What is meat good for?

[Simplicius]

True. The minimum value of 'any length of time' is quite high for humans though, largely due to our pathetically slow LTM write speed. I'd guess days before you even began to notice any differences. Of course there is no sharp threshold; similarity isn't even a simple scalar, it's potentiall a /very/ high dimensionality measurement (depending on how pedantic you're being at that moment...). But for legal purposes we generally need sharp thresholds even if they're arbitrary.

Even if it takes a while for the brain to be physically altered in response to an event, the experiential divergence would be instantaneous because the two could not occupy the same points in space. I would think that would be enough to establish the existence of two distinct persons, even if one was destroyed shortly thereafter.

In absolute terms yes, but that's a seperate issue. Earlier posters were fixating on sex. Sex is one of the sillier parts of human existence and certainly the part most needing a variety injection. Lots of bits of current human life are rather monotonous and uninspiring, but sex is /supposed/ to be one of the highpoints of the human condition. I like the notion of that (unlike plenty of transhumans who claim sex is a silly little physical instinct we should all get rid of ASAP), but it needs some serious work if the implementation is going to live up to the hype.

Plain sense would suggest that the fault lies with the hype-ers, and not that which is being hyped. But how does customizable hot-swappable genitalia differ, on the whole, from fetish play? Both are merely attempts to spice up a bit of simple recreation, when the whole problem could be easily avoided by some perspective in the first place.

[Starglider]

Even if it takes a while for the brain to be physically altered in response to an event, the experiential divergence would be instantaneous because the two could not occupy the same points in space.

I just addressed that; there isn't necessarily /any/ experiential divergence, because the copies may wake up in perfectly identical rooms. Unless you're implemented on a digital substrate and running in a digital simulation, there will always be some minute random drift, well below the threshold of measureability by anything but the most excessive instrumentation.

This isn't the point though. The point is that minor physical differences don't have any cognitive relevance. If you're still hung up on AIs being sentient and uploading working at all (which you specifically probably aren't, but plenty of people are), you won't grok the death can be equivalent to amnesia point. If you /do/ accept that substrate doesn't matter, then you need to think about whether the hard /physical/ branch actually implies any sort of hard /cognitive/ branch, when working out a scheme to apply utility to the existence of certain kinds of sentience/exprience (which is what happens when you try to express things like 'self preservation' in objective logic). If you hammer away at this with reductionist though experiments to isolate the edge cases (unfortunately we can't do all that many real experiments on this yet), you will be forced to conclude that the mapping from physics to consciousness is actually pretty fuzzy; e.g. 'human experience' is only meaningful /at all/ across timespans of at least 100s of milliseconds, but physical events happen in nanoseconds or less (down to planck times for the likely temporal resolution of the real universe). Given adequate technology, I could clone you a thousand times, kill half of them, merge the rest, then do that again one thousand times over - in a few milliseconds. This isn't ridiculously speculative; if you were an upload running on a supercomputer, I could literally do that. You'd never notice of course. Did I just murder half a million yous? Half a million random clones? For uploads, are you going to define physical continuity by memory address? Do you die and get cloned every time you get moved by the memory manager, or rescheduled on a different set of processors?

To be consistent, morality must obey a certain kind of equivalence principle. It should still work for arbitrary substrates. It should still work if the many-worlds theory is true and you're naturally 'cloned' trillions of times a millisecond. It should still work given the existence of a whole list of sci-fi technologies, and it should /never/ start relying on things with no measureable effect. Ideally it should be derriveable by rational aliens and AIs from sensible axioms, which do not include 'because it feels wrong'.

But how does customizable hot-swappable genitalia differ, on the whole, from fetish play? Both are merely attempts to spice up a bit of simple recreation,

There's no fundamental difference. It's just better. Sex wouldn't be sex if it was fundamentally different. But we can make it ten orders of magnitude better. This is a worthwhile endeavour. It's certainly not going to get any /worse/, so the 'oh noes my robot body won't have a penors' people should STFU.

when the whole problem could be easily avoided by some perspective in the first place.

I don't see sex as a problem, particularly (some transhumanists do, IMHO because they're over-abstractionist and/or just bitter). It's just a case of 'if you're going to do something, you might as well do it properly'. They amount of abstraction you have to make the whole concept of sex look completely arbitrary (as opposed to just the reciprocating-sausage part) is IMHO excessive and pointless for practical purposes.

