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Camel wrote:Alright, I'm done. I,obviously, cannot contribute to this discussion.

That could be your epitaph if you don't shape up. Do you understand that debate goes on here, and that we discourage mindless chat and opining?

In Bomber Harris, you had an enthusiastic supporter of strategic bombing

So was Herman Hoering. Don't get me wrong - a combined air force would be many times stronger, but strategic bombing, as all military operations, runs on plans, not the absense/presense of a warmonger on top. The German plans were wrong-footed and lacked priority bombing schedule, not to say they completely missed the evacuation alltogether (such a massive project, would probably be dismissed as nigh-fantastic by all participants of WWII, so I can easily see the Combined AF step on the same old goo and make wrong-based and off-date bombing plans. After the relocation, however, you'd have to be fighting a war and strking targets in places were your aviation can hardly reach.

what effect would raids on Soviet targets like the thousand bomber raid on Hamburg have on USSR production and morale

Do make a thousand bomber raid, you need a thousand bomber force and a thousand-bomber raid plan that is signed and corrected and worked out by all military heads of the Combined Air Force. So I can't see a raid like that happening anywhere in the beginning of the war, where it could actually spell doom. And such a raid would only cause great hatred and a boost in morale opposed to sinking morale. It could cause great harm to the industry, but given Joe's brilliant evac plans (I would give out the maps for the Great Evacuation shortly) I find in hard to see how such bombings could account for any sort of victory over the USSR.

Still, the whole scenario requires a lot of people to have 180 degree changes WRT what they really did

It mostly requires the Phony War to come to an alliance with Hitler. If he keeps a low profile and tried to negotiate things with Poland, I could see that happening. Actually, Poland could very well be Hitler's ally in the Great Anti-Bolshevik Crusade. So it requires just minor tweaking of politics opposed to great turns.

Hitler proposing a 'tactical postponement' of the Final Solution

Hitler may have "postponed" the Final Solution of the Jewish question in Europe, but why would he "postpone" the Ostministerium, and more interestingly, why would Borman and Himmler, and Rosenberg somehow oppose the Ostministeriums genocidal plans when they were among the main architects and pushers of those plans? Nazi elite had a combined will for the plans; so Hitler alone reverting his decision to smite Jews for a little "halt" would not change the course of the Ostministerium's actions.

That is, if you don't mean by "postponing" the general stop of all of the Nazi elite's genocidal policies, not just the Jewish Question in Europe and not just Hitler... That's a very serious turn, even more serious than a Nazi-Western alliance I'd say.

My understanding of the Nazi government is that Hitler deliberately encouraged his underlings to fight amongst themselves as a means of cementing his own power.

For example, Heinz Hohne in his Order of the Death's Head, said that if the SS could quote a Fuhrer Order, they were unstoppable, but if they deviated even a hair's breadth from it, they were fair game for any other opposing satrapy within the party or government in the contest for Hitler's favor.

In other words, I really can't see Rosenberg or the others (especially Himmler, who was totally subservient to Hitler until almost the end) defying a Fuhrer Order to 'wait until later' when it comes to the east and the final solution.

I really can't see Rosenberg or the others (especially Himmler, who was totally subservient to Hitler until almost the end) defying a Fuhrer Order to 'wait until later' when it comes to the east and the final solution.

The plans, although intervoven, should be abandoned altogether if we're talking about really stopping the genocide in the East. The sad fact is however that Hitler only issued basic statements about what was to be done in the East. Himmler, Rosenberg, Borman and hte likes of them developed the actual plans and orders. Also, remember that Himmler was subservient to Hitler because Hitler was the one that sick bastard saw as fitting for power - essentially, Hitler gave Himmler a carte-blanche on so many occasions (the start of final solution in Poland - Hitler doesn't even look at orders brought by Himmler, signs). If Hitler curbs the "Final Solution" alltogether", then it would certainly cause some anger from sickos like Rosenberg and Himmler; they could actually see that as a treachery of the "racial-biologic idea" (the way of thought that dominated the entire Ostministerium). And then, Borman also would not be glad to hear the Fuehrer to be going against his own little robbery and murder plans. I'd say his underlings could stop fighting among themselves and try to remove the Fuehrer or somehow try to reverse his decisions. Whether they'd succeed is another question.

