swoop winning the war. I really do wonder what history would have turned out like if Carthage had won.

Not much differently, they had no real power to hold on to Rome and the Romans were outproducing and outbreeding them.

Bilbo wrote:Hannibal had no chance at all to seige Rome. The city was too large and Hannibal had no real seige forces with him. The cities he took in the south of Italy were generally gained through subversion. He would find some way to get the gates open from the inside.

It's not impossible to imagine Rome being betrayed from the inside. You point out that Hannibal didn't sway as many allies as he needed, what better way of doing that then marching on Rome herself?

Rome betrayed from the inside is impossible due to the organization of the Roman town watch. Was Carthage betrayed to the Romans? No, they had to take it by force.

hongi wrote:

ExarKun wrote:Risking all the political momentum gained on a single battle against a heavily fortified city was too risky.

But oh so tempting...with one fell swoop winning the war. I really do wonder what history would have turned out like if Carthage had won.

Bilbo wrote:Hannibal had no chance at all to seige Rome. The city was too large and Hannibal had no real seige forces with him. The cities he took in the south of Italy were generally gained through subversion. He would find some way to get the gates open from the inside.

It's not impossible to imagine Rome being betrayed from the inside. You point out that Hannibal didn't sway as many allies as he needed, what better way of doing that then marching on Rome herself?

I am convinced that if he had marched on Rome, he would have used some kind of stratagem to breach the defenses. I've never been able to find what kind of army Romans had back in the city, but it couldn't have been much, especially veterans, seeing as so many have been wiped out.

ExarKun wrote: I am convinced that if he had marched on Rome, he would have used some kind of stratagem to breach the defenses. I've never been able to find what kind of army Romans had back in the city, but it couldn't have been much, especially veterans, seeing as so many have been wiped out.

So Hannibal would have Deus Ex Machinaed his way into Rome? Brilliant!

Anyway, as Michael Crawford put it once during the Roman Republic of this time most Roman males were in the Army for lengths of time that were directly comparable to Sparta. This meant that Rome was filled with battle hardened soldiers who had fought the Gauls in the years between the Punic Wars. Moreover Hannibal was operating under the idea that the Romans had two (four maybe, been years since I last studied this) legions near the alps fighting the Gauls. If he hadn't been able to breach the defenses right away he would have been caught between a city filled with angry veterans (which was later able to field 20+ legions for the rest of the war) and a Roman army pinning him down and taking away his tactical flexibility. That's not a situation any commander wants to blunder into, especially when he could (and almost did) win the war by stripping the Romans of their allied cities in Southern and Central Italy.

ExarKun wrote:I am convinced that if he had marched on Rome, he would have used some kind of stratagem to breach the defenses. I've never been able to find what kind of army Romans had back in the city, but it couldn't have been much, especially veterans, seeing as so many have been wiped out.

You do of course base this on the expansive studies you have made on the subject of the Roman population?

Straha wrote:

ExarKun wrote: I am convinced that if he had marched on Rome, he would have used some kind of stratagem to breach the defenses. I've never been able to find what kind of army Romans had back in the city, but it couldn't have been much, especially veterans, seeing as so many have been wiped out.

Anyway, as Michael Crawford put it once during the Roman Republic of this time most Roman males were in the Army for lengths of time that were directly comparable to Sparta. This meant that Rome was filled with battle hardened soldiers who had fought the Gauls in the years between the Punic Wars. Moreover Hannibal was operating under the idea that the Romans had two (four maybe, been years since I last studied this) legions near the alps fighting the Gauls. If he hadn't been able to breach the defenses right away he would have been caught between a city filled with angry veterans (which was later able to field 20+ legions for the rest of the war) and a Roman army pinning him down and taking away his tactical flexibility. That's not a situation any commander wants to blunder into, especially when he could (and almost did) win the war by stripping the Romans of their allied cities in Southern and Central Italy.

Romans didn't have a professional army like Spartans until 100 years later. Their best troops were wiped out in the preceding years. And please do find a citation for the 20+legions figure. Never heard of it before.

So Hannibal would have Deus Ex Machinaed his way into Rome? Brilliant!

