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And if the US commanders had reason to doubt the guns had been moved then not sending men to take them is equally as stupid. It's easy to say in hindsight that they guns were moved, he was told they might have been, he should never have sent anyone to capture them, it's much harder to make that decision knowing the guns were there, they might have been moved, but if they haven't then they could seriously disrupt or stop the rest of the landings and still decide not to send troops at all. Either way its a gamble, risking the lives of them men sent to capture them against the chances the guns had been moved or the lives of the men on the beach against the chance that they haven't.

Miscommunication aside, ordering the attack is mostly an attempt to cover all bases, as it turned out a costly one but not stupid per say.

Zinegata wrote:
The Rangers are not a suicide unit. They are not billed as Kamikazes. Again, this is why their reputation is a bit overstated .

I dunno on that one, the ranger and the commandoes they were directly patterned on pretty much were expected to take on suicide missions if ordered. Sure, the idea wasn't to openly get yourself killed like a Japanese guy with a lunge mine, and act without any regard to losses, but they were intended to be expendable. This was also the reason why so stupidly excessively many ranger and commando units were formed, as it was not expected that they’d be good for more then one action. End result was since nobody wanted to order lots of sucide missions most of them simply fought as regular infantry. This was worse then useless since it still concentrated too many good men with too little firepower, compared to improving the quality of the overall infantry force. The 1st Special Service Force became the ultimate example of this inanity, divisional size ranger unit; it took over 130% losses before being disbanded as too ravaged to be rebuilt. The Marine Raider and Paramarine units must rank close behind since the Marines already labeled themselves elite, but they didn’t last long enough to get themselves slaughtered.

Simon_Jester wrote:That's not a good exchange, but I've heard worse. We're not into Charge of the Light Brigade territory with that.

That’s an awful comparison anyway; the Light Brigade took 40% losses and killed a bunch of Russians, if not the desired group. Such heavy losses in a single action were really not exceptional for the world wars, and heck, not that unheard of in the 19th century either. A couple British battalions on the Somme took 80-90% losses without even reaching the German trenches. The memory of Light Brigade is more about the song and the visual image then the hard facts. Very annoying.

Point Du Hoc in conception has struck me as more of a finding something for the Rangers to do mission the anything else. It was a big invasion, everyone wanted his special part. It certainly was not the most powerful German battery around by any measure, and while it was sighted well forward in a dangerous location that allowed it to be assaulted, this also left it very open to naval bombardment and attack from the rear by the other landing forces. Previous action at Dieppe gave some reason to think a frontal commando attack on a Nazi coastal battery would work, but then it also gave a lot of reason to expect it wouldn’t.

Interestingly at other sectors of the Atlantic Wall, the Germans very expected this sort of attack on cliffs, and had rows of shells and bombs modified to be time bombs rigged up along the cliff edges to be hurtled down onto the beach below by remote control. Had such defenses existed at Point Du Hoc the landing force would have been annihilated. Might have been anyway had the Germans had the guns in position, and far more troops around to guard them.

Sea Skimmer wrote:Might have been anyway had the Germans had the guns in position, and far more troops around to guard them.

Rather interestingly Germany sold 9 21 cm guns to Sweden, like the ones installed in battery Marcouf, in 1944.

Alkaloid wrote:And if the US commanders had reason to doubt the guns had been moved then not sending men to take them is equally as stupid. It's easy to say in hindsight that they guns were moved, he was told they might have been, he should never have sent anyone to capture them, it's much harder to make that decision knowing the guns were there, they might have been moved, but if they haven't then they could seriously disrupt or stop the rest of the landings and still decide not to send troops at all. Either way its a gamble, risking the lives of them men sent to capture them against the chances the guns had been moved or the lives of the men on the beach against the chance that they haven't.

Miscommunication aside, ordering the attack is mostly an attempt to cover all bases, as it turned out a costly one but not stupid per say.

The problem is that the intelligence was very solid that there were no guns at Pointe Du Hoc at all, and according to some accounts the guns they found were actually just there by chance.

The original objective of the mission was to take out a heavy anti-shipping battery. What they found instead was a battery of 88mm guns, which wasn't capable of anti-shipping roles at all. Taking them out didn't really help the invasion at all, and arguably just kept three companies worth of troops and landing craft from participating in the much more critical fight at Omaha.