And, as I promised, Soviet Evacuation - a feat of fantastic scale against heavy odds.



The number of evacuated factories and facilities from the later-Occupied territories is 1523, and you can see how they were redistributed massively among farther population centers. See it for yourself. By Spring 1942, 1200 of 1523 redislocated major industrial facilities were up and running. I won't be translating the legends, sorry, as I posted it primarily so that people can see how the main bulk of industry was relocated in a few month in numbers. If you need something to be translated, just ask.

Stas Bush wrote:

In Bomber Harris, you had an enthusiastic supporter of strategic bombing

So was Herman Hoering.

And Hermann Goering's heaviest bomber (Greif) had a payload of 6000 kilograms. Which was used for tank-busting with 50mm and 75mm cannon. And Goering refused to allow the Greif to be equipped with four engines rather than two pair of linked engines, which would've actually made it useful. In 1942, the Luftwaffe had a grand total of 41 strategic bombers, although that was an improvement from 1941, when they had 4.

Don't get me wrong - a combined air force would be many times stronger, but strategic bombing, as all military operations, runs on plans, not the absense/presense of a warmonger on top.

As a corollary, you do need a decent high command to achieve the force necessary to pull off the operations. The Germans probably had the most incompetent overall organization within the Luftwaffe of all the air forces. Goering himself was an addict, a hedonist, and a vain popinjay of a coward. Milch relied on his position to get revenge on producers he disliked (in particular Messerschmitt and Junkers), as well as changing production orders so often that Russia outproduced Germany 8 to 1 in aircraft in 1942. Greim was probably fairly efficient in his office, but Milch kept the developments from being properly implemented.

The German plans were wrong-footed and lacked priority bombing schedule, not to say they completely missed the evacuation alltogether (such a massive project, would probably be dismissed as nigh-fantastic by all participants of WWII, so I can easily see the Combined AF step on the same old goo and make wrong-based and off-date bombing plans. After the relocation, however, you'd have to be fighting a war and strking targets in places were your aviation can hardly reach.

I will agree that if the relocation occurred, it would be very difficult to attack the factories. It would be much simpler to attack the oil fields and essentially cripple the Soviets the same way the Germans were crippled - tanks and airplanes would be useless without fuel. With the persuasion of allies, the Germans may be convinced to strike at the militarily important targets rather than empty figureheads.

The Dark

And Hermann Goering's heaviest bomber (Greif) had a payload of 6000 kilograms.

Hermann Hoering's bombers could demolish everything if they wanted to because the ranges were on the order of 1500 kms and the Nazis captured many airfields in the initial offensive. However the Nazis did not start pounding the industry to the ground, because they wanted to capture some of it, or perhaps just by blunder. And I don't see that blunder not happening, because - and I mean it - no one in the world seriously believed a country could pull off a total evacuation of their entire industry on 3000-4000 km distances and put it up and running in just a few month. The Germans did not even understand how massive the evacuation was even as they were pounded back to hell by Soviet Tank Armies, hence their surprise in 1943 and 1944 with "seemingly endless Bolshevik reseves and equipment" (q:Das Schwarze Korps).

Goering himself was an addict, a hedonist, and a vain popinjay of a coward.

He was, however, not the worst chief for an Aif Force. His Luftwaffe continued fighing into 1945, when both Kriegsmarine and Wehrmacht were decimated so severely that they could not even put up a fight.