That was Hannibal, he was brilliant. He did it before, there is no reason for me to think that he wouldn't do it again.

Thanas wrote:

ExarKun wrote:I am convinced that if he had marched on Rome, he would have used some kind of stratagem to breach the defenses. I've never been able to find what kind of army Romans had back in the city, but it couldn't have been much, especially veterans, seeing as so many have been wiped out.

You do of course base this on the expansive studies you have made on the subject of the Roman population?

Well, I never heard of anyone listing massive troops present in Rome as the possible reason for him not marching on Rome. There were other reasons, but not that one. If you have a source that lets you know something that we don't, let's see it.

ExarKun wrote: Romans didn't have a professional army like Spartans until 100 years later. Their best troops were wiped out in the preceding years. And please do find a citation for the 20+legions figure. Never heard of it before.

So? Just because it is not a professional army doesn't mean it is any less capable. The Romans did have a strong martial tradition comparable to the Spartans.

That was Hannibal, he was brilliant. He did it before, there is no reason for me to think that he wouldn't do it again.

Yeah, because Hannibal is so brilliant that he can do anything he wants...

Thanas wrote: Well, I never heard of anyone listing massive troops present in Rome as the possible reason for him not marching on Rome. There were other reasons, but not that one. If you have a source that lets you know something that we don't, let's see it.

Do you even know how much troops is required to maintain a seige on a city the size of Rome?

Thanas wrote:Not much differently, they had no real power to hold on to Rome and the Romans were outproducing and outbreeding them.

I disagree. Even if the Romans had overthrown the yoke of Carthaginian rule within a couple of decades, their imperial ambitions would have been severely curtailed.

I expect the Carthaginians would have been ruthless and imposed crippling terms, they had no reason not to and the bitterness from the Roman annexation of Sardinia would have still been fresh in their minds. The Romans would be lacking in allies on the Italian peninsula and the Carthaginian Empire would have a stranglehold on Spain, all in all a very bad position for Rome.

Thanas wrote: Rome betrayed from the inside is impossible due to the organization of the Roman town watch. Was Carthage betrayed to the Romans? No, they had to take it by force.

I cede to your knowledge there.

In what way did the Roman town watch make it effectively impossible for Rome to be betrayed from within? What were they doing that was so much more effective than what other cities of the same era did?

ExarKun wrote:Romans didn't have a professional army like Spartans until 100 years later.

You, Sir, are an ignoramus.

So Hannibal would have Deus Ex Machinaed his way into Rome? Brilliant!

That was Hannibal, he was brilliant. He did it before, there is no reason for me to think that he wouldn't do it again.

Ah, the appeal to idocy. The Romans crushed the germans under Tiberius. There is no reason to think they could do the same again with Tiberius as Empreror.

For the last time: Provide proof that the cities Hannibal took were in any way organized the way Rome was, had the same manpower and the same status. Or I will employ the full weight of the rules against you.

Thanas wrote:

ExarKun wrote:I am convinced that if he had marched on Rome, he would have used some kind of stratagem to breach the defenses. I've never been able to find what kind of army Romans had back in the city, but it couldn't have been much, especially veterans, seeing as so many have been wiped out.

You do of course base this on the expansive studies you have made on the subject of the Roman population?

Well, I never heard of anyone listing massive troops present in Rome as the possible reason for him not marching on Rome. There were other reasons, but not that one. If you have a source that lets you know something that we don't, let's see it.[/quote]

Let me tell you something about the comitia centuriata. it was organised in the way that half the men would form the field army, while the seniors and others would form a town watch. Granted, these are not that good if you want to do a forced march, but you really only need bodies lining a wall. And rome had those. Contrary to popular beliefs, opening a gate from the inside is also no piece of cake. Especially since Fabius would most likely have stationed elite units at the guards.

Hannibal had no siege train. His only hope would have been subversion. This is not going to happen - who is going to be strong enough to overpower a century or so and then hold the gate long enough open so that the army can flood in? name one group who could do that and who had an incentive to see Rome burn.

hongi wrote:I disagree. Even if the Romans had overthrown the yoke of Carthaginian rule within a couple of decades, their imperial ambitions would have been severely curtailed.