I dunno on that one, the ranger and the commandoes they were directly patterned on pretty much were expected to take on suicide missions if ordered. Sure, the idea wasn't to openly get yourself killed like a Japanese guy with a lunge mine, and act without any regard to losses, but they were intended to be expendable. This was also the reason why so stupidly excessively many ranger and commando units were formed, as it was not expected that they’d be good for more then one action. End result was since nobody wanted to order lots of sucide missions most of them simply fought as regular infantry. This was worse then useless since it still concentrated too many good men with too little firepower, compared to improving the quality of the overall infantry force. The 1st Special Service Force became the ultimate example of this inanity, divisional size ranger unit; it took over 130% losses before being disbanded as too ravaged to be rebuilt. The Marine Raider and Paramarine units must rank close behind since the Marines already labeled themselves elite, but they didn’t last long enough to get themselves slaughtered.

Yeah, I'm not trying to say they're not sent into insanely risky and dangerous missions. My only point is that's a bit different from outright suicide units like Kamikazes, and that the Rangers tended be wasted on what ultimately amounted to pointless battles when a bit of thinking (and less of "We must prove we're Supermen!") could have saved a lot of blood. Their real successes were just Omaha (punched through weak beach defenses serving as infantry), and the raid in Cabanatuan (which worked mainly because they thought the plan through with the Filipino guerillas).

They did very good work at Salerno, though they also had some attached 75mm half tracks. Merrill’s Marauders are probably best example of the Rangers actually operating in conditions that demanded something exceptional. The logic of the overall operation is open to question, but it damn well worked and allowed a minimal force to defeat a much larger enemy in conditions under which regular troops would have dropped dead.

Zinegata wrote:Willingness to take losses is fine. But these losses must be justified by concrete gains based on the sacrifices made. For instance, I wouldn't besmirch the "elite" reputation of the US Airborne because of the heavy losses they suffered in Normandy - despite the additional casualties incurred due to the bad drop most historians agree that they played a pivotal role in delaying the German counter-attacks on the beaches. That's a sacrifice with a much more important return, as opposed to losing 3 companies for 1 battery.

This sounds just plain thick-headed to me.

The question of troop quality is not the same as good command decisions. Good leadership can allow a theoretically 'inferior' army (lower-grade manpower, inferior equipment) to triumph over a 'superior' one. Bad leadership can cause a superior unit to lose to an inferior one.

Your entire argument seems to be "the Rangers had a colonel who took too many risks for an objective I deem insufficient, therefore the Rangers weren't all they were cracked up to be." I don't get how this is supposed to make sense.

Simon_Jester wrote:The question of troop quality is not the same as good command decisions. Good leadership can allow a theoretically 'inferior' army (lower-grade manpower, inferior equipment) to triumph over a 'superior' one. Bad leadership can cause a superior unit to lose to an inferior one.

Your entire argument seems to be "the Rangers had a colonel who took too many risks for an objective I deem insufficient, therefore the Rangers weren't all they were cracked up to be." I don't get how this is supposed to make sense.

"There are no bad regiments, only bad regimental commanders"?

Leadership does in fact play a key role regardless of the conditioning of the troops due to their training and physical prowess. If you have an excellent company like Easy Company of the 506th, but it's led by Captain Sobel who can barely read a map, then you go from an "Elite" company that can take out an entire battery with just two squads to a "Dead" company charging a lone machinegun in the open.

An "elite" unit must be sound from top to bottom. Well-conditioned troops are not gonna perform well if their immediate superiors are into the habit of ordering assaults on pointless objectives (and sacking officers who point out the truth); or launching operations with half-assed plans and little regard for intel (unlike Merrill's Marauders).

Zinegata wrote:The problem is that the intelligence was very solid that there were no guns at Pointe Du Hoc at all, and according to some accounts the guns they found were actually just there by chance.

The original objective of the mission was to take out a heavy anti-shipping battery. What they found instead was a battery of 88mm guns, which wasn't capable of anti-shipping roles at all. Taking them out didn't really help the invasion at all, and arguably just kept three companies worth of troops and landing craft from participating in the much more critical fight at Omaha.

Wasn't part of the reason to take PDH that the fortifications were still intact, and even if the guns were moved, it would allow forward observers a perfectly save place to guide artillery to create havoc on Omaha and/or Utah? That alone would be a quite compelling reason to take PDH out or just disturb operation there, even at high cost.