[The Duchess of Zeon]

It's ok. What you believe about it won't make any difference anyway.

Actually, if enough humans thought this was a really, really bad thing, we'd have our own version of the Butlerian Jihad.

[Surlethe]

They aren't components of the same person. They're two very, very similar people. The point is that 'me' as a category, to make any sense at all, includes a lot of very similar people. If you can count your future self a month from now as 'me', certainly two people based on the current you but experiencing different things for the next ten minutes count as 'you'. What molecules they're made of is utterly irrelevant to any sane 'me-ness' measurement.

Why should a sane measure of "me-ness" treat concurrent, separate, distinct, and yet similar, persons the same as similar, separate, and distinct persons who do not exist concurrently?

[Kuroneko]

If we must give up something, making personal identity "fuzzy" in this manner is far from the only alternative. For example, we could simply deny that the personal identity relation is transitive, in which case a branching of A into B and C could have A,B and A,C having the same identity without B,C doing so. Alternatively, the case of branching identity is so pathological that we might simply adopt a certain legalistic approach to personhood: when A branches into B and C, B and C are personally distinct from one another, but with A becoming personally identical with the aggregate {B,C} rather than any of them individually.

Neither of those approaches are very attractive in dealing with personal branching (there are others, but more outlandish), but I'd prefer either of them to Starglider's "fuzzy measurement"-based approach, which at best shows that in some cases resolving these issues of is in some particular cases is difficult to practically impossible. But so what? As an analogy to, say, pure utilitarian ethics, we don't "know" in any kind of absolute sense of certainty which is actually the best action to take, but we have good heuristics about these matters and thus most of the time we have pretty good idea. Starglider's approach seems to substitute a heuristic of "me-ness" for a definition.

[Surlethe]

Dealing with branching in particular, it seems, as Mr Wong points out, that "continuity" of personhood depends on the physical continuity of the body to which the "person" is attached. Even though psychological discontinuities occur -- e.g., sleep -- because physical continuity is maintained one still identifies oneself as "me". This leads directly to something to suppress: if A branches into B and C, and supposing WLOG that A and B retain physical continuity while C does not, then A,B is distinct from C. Meanwhile, if A,B and A,C are both physically discontinuous, then say that A died at the moment of branching while B and C are distinct persons.

[Kuroneko]

Dealing with branching in particular, it seems, as Mr Wong points out, that "continuity" of personhood depends on the physical continuity of the body to which the "person" is attached.

If transplantation of a brain or central nervous system were possible, what does this say about the the identity of the (surviving) patient of such an operation? And if physical continuity of the CNS is what's actually important, how do you deal with the case where the neurons are replaced with other identically-acting neurons, either gradually or instantaneously?

This leads directly to something to suppress: if A branches into B and C, and supposing WLOG that A and B retain physical continuity while C does not, then A,B is distinct from C. Meanwhile, if A,B and A,C are both physically discontinuous, then say that A died at the moment of branching while B and C are distinct persons.

Suppose both B and C maintain physical continuity with A, e.g., A undergoes an amoeba-like fission. What follows? If you like, we can make it substantially less hypothetical by considering a patient undergoing hemispherectomy, which is a survivable medical procedure, but with both cerebral hemispheres then transplanted to other bodies.

[Surlethe]

If transplantation of a brain or central nervous system were possible, what does this say about the the identity of the (surviving) patient of such an operation? And if physical continuity of the CNS is what's actually important, how do you deal with the case where the neurons are replaced with other identically-acting neurons, either gradually or instantaneously?

Transplantation of the CNS maintains physical continuity because the CNS is the physical portion of the person. Similarly, replacement with identically-acting neurons -- either gradual or instantaneous -- also maintains physical continuity because the consciousness is not undergoing a discontinuous translation.

This, of course, leads to the conclusion that transplantation and replacement will maintain personhood, which does not seem to be a problem. It's not relevant in any case to the question of making a copy and branching the consciousness.

N.B.: it's not that physical continuity is biconditional to distinct personality; the claim is simply that it's necessary.

Suppose both B and C maintain physical continuity with A, e.g., A undergoes an amoeba-like fission. What follows?