I expect the Carthaginians would have been ruthless and imposed crippling terms, they had no reason not to and the bitterness from the Roman annexation of Sardinia would have still been fresh in their minds. The Romans would be lacking in allies on the Italian peninsula and the Carthaginian Empire would have a stranglehold on Spain, all in all a very bad position for Rome.

This assumes that Carthage had the political unity to do so. This is a state that was nearly brought to its knees when mercenaries revolted. Furthermore, Hannibal himself was far from being unopposed on the council.

Simon_Jester wrote:In what way did the Roman town watch make it effectively impossible for Rome to be betrayed from within? What were they doing that was so much more effective than what other cities of the same era did?

See above. In addition to that, there is a limited number of gates you have to guard. Taking a city by subversion was only done when there was a significant political faction that had something to gain by having its city destroyed. There is no such faction in Rome.

This assumes that Carthage had the political unity to do so.

If Hannibal won, the Barcid supremacy that had been building up ever since his father would have been unassailable.

This is a state that was nearly brought to its knees when mercenaries revolted. Furthermore, Hannibal himself was far from being unopposed on the council.

Primarily one person as far as I can remember, Hanno the Great and he and his supporters were marginalised ever since conquering Spain turned out to be such a successful venture.

hongi wrote:

This assumes that Carthage had the political unity to do so.

If Hannibal won, the Barcid supremacy that had been building up ever since his father would have been unassailable.

I doubt it. Assassination was always popular in Carthage. But of course this is pretty much ahistorical speculation, so I'll stop doing so now.

ExarKun wrote:That was Hannibal, he was brilliant. He did it before, there is no reason for me to think that he wouldn't do it again.

Idiot.
If you bothered to read up on anything you've been spouting crap on you'd realise that Hannibal had many, many, failures at taking cities during his campaigns in Italy. Cities much smaller and less defended than Rome. He just didn't have the necessary equipment with his army. Basically all the cities he had control of in Italy had welcomed him in. IIRC the one notable success was Tarentum. The 'stratagem' he used to take Tarentum was to have anti-Roman sympathisers open the bloody gates for his army. Do you think that would have happened with Rome?

Turns out you can't just 'stratagem' away walls when you don't have the required equipment.

Wouldn't the fact that Hannibal didn't even try to trick his way into Rome suggest that he was smart enough to figure that it wouldn't work?

Try explaining that to Kun - according to him, Hannibal was too scared to do the gamble. Really, that is the essence of his argument - that Hannibal was too afraid to attack Rome.

But if Hannibal was a tactical genius clever enough to outthink the defenses of Rome even without the muscle to brute-force them down, surely he was clever enough to know that. Conversely, if he wasn't smart enough to make an accurate assessment of his own ability to break into Rome, how could he have been smart enough to break into Rome by pure cleverness?

Ignoring ExarKun's idiocy for the moment, it seems to me, from reading this thread, that the Carthaginians were pretty well stuck. The Romans had naval superiority, Hannibal did about the best anyone could have expected and still couldn't move enough forces into Italy to take Rome or destroy its shipbuilding capability, and the Romans themselves were going to start the Second Punic War whether or not the Carthaginians wanted it. The best they could hope for was for the Romans to give up after a sufficiently demoralizing defeat in the field--and they didn't, not even after suffering one of the worst military disasters in Roman history.

Wow. What a bunch of circle-jerking nonsense. I come back hoping to read something intelligent and am disappointed by complete childishness...

Thanas wrote:Try explaining that to Kun - according to him, Hannibal was too scared to do the gamble. Really, that is the essence of his argument - that Hannibal was too afraid to attack Rome.