LaCroix wrote:Wasn't part of the reason to take PDH that the fortifications were still intact, and even if the guns were moved, it would allow forward observers a perfectly save place to guide artillery to create havoc on Omaha and/or Utah? That alone would be a quite compelling reason to take PDH out or just disturb operation there, even at high cost.

I'm not really sure about that (PDH being an observation post that had a perfect view of Omaha). From the maps I've seen I'd tend to say "no" and I've never heard PDH described that way

Besides which, PDH actually isn't that far from Omaha (the 29th Division relieved the Rangers on D+1). And it was a location highly exposed to naval gunfire anyway. There were plenty of ways to take it out without picking the grappling hook option, and it was certainly not a great diversion when troops and landing craft were needed most at Omaha itself.

Zinegata wrote:

LaCroix wrote:Wasn't part of the reason to take PDH that the fortifications were still intact, and even if the guns were moved, it would allow forward observers a perfectly save place to guide artillery to create havoc on Omaha and/or Utah? That alone would be a quite compelling reason to take PDH out or just disturb operation there, even at high cost.

I'm not really sure about that (PDH being an observation post that had a perfect view of Omaha). From the maps I've seen I'd tend to say "no" and I've never heard PDH described that way

Besides which, PDH actually isn't that far from Omaha (the 29th Division relieved the Rangers on D+1). And it was a location highly exposed to naval gunfire anyway. There were plenty of ways to take it out without picking the grappling hook option, and it was certainly not a great diversion when troops and landing craft were needed most at Omaha itself.

Well, they tried a naval bombardment and a bombing run, but the facility was hard enough to withstand it almost unharmed. That's why they had to send boots there to be sure.

I'm still trying to figure out:

Are we talking about whether the Ranger assault was a bad idea?

Or are we talking about whether the fact that the assault happened at all makes the Rangers inferior troops, compared to their reputation?

Simon_Jester wrote:I'm still trying to figure out:

Are we talking about whether the Ranger assault was a bad idea?

Or are we talking about whether the fact that the assault happened at all makes the Rangers inferior troops, compared to their reputation?

My original point is that the Ranger's reputation as elite troops is overblown; they were generally annihilated with little gain save for a few actions. Skimmer points out this may have to do with them being employed as infantry (and with a paucity of heavy weapons)... but again how "elite" can you really be when you get wiped out just as badly as other infantry? (The 29th Division for instance also suffered over 100% losses in Normandy)

My further point is that a truly elite unit needs to have sound leadership. PDH was an example of very brave troops attacking a non-objective thanks to unsound leadership; who proceeded to attack despite knowing it was already a non-objective. That's not the actions of an "elite" unit. Merill's Marauders by contrast do show it by having excellent troops AND a sound a leader.

My original point is that the Ranger's reputation as elite troops is overblown; they were generally annihilated with little gain save for a few actions. Skimmer points out this may have to do with them being employed as infantry (and with a paucity of heavy weapons)... but again how "elite" can you really be when you get wiped out just as badly as other infantry? (The 29th Division for instance also suffered over 100% losses in Normandy)

come again?

Crazedwraith wrote:

My original point is that the Ranger's reputation as elite troops is overblown; they were generally annihilated with little gain save for a few actions. Skimmer points out this may have to do with them being employed as infantry (and with a paucity of heavy weapons)... but again how "elite" can you really be when you get wiped out just as badly as other infantry? (The 29th Division for instance also suffered over 100% losses in Normandy)

come again?

My original post:

There are also cases wherein the units themselves tend to overblow their own reputation. The US Rangers in particular come to mind, despite their lofty reputation and constant appearance in games and other media, their performance in World War 2 was actually marginal. The Rangers were pretty much annihilated in every single battle they fought in.

Skimmer then explains that the heavy losses were how they were actually employed:

End result was since nobody wanted to order lots of sucide missions most of them simply fought as regular infantry. This was worse then useless since it still concentrated too many good men with too little firepower, compared to improving the quality of the overall infantry force. The 1st Special Service Force became the ultimate example of this inanity, divisional size ranger unit; it took over 130% losses before being disbanded as too ravaged to be rebuilt. The Marine Raider and Paramarine units must rank close behind since the Marines already labeled themselves elite, but they didn’t last long enough to get themselves slaughtered.

Whether this is enough to still call them elite... I'm a bit leery.

Sorry I was unclear. Check the part of the quote is bolded. This section: (The 29th Division for instance also suffered over 100% losses in Normandy)


Over 100% losses is a neat trick. Was that just a typo or creative book keeping on someone's casualty list?

