Largely because that doing a thesis' level of research and posting it online is alot of work for an informal discussion simply stating the book as my source by a credible and respectable analyst should have been enough.Simplicius wrote: Look- first, when you're asked for evidence, instead of saying "Buy the book," you find passages that support what you say and quote them. Preferably, these passages contain evidence the author used for her conclusions, and not just those conclusions. Otherwise, why should anyone care about this book?
Agreed, its a fun enough read that I'll consider this but I had priorities that took me elsewhere. So I had to make do with paraphrasing my understanding from memory.Second, by not presenting any text, you ask us to believe that you have a perfectly clear understanding of the author's conclusions and are relaying them to us free of distortion or misinterpretation. There is no guarantee that this is so, whether deliberately or not, which is why you should post relevant citations.
Why is being hearsay or not relevent in an academic paper/book? This isn't a court of law, it is an authoritive statement taken from said 'well known commentator' which is probably sourced in the footnotes.As it happens, there are excerpts of this book on Google Books here, from which you may quote. However, you should read closely before you do, so as not to make an ass of yourself.
1. This is hearsay, not an authoritative statement or a conclusion backed by evidence.Shirk, [i]China: Fragile superpower[/i], pp. 181-182 wrote:"Ordinary people take a very hard line on Taiwan," a well-known academic commentator explained later, "not because of the need to save face, but because if Taiwan goes independent, it will trigger other secessionist movements in Tibet, Xinjiang, and maybe Inner Mongolia, and national unity will be threatened. [] "But," he said, "Taiwan is a question of regime survival--no regime could survive the loss of Taiwan."
2. The academic refers to other separatist movements seizing on Taiwanese independence as an excuse for action, not mass protests, as the threat to the government.
I think its this one that chapter is shoddily sourced: Shi Guhong 1999, "Difficulties and Options: Thoughts on the Taiwan matter".
When gauging the opinions of an authoritarian government from its senior military officers what do you expect? Do you have reason to believe that this colonel wasn't met with or didn't give his correct view? Also this 'generalization' is repeated and substantiated upon several other times in the book.Shirk, p. 182 wrote:China's decision-makers feel trapped between Taiwan and their own public in an impossible situation. As one colonel put it, "People criticize the government for not doing enough about Taiwan. If Chen Shui-bian does something and the U.S. doesn't stop him, then the army will think it should act to teach him a lesson. Then the U.S. will respond and the Chinese people will support a harsh government reaction, showing muscle. But the U.S. is the world's superpower, it has face to keep, so the U.S. will have to respond, It will be impossible to control the escalation."
Again, Shirk states a generalization and provides hearsay from an anonymous source to "support" it.
Earlier in the book the view of the military is sourced here: "The Supreme Leader and the Military", Ji, 289.
Also substantiated here: "PRC Security relations with the United States, why things are going so well" China Leadership Monitor, no. 8.
Public Opinion on Taiwan being described as outraged by Taiwanese provocations given by the Social Survey Institute of China.
And again here: "Posing problems without catching up: China's Rise and challenges to US security".
Since the discussion is about Taiwan it was unnessasary to mention the other pillars of CPC legitimacy.Shirk, p. 183 wrote:Recognizing the huge costs of military action--at minimum, it would set back the economy by three, five, or ten years, according to various Chinese internal studies--the CCP leaders seek to avert it, or at least postpone it until the military is ready.
Here is indication of something you glossed over in your simplistic analysis. The CCP derives a lot of its legitimacy from its demonstrated ability to grow the economy and increase Chinese prosperity; protests a couple of years ago were not against the government for not being tough about Taiwan, but by poor rural Chinese who felt that the country's economic growth came at their expense (IIRC). Significant disruptions to economic growth are a threat to the CCP. Any action that derails that growth is anathema to the government - why do you think China stonewalls on international climate change treaties?
As for stonewalling climate change treaties I believe the integrity behind them are debatable either they target the developed world unfairly or they target the developing world unfairly, in either case China is putting alot of effort into greener technologies and energy efficiency and I trust that since its so obviously in their national best interest to do it then they will do so on their terms.
Substantiated later in the book sourced above.Shirk, p. 186 wrote:It is universally believed in China that the CCP would fall if it allowed Taiwan to become independent without putting up a fight. A Beijing student put it this way, "If we can't get Taiwan back, the Chinese government may lose its power to control the people. It will show that the government is too weak to protect our territory--then people will want to change the government, maybe even demand democracy."
HUGE claim there; no evidence given except more hearsay - from a student. But wait...
Aha but this is where your not getting it aside from you still incorrect perception of hearsay is that what actually may happen isn't nearly as important as peoples perception to it and what they believe, in Beijing the government thinks they would have to respond because that is the feedback they are getting from their media from the major cities, with a better and more open press Susan actually goes on to say the Government can get a better idea of peoples opinions and not just the extremes of those opinions but for now there is a limitation to what they know, and what they know so far and percieve is that losing face over Taiwan could be fatal.Shirk, pp. 186-187 wrote:People rarely specify how they think a Taiwan crisis would bring down the Communist Party--it takes more than a lot of angry, unhappy people to overturn a government. And, in fact, once you get outside the power elite in Beijing, you may find a 'silent majority' who care more about the economic progress than Taiwan. (A small group of local government officials told me that, as one of them said, "The people don't really care much about Taiwan. It's the government that cares.")
So, even in this morass of unsubstantiated generalizations and hearsay opinions, the author suggests that the country, on the whole, isn't going to pressure the government to crush and independent Taiwan, and is in fact pretty chill about the whole thing. Of course she doesn't bother to investigate this at all - no more than any of her other claims - but she basically confesses that her "authentic" hearsay might be totally irrelevant after all.
So the point is that while the Selectorate believes it is nessasary for regime survival they will probably react.
When I get time to do it, but I'm more interested in how you would conduct the research and how would you present it in a nation where open discussion of policy usually isn't publicly encouraged 'in the open' as it were and what sort of standards you would require before you would accept it as valid evidence.So, Blayne, it's your turn. Pick out the passages, either online or from the actual text, that lend credence to your claims.
Also, for anyone who wans a condensed read, there is a summary-review here.