My argument was explained on November 10th, backed up by historians who have actually studied Hannibal and ancient Rome and work as professionals. I didn't make it up, I learned it off others who actually study this for a living. Don't make up arguments now. Here it is again since you "missed" it:

ExarKun wrote:Hannibal, having studied Alexander, seems to have made the tactic of encirclement his life's philosophy. He used it in his battles as the main tactic, as an overall military strategy, and as a grand strategy. After Cannae, he wanted to continue braking up Roman allies and encircle the city of Rome completely and force them to surrender. While he encircled them militarily, he would also do so politically, by allying himself with Macedonians in the east, Syracuse in the south, there were already hostile tribes in the north who defeated a Roman army only days after Cannae, and minimal Roman presence in Spain, one battle away from being kicked out. There was a new wave of optimism about the war from senate in Africa. Cannae made all this possible, and looking at it from his perspective, it must have seemed like the right strategy. Risking all the political momentum gained on a single battle against a heavily fortified city was too risky.

Thanas wrote:For the last time: Provide proof that the cities Hannibal took were in any way organized the way Rome was, had the same manpower and the same status. Or I will employ the full weight of the rules against you.

For the last time? And when was the first time? I think I'm stepping on some toes here, because you're being a bit of an ass. Am I enroaching on your territory as a local pseudo historian?
And what a loaded question, so you want me to prove that Hannibal took another city in Italy the size of Rome, when there was no other city in Italy the size of Rome? Really slick. Should I also prove to you how Hannibal used paratroopers to capture other cities or you will employ the full weight of the rules against me?

My comment about Hannibal's ingenuity is based on his previous battles where he repeatedly defeated the odds. It's based on history. Your comments like this gem:

Thanas wrote:Especially since Fabius would most likely have stationed elite units at the guards.

is not based on anything. What "elite guards"? What gates? Why does Hannibal have to attack gates and not a wall that's not easily defensible?


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Here are some facts for you:

1. Maharbal, after Cannae, though that it was possible to march on Rome. Apparently, according to you, you can command Hannibal's cavalry and be a retard at the same time? Maharbal was an idiot right? It just so happens that Maharbal was the siege commander of Saguntum in Hannibal's absence, and his equal in skill during that time. You'd think he'd know a thing or two about attacking fortifications eh?

2. After seeing that his strategy won't succeed, Hannibal himself wanted to march on Rome when his brother brought his troops over. You might say that this proves that he needed more troops, but this was 9 years of campaigning in Italy after Cannae, of course after almost a decade of attrition he couldn't attack Rome without reinforcements.

3. Livy on situation after Cannae:

Never before, while the City itself was still safe, had there been such excitement and panic within its walls. I shall not attempt to describe it, nor will I weaken the reality by going into details… it was not wound upon wound but multiplied disaster that was now announced. For according to the reports two consular armies and two consuls were lost; there was no longer any Roman camp, any general, any single soldier in existence; Apulia, Samnium, almost the whole of Italy lay at Hannibal's feet. Certainly there is no other nation that would not have succumbed beneath such a weight of calamity.

"It is generally believed that the day's delay was the salvation of the City and the Empire."

The Romans, despite simultaneously losing their army in Cisalpine Gaul in an ambush (Roman military leadership was still rather variable in quality) used the respite to gather together their remaining resources, put the city in an effective state of defence and raise four new legions from men still under military age (17 rather than 18). This took time, and before it could be done the authorities had to restore order
Never, without an enemy actually within the gates, had there been such terror and confusion within the city.
They raised 20,000 kids under the age of 17, with no experience or training!

What's that? He lived couple of hundred years later you say? Ok, what about another historian:

4. Polybius, lived during the time when there would have been survivors of the war (sort of like today's military historian writing about WWII). He was a military man himself, not an obnoxious Roman forum member who made up history:

"As for the Romans, after this defeat they gave up all hope of maintaining their supremacy over the Italians, and began to fear for their native soil, and indeed for their very existence, since they expected Hannibal to appear at any moment."

Hannibal, however, let the opportunity pass: instead of marching on Rome immediately after the battle, he turned his efforts to securing defections by Rome's Italian allies (many did) and seeking support (money and reinforcements) from the Carthaginian senate (it refused). As one of his cavalry commanders (Maharbal) commented
"You know, Hannibal, how to win a fight; you do not know how to use your victory."

.....................................................................................................................