Crazedwraith wrote:Sorry I was unclear. Check the part of the quote is bolded. This section: (The 29th Division for instance also suffered over 100% losses in Normandy)


Over 100% losses is a neat trick. Was that just a typo or creative book keeping on someone's casualty list?

Oh.

Nearly all US combat units suffered over 100% losses by the end of the war. Some had something like 300% losses - largely because they also counted the replacements who also became casualties.

For instance, say you had a Division of 10,000 guys. It loses 9,000 men in Normandy (90% losses), who all get replaced. It then loses another 5,000 men at the Bulge... bringing its total losses to 14,000, or 140% of the unit.

The 29th was one Division that suffered such heavy losses. Its commander was morbidly described by many as a "Corps Commander" - because he had "A Division in the foxholes, a Division in the Hospital, and a Division in the Cemetery".

I believe what's so confusing is the statement of over 100% losses in Normandy. Do you mean the campaign as a whole? On first glance it reads as if they managed to suffer 100% casualties during the landings, which would imply replacements during the battle.

Zinegata wrote:

Simon_Jester wrote:I'm still trying to figure out:

Are we talking about whether the Ranger assault was a bad idea?

Or are we talking about whether the fact that the assault happened at all makes the Rangers inferior troops, compared to their reputation?

My original point is that the Ranger's reputation as elite troops is overblown; they were generally annihilated with little gain save for a few actions. Skimmer points out this may have to do with them being employed as infantry (and with a paucity of heavy weapons)... but again how "elite" can you really be when you get wiped out just as badly as other infantry? (The 29th Division for instance also suffered over 100% losses in Normandy)

My further point is that a truly elite unit needs to have sound leadership. PDH was an example of very brave troops attacking a non-objective thanks to unsound leadership; who proceeded to attack despite knowing it was already a non-objective. That's not the actions of an "elite" unit. Merill's Marauders by contrast do show it by having excellent troops AND a sound a leader.

That's a frankly stupid metric without context, though. For starters in specific instances the Ranger commander is not responsible for the choice of mission, only its execution. No unit no matter how elite is able to dodge bullets - losses are inevitable (and for the record, pretty sure the Ranger companies that landed on Omaha itself took lower casualties than their counterparts in the 29th and generally performed better). Hard to fault the leadership of the Ranger battalions or the 1st SSF when the missions assigned to them were so far removed from the ones they had trained for.

xthetenth wrote:I believe what's so confusing is the statement of over 100% losses in Normandy. Do you mean the campaign as a whole? On first glance it reads as if they managed to suffer 100% casualties during the landings, which would imply replacements during the battle.

When I say Normandy I refer to the whole campaign (from the Beaches to the breakout, covering several weeks), where the 29th suffered well over its own original strength in losses. If it was just the battle for the beaches I would specifically say "Omaha" as opposed to Normandy.

For starters in specific instances the Ranger commander is not responsible for the choice of mission, only its execution.

Rudder actually was to a large extent. I've covered how Rudder decided to proceed with PDH and send all of his Rangers (despite having the option to go Omaha) even after knowing the guns were not there. The only reason why the rest of the Rangers didn't end up at PDH was because they thought the initial attack was actually wiped out. If they had gotten the correct signal, a whole Ranger battalion would have ended up uselessly at PDH instead of Omaha.

No unit no matter how elite is able to dodge bullets - losses are inevitable (and for the record, pretty sure the Ranger companies that landed on Omaha itself took lower casualties than their counterparts in the 29th and generally performed better). Hard to fault the leadership of the Ranger battalions or the 1st SSF when the missions assigned to them were so far removed from the ones they had trained for.

Hard to say if that's because the Rangers are awesome or because the Rangers lucked out and hit a soft spot in the German defenses (which their portion of the beach was).

If they had landed where "A" company of the 29th's 116th Regiment did, I am doubtful they could have done much better. Thinking that you're elite doesn't help much when you get plastered by heavy guns right after you step off the landing craft.

It's not hard to say at all. Company C 2d Rangers landed next to Company A of the 116th on the edge of Dog Green (facing the Vierville exit) and lost more than half it's strength (34 out of 65) crossing the beach. Unlike other units on the beach, they immediately rallied and began to move out - specifically by climbing up a cliff face. The Official History records that Company C 'was probably the first assault unit to reach the high ground (beach sector Charlie)'.