It would be much simpler to attack the oil fields and essentially cripple the Soviets the same way the Germans were crippled

The question is, weren't the original plans also directed at the oil of the USSR?
Of course they were: 3th July 1941, 10 days after the war started, Hitler said: "It's time to look forward. I am speaking of the opportunity to aquire the Donbass and the Caucasus oil region. For the operation on Caucasus we need massive forces, but any price should be paid for oil".
A year later, 1 July 1942 he said: "If I will not get the oil of Maykop and Grozny, I have to abandon/finish this war". On 10th of August, 1942, General-Fielmarshall List took Maykop. The head of the Italian AF on the front wrote: "Tens of thousands of qualified workers follow List's armies to renew the production. To relaunch the oil facilities we would need from 4 to 6 month, according to estimates.
Stalin, on the other hand, was wary of the situation with oil (he knew the Allies were planning an air strike on USSR's oil central Baku), so he created massive storages along the Baku supply line - the oil was moved along to Astrakhan and Krasnowodsk, then near Swerdlowsk it was stored in enormous storages. Joe was well aware of the dangers that he would face should he lose Baku, so he pumped up other oil sources. In 1942 the Baku oil production peaked, but in 1943, 1944 and 1945 it was steadily declining, and from 1942 to 1945 it declined on 40%!
On 31 Aug 1942 Hitler ordered to List again: "WIth all avalable forces, and most of all the mobile forces, assault Grozny and aquire the oil regions!"
25 Sep General-Colonel Kleist swore "I shall drink a cup to Fuehrer's health in Baku".
But close to mid-October, the offensive on Baku came to a halt. Hitler never got the Soviet oil.

Stas Bush wrote:He was, however, not the worst chief for an Aif Force. His Luftwaffe continued fighing into 1945, when both Kriegsmarine and Wehrmacht were decimated so severely that they could not even put up a fight.

Really? Then where was the entire Luftwaffle from 6 June 1944 to 7 May 1945 other than Operation Bodenplatte which threw away everything?

Then where was the entire Luftwaffle

It went on a free-target raid spree because it could no longer support massive air front operations. That's simple. They could not attack where needed, so they had to attack where they could. At least they still could attack somewhere, that's all I mean.

Stravo wrote:Both the Germans and the Russians on their respective fronts were facing a foe who dominated the skies and they handled themselves pretty damned well

Wrong. On the Eastern Front, airpower was a very fluid thing. The front was so large that neither the Luftwaffle or VVS could actually gain clear superiority over a large sector of the front.

In the West it was much much different.

The Germans could not move AT ALL unless it was at night; or else the roving Allied Thunderbolts, Typhoons and Tempests would show up and strafe, rocket, and bomb them into submission.

Stas Bush wrote:It went on a free-target raid spree because it could no longer support massive air front operations.

And completely utterly annihilated itself for no gain. Virtually all of the Bodenplatte aircraft were lost, along with their pilots, while the Western Allies really didn't lose anything, just brought over more fighters to replace the destroyed ones on the ground.

And completely utterly annihilated itself for no gain.

That was the situation for all the German military branches in late 1944-1945. So? And it didn't "annihilate itself for no gain", just that the Allies have aquired a superiority that the Luftwaffe could not outbalance by any actions. The Germans also tried to replace their aircraft park for 1945, but it was a futile effort since they were essentially losing all the bases for operations and lost almost all the personnel. Compare that to the Kriegsmarine which had ~400 U-boats at the time of Germany's submission (that's almost the powerful U-boat Navy in the world) and just didn't do jack shit, because of it's silly U-boat oriented strategy. That's what I could call worthless (not in money terms, but in war effect terms).

The Germans could not move AT ALL unless it was at night

I agree that the Germans' problems with Allied AF were more severe due to a smaller front. However, that's just off-base. So tell me, how did these "Germans" which could only move at night, redislocate the 6th SS Tank Army and a bunch of additional divisions to the Eastern Front in a few days during the final phase of the Ardennes? What happened? Did the Allied AF suddenly lose it's mighty "pound immediately" ability, or it just never had that science-fiction level of destructive ability anyway, eh? The percent of war machines lost to aircraft is a lot less than that lost to other anti-tank weapons such as tanks, AT guns, AA guns. Where's the gung-ho "planes can squash in a minute" claim?

The front was so large that neither the Luftwaffle or VVS could actually gain clear superiority over a large sector of the front.

That's the hypothetical front we're dealing with and besides, the VVS didn't gain "clear superiority" anywhere until the Luftwaffe was simply it it's last throes. Until 1943 the German communication lines were effectively unstoppable for the Russians, so the Germans could move and shift around mechanized armies and air fronts easily. That counts as superiority. The VVS, sadly, did not gain such ability in the entire war.