Despite all this, I think I'm wrong, because a bunch of know-it-alls that live 2100 years later, say so. What do those Romans and Carthaginians know anyways they are bunch of barbarians compared to us? Of course, those armchair generals have no historical legs to stand on, except their own "logic" backed by the threat of using a banning stick.
I write because I hope I can learn something in an informative exchange of information and ideas; ready to change my opinion at a moment's notice if I'm proven wrong. You write for your egos like a bunch of kids, nodding at each other's ideas, and learning the wrong information. How sad. I don't have time for this. You don't have to ban me, I'm done with this section until you have adults on here. Grow the fuck up

For the last time? And when was the first time? I think I'm stepping on some toes here, because you're being a bit of an ass. Am I enroaching on your territory as a local pseudo historian?

Thanas is working as a professional historian you know. It's kinda idiotic that the moment someone disagreed with you, you are whining about rules.

Of course, those armchair generals have no historical legs to stand on, except their own "logic" backed by the threat of using a banning stick.

Hell, no one is threatening to ban you.

My comment about Hannibal's ingenuity is based on his previous battles where he repeatedly defeated the odds. It's based on history.

Yes, just because his ingenuity allow him to win battles doesn't necessary mean he will succeed in taking Rome. Look, if Hannibal is so clever with an excellent track record, why the hell did he lose at Zama?

Run out of Edit time.

ExarKun, do you realise you are ignoring chunks of Thanas's argument?

ExarKun wrote:Wow. What a bunch of circle-jerking nonsense. I come back hoping to read something intelligent and am disappointed by complete childishness...

Thanas wrote:Try explaining that to Kun - according to him, Hannibal was too scared to do the gamble. Really, that is the essence of his argument - that Hannibal was too afraid to attack Rome.

My argument was explained on November 10th, backed up by historians who have actually studied Hannibal and ancient Rome and work as professionals.

What a coincidence. So do I. Care to give a real citation now?

I didn't make it up, I learned it off others who actually study this for a living.

Who would that be?

Don't make up arguments now. Here it is again since you "missed" it:

ExarKun wrote:Hannibal, having studied Alexander, seems to have made the tactic of encirclement his life's philosophy. He used it in his battles as the main tactic, as an overall military strategy, and as a grand strategy. After Cannae, he wanted to continue braking up Roman allies and encircle the city of Rome completely and force them to surrender. While he encircled them militarily, he would also do so politically, by allying himself with Macedonians in the east, Syracuse in the south, there were already hostile tribes in the north who defeated a Roman army only days after Cannae, and minimal Roman presence in Spain, one battle away from being kicked out. There was a new wave of optimism about the war from senate in Africa. Cannae made all this possible, and looking at it from his perspective, it must have seemed like the right strategy. Risking all the political momentum gained on a single battle against a heavily fortified city was too risky.

Which is supposed to show that the romans lacked manpower...how, exactly? Heck, they had enough men to sent the survivors of Cannae to Sicily instead of enlisting them in the main army again.

For the last time? And when was the first time? I think I'm stepping on some toes here, because you're being a bit of an ass. Am I enroaching on your territory as a local pseudo historian?
And what a loaded question, so you want me to prove that Hannibal took another city in Italy the size of Rome, when there was no other city in Italy the size of Rome? Really slick. Should I also prove to you how Hannibal used paratroopers to capture other cities or you will employ the full weight of the rules against me?

No, I am asking you to prove how Hannibal had anywhere the capabilities to take Rome. His failed "assault" on the city five years later says otherwise and all your arguments have done nothing to show how he suddenly had those capabilities in 216.

So why do you assume he could have taken Rome?

My comment about Hannibal's ingenuity is based on his previous battles where he repeatedly defeated the odds. It's based on history.

Ah, so he would have defeated the Romans because he was Hannibal and had some ingenuity? By the same logic Rommel should have destroyed Montogomery because he was Rommel. You have no argument.

Your comments like this gem:

Thanas wrote:Especially since Fabius would most likely have stationed elite units at the guards.

is not based on anything. What "elite guards"? What gates? Why does Hannibal have to attack gates and not a wall that's not easily defensible?