Beyond that, it does get more difficult because Ranger units either became intermingled with with the remnants of the 116th on Dog Green (Companies A and B of the 2d) or came in intact (as the 5th did) almost totally intact. In general, the Rangers displayed more cohesiveness than their line counterparts and more initiative in getting off the beach. Which is an obvious product of their superior training and selection process.

As it also points out, the cliff was sheltering them from enemy fire, and as this landing was the extreme right flank of the beach they wouldn't have faced the worst of the mortar and artillery concentrations either, nor the direct fire from German 75mm casemates further east. Not to mention the German defenses had more depth in the center. Doubtful they've have looked any better then anyone else if they'd be thrust into the dead center of the force.

Zinegata wrote:My original point is that the Ranger's reputation as elite troops is overblown; they were generally annihilated with little gain save for a few actions. Skimmer points out this may have to do with them being employed as infantry (and with a paucity of heavy weapons)... but again how "elite" can you really be when you get wiped out just as badly as other infantry? (The 29th Division for instance also suffered over 100% losses in Normandy)

"How tough can he be? A stick of dynamite will blow him up the same as the next man!"

You can't sensibly argue "they must have been mediocre because they got beat up when someone sent them into a really hard fight."

My further point is that a truly elite unit needs to have sound leadership. PDH was an example of very brave troops attacking a non-objective thanks to unsound leadership; who proceeded to attack despite knowing it was already a non-objective. That's not the actions of an "elite" unit. Merill's Marauders by contrast do show it by having excellent troops AND a sound a leader.

This makes no sense to me. It makes 'elite' status something that can be flipped on and off like a light switch whenever the commander is ordered to do something dangerous and risky.

Remember how chains of command work. The colonel commanding a unit may have some influence over whether the unit is committed to a certain objective, but ultimately, if General Whathisname thinks that coastal gun battery needs to be taken out, it gets taken out, one way or another.

Sure, maybe Pointe du Hoc wasn't an example of that strict "fuck this is stupid but orders are orders," but a lot of other high-casualty battles were.


Another point that the Rangers cannot logically be blamed for is that the high command kept trying to use them as a form of 'super-infantry' to be thrown into line combat where any other equal-sized force would fail. That is exactly the wrong way to employ special forces, and it guarantees they'll take the heavy losses you think disqualify them from being 'elite' at all.

"Elite" doesn't necessarily mean "special forces". History has known many units which were basically infantry, but were comitted only to the hardest fights, because their commanders knew they were reliable.

Simon_Jester wrote:"How tough can he be? A stick of dynamite will blow him up the same as the next man!"

You can't sensibly argue "they must have been mediocre because they got beat up when someone sent them into a really hard fight."

The point is that an elite unit would know how to change the cirumstances of the fight so that they don't have to absorb a stick of dynamite on the way in.

Frankly, what you seem to be describing isn't "elite" troops - but shock troops or even suicide troops. Guys who will attack an objective regardless of the difficulty. Which again sounds great on paper, but in practice results in unnecessarily high casualties (i.e. Banzai charges, which made little sense but did require a fair bit of courage).

Remember how chains of command work. The colonel commanding a unit may have some influence over whether the unit is committed to a certain objective, but ultimately, if General Whathisname thinks that coastal gun battery needs to be taken out, it gets taken out, one way or another.

Yes, but like I keep pointing out, all the mistakes at PDH were done at the Colonel level. It wasn't as though a General wanted to attack PDH and the Rangers were against it. The head Ranger himself wanted it, despite already knowing the objective wasn't there and he had an option to go to Omaha (which was a real objective) anyway.

Now, you can argue "This was just Rudder being an idiot! It doesn't put a black mark on all the Rangers!". And like I said, I agree with Skimmer and Merrill's did very well.

But the problem for me is that good leadership has not been institutionalized within the Ranger organization (how can it be when the leadership varies in quality so much?). Moreover, this is a very real indication of how the Rangers tend to engage in "brawn over brains" types of actions.

In Black Hawk Down for instance (the book), the Delta Force commander considered the Ranger commander (Steele) to be an "arrogant buffoon" who spent too much time giving useless pep talks instead of good tactical training. The Delta Commander himself was a former Ranger, and he points out specifically how very few Rangers make it to Delta or other Special Forces precisey because while the Rangers are highly fit, their tactical and leadership training was completely lacking, and the mindset tended to encourage useless heroics as opposed to teamwork.