Then the person has multiple personality disorder.

If you like, we can make it substantially less hypothetical by considering a patient undergoing hemispherectomy, which is a survivable medical procedure, but with both cerebral hemispheres then transplanted to other bodies.

I see no problem with saying that B and C are separate persons.

[Simplicius]

[Trimmed for brevity's sake, not for dishonesty's]

Hm. Please bear with me, as I am puzzling my way through this with little more than my native faculties.

If I understand you correctly, there are basically three ways a person can be copied, in terms of timing. The first is that the copy is made at the exact instant the original is destroyed, in which case the consciousness transfers from one physical entity to another, and is never borne by more than one individual simultaneously. This is a "torch-passing" case as I previously described.

The second is that the two entities exist concurrently, but for a duration shorter than the human ability to register. Even though two beings may co-exist momentarily, anything which transpires during that time won't be noticed by either, so for all practical purposes the torch has been passed cleanly.

The third, and the second case which I originally imagined, is the the two entities co-exist long enough for the human mind to register that time has passed. In that case, unless the circumstances are perfectly controlled, divergence is rather likely, as something as small as a stray air current could provoke a thought in the mind of one which does not occur in the mind of the other. Since it seems sensible to call only those things identical which are not detectably different, this case most probably creates two distinct persons, even if only temporarily.

If only this latter case creates two persons, only in this case would moral prohibition of the destruction of a person activate, as personhood is intact in the first two cases regardless of the fate of one physical entity.

Is this more or less accurate?

There's no fundamental difference. It's just better. Sex wouldn't be sex if it was fundamentally different. But we can make it ten orders of magnitude better. This is a worthwhile endeavour. It's certainly not going to get any /worse/, so the 'oh noes my robot body won't have a penors' people should STFU.

Ah. I think we're talking about the same problem in two different ways. As you present it, the problem is that people get bored with sex, and the solution is the introduction of new and hitherto unimaginable variety. As I present it, the problem is boredom itself, and human mental faculties make that solvable enough for anyone who cares to actually work at it.

At any rate, I'm not disputing your refutation. If or when human augmentation goes mainstream, the market for sexual enhancement will be huge.

[Kuroneko]

Transplantation of the CNS maintains physical continuity because the CNS is the physical portion of the person. Similarly, replacement with identically-acting neurons -- either gradual or instantaneous -- also maintains physical continuity because the consciousness is not undergoing a discontinuous translation.

What exactly do you mean a discontinuity in consciousness, if not an interruption of conscious thought (and possibly lower-level thought as well)? You seem to be using some other meaning. A cessation of brain activity is at least sometimes a temporary phenomenon, after all.

This, of course, leads to the conclusion that transplantation and replacement will maintain personhood, which does not seem to be a problem. It's not relevant in any case to the question of making a copy and branching the consciousness.

It's relevant to whether a non-brain-transplantation transfer, which is analogous to a "copy without branching", maintains personhood. That's what started this thread in the first place.

Then the person has multiple personality disorder.

Ah, so the person and his or her fission products are the same.

I see no problem with saying that B and C are separate persons.

Then a hemispherectomy patient is actually destroyed during the operation? This suggests that the doctors who perform them are killers. If you do not accept this, then you're implicitly adopting one of the stances I've mentioned a few posts ago: B,C are distinct but A and the aggregate {B,C} are the same (as per your above answer). But since this is by itself enough to deal with the problems of branching, why is physical continuity a necessary condition?

[Surlethe]

What exactly do you mean a discontinuity in consciousness, if not an interruption of conscious thought (and possibly lower-level thought as well)? You seem to be using some other meaning. A cessation of brain activity is at least sometimes a temporary phenomenon, after all.

Of course. I'm not sure where I've used the term discontinuity in consciousness in some other sense.

It's relevant to whether a non-brain-transplantation transfer, which is analogous to a "copy without branching", maintains personhood. That's what started this thread in the first place.

How can a non-brain-transplantation transfer be physically continuous?

Then a hemispherectomy patient is actually destroyed during the operation? This suggests that the doctors who perform them are killers. If you do not accept this, then you're implicitly adopting one of the stances I've mentioned a few posts ago: B,C are distinct but A and the aggregate {B,C} are the same (as per your above answer). But since this is by itself enough to deal with the problems of branching, why is physical continuity a necessary condition?