Because the wall will be filled with Roman citizens? As for the elite guards, I am of course talking about the personal guards of the Dictator Maximus and the reserves stationed at Rome. And did you just say the walls of Rome were not easily defensible?

...........................................................................................................................
Here are some facts for you:

1. Maharbal, after Cannae, though that it was possible to march on Rome. Apparently, according to you, you can command Hannibal's cavalry and be a retard at the same time? Maharbal was an idiot right? It just so happens that Maharbal was the siege commander of Saguntum in Hannibal's absence, and his equal in skill during that time. You'd think he'd know a thing or two about attacking fortifications eh?

You are of course basing this on a very subjective passage of Livius. But hey, let's not get something like the crafts of real historians, critical thinking, go in your way. Heck, your view has been outdated since Delbrück. I'd also ask you for the proof that Maharbal was the equal of Hannibal in attacking fortifications and grand strategy. You know, cite some evidence. The fact is that Hannibal clearly did not think he could win.

2. After seeing that his strategy won't succeed, Hannibal himself wanted to march on Rome when his brother brought his troops over. You might say that this proves that he needed more troops, but this was 9 years of campaigning in Italy after Cannae, of course after almost a decade of attrition he couldn't attack Rome without reinforcements.

You are missing the fact that Hannibal attacked Rome in 211 BC and could not get anywhere. Surely, with his army depleted after Cannae, he could have done so much better....not.

3. Livy on situation after Cannae:

Never before, while the City itself was still safe, had there been such excitement and panic within its walls. I shall not attempt to describe it, nor will I weaken the reality by going into details… it was not wound upon wound but multiplied disaster that was now announced. For according to the reports two consular armies and two consuls were lost; there was no longer any Roman camp, any general, any single soldier in existence; Apulia, Samnium, almost the whole of Italy lay at Hannibal's feet. Certainly there is no other nation that would not have succumbed beneath such a weight of calamity.

"It is generally believed that the day's delay was the salvation of the City and the Empire."

The Romans, despite simultaneously losing their army in Cisalpine Gaul in an ambush (Roman military leadership was still rather variable in quality) used the respite to gather together their remaining resources, put the city in an effective state of defence and raise four new legions from men still under military age (17 rather than 18). This took time, and before it could be done the authorities had to restore order
Never, without an enemy actually within the gates, had there been such terror and confusion within the city.
They raised 20,000 kids under the age of 17, with no experience or training!

Ah, nice work, quoting the most dramatically exaggerating source first. But your own source says that the romans raised for new legions, but Hannibal was still expected to take the city with no siege train whatsoever?

What's that? He lived couple of hundred years later you say? Ok, what about another historian:

4. Polybius, lived during the time when there would have been survivors of the war (sort of like today's military historian writing about WWII). He was a military man himself, not an obnoxious Roman forum member who made up history:

"As for the Romans, after this defeat they gave up all hope of maintaining their supremacy over the Italians, and began to fear for their native soil, and indeed for their very existence, since they expected Hannibal to appear at any moment."

You do of course neglect to cite the rest of the chapter, seeing how it does not suit your argument.

Polybios 3.11 wrote:]In spite of all, however, the Senate left no means untried to save the State. It exhorted the people to fresh exertions, strengthened the city with guards, and deliberated on the crisis in a brave and manly spirit. And subsequent events made this manifest. For though the Romans were on that occasion indisputably beaten in the field, and had lost reputation for military prowess; by the peculiar excellence of their political constitution, and the prudence of their counsels, they not only recovered their supremacy over Italy, by eventually conquering the Carthaginians, but before very long became masters of the whole world.

Hannibal, however, let the opportunity pass: instead of marching on Rome immediately after the battle, he turned his efforts to securing defections by Rome's Italian allies (many did) and seeking support (money and reinforcements) from the Carthaginian senate (it refused). As one of his cavalry commanders (Maharbal) commented
"You know, Hannibal, how to win a fight; you do not know how to use your victory."[/i]
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This does not appear at all in the chapter. Did you just copy the section of Livy XXII, 51 and claim it to be Polybios? Please give me the full cite. (You know, you should really cite your sources, I am sure at least some of your respectable teachers should have told you so....).