It was so bad that despite spending a lot of time at the firing range, Steele's men ended up shooting at the Delta Force guys in bouts of over-excitement despite Delta wearing about the same uniforms as the Rangers! And it's not as though it's the only incident they ever had - Tillman for instance was killed by friendly fire from the Rangers in Afghanistan.

====

Contrast this to the 506th's Easy Company. When Sobel was shown to be an inept combat leader, he was replaced and put into a role that he excelled in (compare that to Steele, who instead got the Bronze Star, retained the same leadership style, and ended up getting involved in war crimes in Iraq). When Dike froze, Winters replaced him with Spiers who got the job done. It wasn't about getting leaders who talked loudly, it was about getting leaders who understood combat and got the job done.

(Lipton's description of the Brecourt Manor assault is particularly telling: Nobody tried to rush a machine gun or did any heroics. We found a way to flank it or suppress it. We learned very early in training that heroics didn't get the job done, and getting the job done was more important)

Being elite means being sound from top to bottom. That means being willing to replace inept commanders who charge machine guns for glory. As opposed to promoting inept commanders and replacing commanders who made the right call.

PeZook wrote:"Elite" doesn't necessarily mean "special forces". History has known many units which were basically infantry, but were comitted only to the hardest fights, because their commanders knew they were reliable.

But were the Rangers trained for that kind of 'super-infantry' mission, or more in line with what we now think of as special forces?

Zinegata wrote:

Simon_Jester wrote:"How tough can he be? A stick of dynamite will blow him up the same as the next man!"

You can't sensibly argue "they must have been mediocre because they got beat up when someone sent them into a really hard fight."

The point is that an elite unit would know how to change the cirumstances of the fight so that they don't have to absorb a stick of dynamite on the way in.

Frankly, what you seem to be describing isn't "elite" troops - but shock troops or even suicide troops. Guys who will attack an objective regardless of the difficulty. Which again sounds great on paper, but in practice results in unnecessarily high casualties (i.e. Banzai charges, which made little sense but did require a fair bit of courage).

Zinegata, you're missing the point.

Soldiers do what they're damn well ordered to do. Sometimes someone screws up and a lot of them get killed. That is true of both elite and non-elite units.

The difference between elite and non-elite is in how those soldiers perform under given conditions- because they don't get to choose the conditions they fight under. Regiments do not get to say "I'm sorry, but this attack on Omaha Beach looks stupid, let's go to Utah Beach instead." The decision is made for them, because that's how armies work.

There are armies famous for having good troops and poor leadership: "lions led by donkeys." Sometimes troop quality compensates for bad strategy; at least as often, it does not.

Yes, but like I keep pointing out, all the mistakes at PDH were done at the Colonel level. It wasn't as though a General wanted to attack PDH and the Rangers were against it. The head Ranger himself wanted it, despite already knowing the objective wasn't there and he had an option to go to Omaha (which was a real objective) anyway.

One, from the sound of it, it is questionable whether he "knew it wasn't there," as opposed to "wasn't sure if it was there or not." Second, I'm not clear on what you expect to have happened. Was the colonel commanding the Rangers supposed to refuse to carry out the assault altogether? Or are you saying that he was solely responsible for planning it and got to decide where his troops would go at Normandy all by himself?

But the problem for me is that good leadership has not been institutionalized within the Ranger organization (how can it be when the leadership varies in quality so much?). Moreover, this is a very real indication of how the Rangers tend to engage in "brawn over brains" types of actions.

Is "all our officers always make the right choices" a requirement for elite status?

It was so bad that despite spending a lot of time at the firing range, Steele's men ended up shooting at the Delta Force guys in bouts of over-excitement despite Delta wearing about the same uniforms as the Rangers! And it's not as though it's the only incident they ever had - Tillman for instance was killed by friendly fire from the Rangers in Afghanistan.

This part I'm not going to argue one way or the other- save that this is the same organization fifty years later, so trying to generalize sounds pretty foolish.

Being elite means being sound from top to bottom. That means being willing to replace inept commanders who charge machine guns for glory. As opposed to promoting inept commanders and replacing commanders who made the right call.

Well if that's your point, why didn't you say so earlier... Seriously, it's a good point, but you were meandering all over the map by criticizing the Rangers in a vague, general way for just being in the wrong place. Or at least that's how it sounded to me.