In this case, A~{B,C} implies that physical continuity is still necessary. While physical continuity is intuitively satisfying in every case, A~{B,C} leads to the counterintuitive notion that if I copy myself into a computer, the situation in which I find myself is equivalent to that of a personality in a person with multiple personalities. Is there a compelling reason to accept counterintuitive conditions instead of intuitive ones?

[Kuroneko]

Of course. I'm not sure where I've used the term discontinuity in consciousness in some other sense.

As was previously discussed pages ago, whether or not the function of one physical substrate was interrupted has no bearing on this issue. According to your position, instantaneous replacement of all neurons with functionally equivalent ones is fine, except in cases where consciousness is interrupted. But if consciousness can be interrupted (say, cryogenic freeze or other hypothetical forms of stasis, or simply deep but temporary coma) without damaging personal identity, how is it that when we put combine both of them we get a new person? Consciousness does undergo a "discontinuous translation" in that case, if I understand your criterion correctly.

Either the physical substrate (the physical brain) is somehow important to personal identity per se (i.e., separately from its function in producing consciousness), in which case neural substitution is unacceptable even if the substitutes are functionally equivalent, or physical continuity is irrelevant. You seem to want to have it both ways.

How can a non-brain-transplantation transfer be physically continuous?

I think a better question would be: why must it?

In this case, A~{B,C} implies that physical continuity is still necessary.

Mere psychological continuity seems with this identity interpretation seems sufficient.

While physical continuity is intuitively satisfying in every case, A~{B,C} leads to the counterintuitive notion that if I copy myself into a computer, the situation in which I find myself is equivalent to that of a personality in a person with multiple personalities. Is there a compelling reason to accept counterintuitive conditions instead of intuitive ones?

Well, since it is logically implied by your statements in the previous posts, I suppose it's at least as compelling as that.

[Darth Wong]

Strictly, yes, but only at the moment of copy. Given arbitrarily good technology, you can manipulate them such that milliseconds later, it is impossible for any external observer to tell which was the original and which was the copy.

Why does the observer's inability to differentiate between the two copies change the fact that one of them is the original, and one of them isn't?

This isn't relevant though. Yes, in practice, in the real universe, the two versions will usually experience differing future histories based on their position (quantum effects also come in, but then you could have both locked in identical boxes for the rest of their life such that position doesn't actually matter even at the physical level).

Your position is still based on the assumption that identical characteristics = same entity. You can come up with a hundred different ways of expressing this basic axiom, but I don't see why I have to accept the axiom in the first place.

But this does not matter at the cognitive level, any more than whether they're neurons are actually neurons, nanobots perfectly simulating neurons at the hardware level, or a software simulation of neurons matters.

Fine, if you want to talk exclusively about "the cognitive level", then yes, if there's a copy of you somewhere, then someone is still cognitive and has your characteristics. That doesn't justify your assumption that identical characteristics = same entity.

But why is "the cognitive level" paramount here, other than the fact that this is the sphere where you feel most comfortable discussing the matter? Since when is the definition of life or identity tied up with cognitive abilities anyway? Is a plant not alive because it has little or no cognitive abilities? Does it have no discrete identity because of the absence of those abilities? We often use cognitive ability as a way of determining how much sympathy we should feel for a creature, but most people don't use it as a way of determining whether the creature is alive or discrete at all; that would be considered absurd.

Of course if you're still hung up on something that basic, I don't expect you to get why death-followed-by-resurrection-from-a-backup is subjectively equivalent to amnesia.

I get why that's the case ... for the copy. For the original, it's not equivalent to amnesia. It's equivalent to death. The original won't experience anything from this point forward.

In Philosophy 101, every student is taught that we are too hung up on the physical atoms in our bodies. We are taught that the atoms in our bodies are constantly changing, therefore the notion of a discrete physical identity is nonsense. This is generally considered to be an overwhelmingly powerful argument, nigh-immune to rebuttal. Except that it presumes one thing: that the "identity" argument requires life to be considered a physical object, rather than a process.