Despite all this, I think I'm wrong, because a bunch of know-it-alls that live 2100 years later, say so. What do those Romans and Carthaginians know anyways they are bunch of barbarians compared to us? Of course, those armchair generals have no historical legs to stand on, except their own "logic" backed by the threat of using a banning stick.
I write because I hope I can learn something in an informative exchange of information and ideas; ready to change my opinion at a moment's notice if I'm proven wrong. You write for your egos like a bunch of kids, nodding at each other's ideas, and learning the wrong information. How sad. I don't have time for this. You don't have to ban me, I'm done with this section until you have adults on here. Grow the fuck up

...says the man who has not made a single argument and is now throwing a childish temper tantrum. Grow up, get a degree, then come back.

It would have been almost impossible for Hannibal to have immediately marched on Rome. Gregory Daly, in his book Cannae: The Experience Of Battle In The Second Punic War, points out that the Punic Army would not have been in any shape to march immediately following the slaughter at Cannae, being physically and emotionally exhausted. Furthermore, on the march, Hannibal was able to manage about 20km a day on average. Rome is 400km from Cannae, which means a march of twenty days minimum (in addition to however long it takes Hannibal's troops to recover from the strain of battle) —more than enough time for Rome to recruit levies to fill out the legions to defend the city as well as improving its works. Additonally, Rome still has the port of Ostia, from which she can receive further reinforcements from Spain and supplies in all that time.

Hannibal had no siege engines nor the logistical train necessary to sustain either the march to Rome or a protracted investment of the city had he managed to keep his post-Cannae army intact along the way, and he won't have sufficient numbers to prevent raiding forces from picking off his troops in a guerrilla campaign of attrition, in accordance with the Fabian strategy which Rome reinstituted following Cannae. He doesn't have the force to take the city by direct assault and time is not on his side. Finally, a protracted siege denies Hannibal the opportunity to achieve the political objectives of his campaign by pinning himself down in one locale instead of meeting Roman armies in the field to destroy them in set-piece battles —which the Romans were not going to grant him the opportunity for in any case. And if Hannibal besieges Rome with the force he needs to even attempt to do the job, he can't defend the cities which defected to him from Roman armies which will be free to manoeuver at will and attack at any point of their choosing.

After the Romans got over the momentary shock of Hannibal sieging the city (which would have lasted about 15 minutes) they would have fallen over themselves with glee over being sieged. Hannibal did not have nearly a large enough army to properly encircle Rome. Any attempt would have spread his troops very thin and allowed Roman sallies to cut to pieces sections of his army before Hannibal himself might even hear of the sally much less get there to organize his forces.

Find a map of Rome at this time. Figure out how many miles of wall it has. Count the number of gates. Then take those numbers and divide them by the total force Hannibal had at his disposal after Cannae. His army gets pretty thin when spread over the entire area around Rome.

This does not even take into accoun the fact that he has no ability to attack the city since he has no siege equipment. He has no disloyal contingent of Greeks in the city to open a gate at night for him. Finally he has no ability to keep the Romans from bringing in supplies from the sea, not that it would matter. He doesnt have the forces to keep trade from coming in and out of the city through any number of gates he did not have the troops to cover.

Take a look at history and see how many times ancient Rome was stormed versus bled out by much larger attacking armies.

Patrick Degan wrote: Finally, a protracted siege denies Hannibal the opportunity to achieve the political objectives of his campaign by pinning himself down in one locale .....

Hannibal sieged many cities in the south that held out. He had to break off the sieges when Roman legions appraoched and there was a risk of being pinned by the legion on one side and the city on another.

Hannibal was a master of maneuver warfare. He chose where to fight and where not to fight. It is rather telling that when he was defeated in Zama, not only was it by experienced troops led by a general familiari with Hannibal, it was also in a defensive situation. Hannibal was protecting Carthage and this meant he could not dance around forever and find the perfect place to fight Scipio.

Any major siege of a city does the same thing. It takes the maneuver element away from Hannibal.