Not only is that assumption unwarranted, it is demonstrably false. After all, when you die, all of the atoms in your body are still there. The physical object is still there. But you're still dead, because the process of life has stopped. Life is indisputably a process. Therefore, pointing and laughing at the notion that the continuity of that process is integral to the definition of life is more churlish than witty.

[Stark]

Yes, it is, to any reasonable threshold of similarity. 1.0 is not a reasonable threshold, given how noisy and lossy human brains are in the first place and how (relatively) slowly they changte.

I'm really having trouble with what you're saying here. If I copy you, I'm creating SOMEONE ELSE who is EXACTLY LIKE you. You don't experience their life, they're totally independent from your perspective and experience. If you die, you're not magically transferred into the other body: you're dead. Some other guy, exactly like you, is alive, but it's not 'you': you have ceased to be.

Harping on about 'how identical' it is seems irrelevant. You have your perspective, and I could make a hundred million copies of you, but you've only got that one perspective. If I shoot you in the face (or disintegrate you, or whatever), you're dead, and all the little Stargliders are irrelevant to your death. The only change is that someone else THINKS they're you, but that doesn't change the fact that your life and perception ended.

I thought you were simply okay with your identity continuing to exist in another object, rather than apparently thinking your identity is somehow the same, in both (or all) of the objects at once.

[Stark]

GHETTO: I largely agree with what you're saying (from a materialist perspective), but I don't understand how you make the leap from 'able to create arbirary numbers of identical copys at a given state' (as in your AI example) and 'I'm not dead so long as a copy of me continues to exist'.

[petesampras]

I'm really having trouble with what you're saying here. If I copy you, I'm creating SOMEONE ELSE who is EXACTLY LIKE you. You don't experience their life, they're totally independent from your perspective and experience. If you die, you're not magically transferred into the other body: you're dead. Some other guy, exactly like you, is alive, but it's not 'you': you have ceased to be.

What, exactly, is this *you* which exists in your current body, but not in a copy? We'd agree, I believe, for reasons already discussed, the exact atoms which constitute your body aren't important. The information and cognitive processes encoded in your brain will exist in the copy. Information does not depend on the medium of it's storage, provided that medium is capable of accurately storing that information. So it can't be the information and your cognitive processes. So what is it that needs to be transfered. What else is there, apart from the matter and it's arrangements?

[AniThyng]

This begs the question of weather someone who has a "backup" copy of himself would then willingly risk (or induce) death in some fashion, supremely confident that "he" has not truly died?

[petesampras]

This begs the question of weather someone who has a "backup" copy of himself would then willingly risk (or induce) death in some fashion, supremely confident that "he" has not truly died?

Whether or not you believe that your identity has a particular link to a specific physical manifestation, this would be completely against human nature.

[Darth Wong]

What, exactly, is this *you* which exists in your current body, but not in a copy? We'd agree, I believe, for reasons already discussed, the exact atoms which constitute your body aren't important. The information and cognitive processes encoded in your brain will exist in the copy. Information does not depend on the medium of it's storage, provided that medium is capable of accurately storing that information. So it can't be the information and your cognitive processes. So what is it that needs to be transfered. What else is there, apart from the matter and it's arrangements?

What part of "life is a physical process" do you not understand, exactly?

Creating another process somewhere and setting some of its parameters to match does not mean that you have ensured the continuation of this process. And like Starglider, you are using your conclusion as a premise. You are trying to prove that "identical characteristics" = "same entity" by simply assuming it as a premise and using that premise in order to support itself. Pure circular logic. At no point is anyone actually justifying this premise.

[Old Peculier]

Of course if you're still hung up on something that basic, I don't expect you to get why death-followed-by-resurrection-from-a-backup is subjectively equivalent to amnesia.

I get why that's the case ... for the copy. For the original, it's not equivalent to amnesia. It's equivalent to death. The original won't experience anything from this point forward.

So taking this part back to the original point of the thread, 'what's so special about the meatbag?', then is there anything wrong with saying: sure, I'd like to download my brain into this machine/nano-clone/whatever then burn the original body. Yes my original body has died, but have any of the usually associated drawbacks of death actually happend? From the new-body's perspective, which is as equally mine as the original-body's, I've just had a body jump, and the original-body doesn't have a perspective, I'm dead. No problem?

[Darth Wong]

So taking this part back to the original point of the thread, 'what's so special about the meatbag?', then is there anything wrong with saying: sure, I'd like to download my brain into this machine/nano-clone/whatever then burn the original body. Yes my original body has died, but have any of the usually associated drawbacks of death actually happend? From the new-body's perspective, which is as equally mine as the original-body's, I've just had a body jump, and the original-body doesn't have a perspective, I'm dead. No problem?

The original question seems to be subjective in nature, ie- asking why people are so attached to their physicality. So obviously, it will have a subjective answer, and that's perfectly acceptable in this case. The attempt to turn it into a philosophical debate is arguably off-topic in its entirety.

[Boyish-Tigerlilly]

I wouldn't inherently mind abandoning a physical body for something else, as long as I am the one experiencing and I can lead a quality life (entertainment, etc).

However, if the process of conversion entails me having to die and merely a copy of me running into the sunset, that's all neat and all, but it's not benefiting me.

Other than that, I think it would be pretty cool and wouldn't have too many qualms about it.

I don't see how identical beings can be construed as the same being. If you cognitively cloned person A and put that into body B, both talking to you, and then if you killed A, A would no longer be experiencing the world despite his copy B continuing to talk to you. Somewhere, someone is losing existence.

[Seggybop]

What about present cases where patients "die" but then are later medically revived? In these cases, the process of life appears to have ceased, but then is resumed later.

Perhaps when this happens, the person does in fact die in the same way as if you made a clone of them and killed the original. In both cases, it seems that the original process has terminated and a new one has been initiated. Of course, that person retains all memories up to the point at which they died, and operates exactly the same even if they might be technically a different existence. Which means this idea isn't testable, so it isn't worth a whole lot.

Still, to continue speculating, maybe every period of consciousness that one experiences is like a distinct existence, kind of like a computer's operating session. Someone who is awake is like a computer powered on with the OS loaded, and someone dead is like a computer powered off. All the hardware and memory is still present, but inactive like any other inert matter in the world.

So, our consciousness might not be something that is intrinsically linked to our selves. If humans can lose consciousness and become inert, but then later reinitialize, that may imply that a copy human's consciousness and that of a human who has lost consciousness and regained it have the same validity as far as being the original goes.

[Stark]

What, exactly, is this *you* which exists in your current body, but not in a copy? We'd agree, I believe, for reasons already discussed, the exact atoms which constitute your body aren't important. The information and cognitive processes encoded in your brain will exist in the copy. Information does not depend on the medium of it's storage, provided that medium is capable of accurately storing that information. So it can't be the information and your cognitive processes. So what is it that needs to be transfered. What else is there, apart from the matter and it's arrangements?

I'm talking solely in terms of perspective. The existence of other Starks in the world has no bearing on my desire to die: I'm not going to allow myself to die and my perception to be extinguished, just because 'another Stark' will continue to exist and no information is being lost. *I'm* dead, and frankly that's all I care about from a 'don't shoot me in the face please' perspective.

I'm extremely materialist, but I'm eager to continue to experience life. The experiences of another person - however similar to me they are - is irrelevant to this desire.

[Dooey Jo]

Is there anything else in the whole world that behaves the way the pro-transfer people say the mind works? Not even computer software works like that (disregarding that the brain is in fact not a computer running software); cloning an instance of a program would only make them functionally the same, but they will still have unique process IDs, or running on physically different computers, or whatever. I can think of only one thing that is supposed to work that way; a soul that follows the mind it's bound to. It seems to me that this debate has deeply religious overtones, especially as it goes exactly the same way every time it's brought up, with the pro-transfer people only coming up with different analogies to say the same thing over and over, with no new reasoning or evidence.

What about present cases where patients "die" but then are later medically revived? In these cases, the process of life appears to have ceased, but then is resumed later.

When has this happened, exactly? If you're referring to the concept of "clinical death", that only means cessation of circulation and respiration.

Perhaps when this happens, the person does in fact die in the same way as if you made a clone of them and killed the original. In both cases, it seems that the original process has terminated and a new one has been initiated. Of course, that person retains all memories up to the point at which they died, and operates exactly the same even if they might be technically a different existence. Which means this idea isn't testable, so it isn't worth a whole lot.

Why would resuming a consciousness put "on hold" be the same as creating a totally new one with identical characteristics?