MKSheppard wrote:

Stravo wrote:Both the Germans and the Russians on their respective fronts were facing a foe who dominated the skies and they handled themselves pretty damned well

Wrong. On the Eastern Front, airpower was a very fluid thing. The front was so large that neither the Luftwaffle or VVS could actually gain clear superiority over a large sector of the front.

In the West it was much much different.

The Germans could not move AT ALL unless it was at night; or else the roving Allied Thunderbolts, Typhoons and Tempests would show up and strafe, rocket, and bomb them into submission.

True enough that the air supremacy in the West was a killer advantage but that supremacy could do nothing about dislodging the Germans from the Siegfried line or the Gustav line in Italy. All the bombers and fighters in the war couldn't take and hold an inch of terriotory anywhere in Europe that's the point being made by people critical of the uber power of the airforce.

Its a damn fine force multiplier but thats it. It cannot win war. Infantry, tanks, artillery, boots on the ground win them.

Stravo wrote:Its a damn fine force multiplier but thats it. It cannot win war. Infantry, tanks, artillery, boots on the ground win them.

It makes winning it significantly easier if your enemy just had the bridge he was relying on for movement/retreat blown up by B-26s, the railroads supplying men and materiel cut by P-47s, and of course, hoards of trucks full of replacements strafed by P-51s.

According to IMPACT, the US Army Air Forces' confidental intel magazine, on one day in 22 January 1945, the XXIX Tactical command destroyed or severely damaged 879 railroad cars and 16 locomotives.

The 9th AF alone from 22-29 January claimed:
8,185 Motor Vehicals
460 Armored Vehicals
2,871 Railroad cars
53 Locomotives

MKSheppard
Huh, no doubt about that air superiority makes winning easier. Nitpick: you need to compare claims to actual losses and then, destroying rail is one of the best features of airforce, but it still bogs me, how did the Germans really move the 6th SS Panzer Armee if the air raids were so resultative? And types of planes don't really matter on a small and narrow front, it's as bad if your bridge is blown up by a Stuka as by a B-anything. The end result is the same.

Stas Bush wrote:MKSheppard
Huh, no doubt about that air superiority makes winning easier. Nitpick: you need to compare claims to actual losses and then, destroying rail is one of the best features of airforce, but it still bogs me, how did the Germans really move the 6th SS Panzer Armee if the air raids were so resultative?

Wasn't weather rather sketchy right before the Ardennes offensive? That helped hinder air cover during the move as well as being intrumental for the offensive as well. Don't discount the discipline the German army had when moving into position was impressive as hell. A book I read on the Ardennes offensive ("Trumpets in the Distance" or something like that) described the way they moved only at night, on backroads, diversionary trains running on different lines, taking things apart and carrying them on horse back, etc.

Stravo wrote:taking things apart and carrying them on horse back, etc.

For the guns in the early phase of the offensive, every shell was moved up to the front by hand; no trucks at all; to hide the offensive.

Wasn't weather rather sketchy right before the Ardennes offensive?

Yeah; the point is, the 6th SS Panzer Army and additional divisions were moved after the Ardennes Offensive, on 13-20th January. So my point still stands, how the hell did the Germans move an entire tank Army? And they did so quickly; late January, the forces on the Ardennes front retreated massively to cover-up the massive rediclocation of the 6th Army.

Stas Bush wrote:Yeah; the point is, the 6th SS Panzer Army and additional divisions were moved after the Ardennes Offensive, on 13-20th January. So my point still stands, how the hell did the Germans move an entire tank Army?

Without most of their tanks.

That was the situation for all the German military branches in late 1944-1945. So? And it didn't "annihilate itself for no gain", just that the Allies have aquired a superiority that the Luftwaffe could not outbalance by any actions. The Germans also tried to replace their aircraft park for 1945, but it was a futile effort since they were essentially losing all the bases for operations and lost almost all the personnel. Compare that to the Kriegsmarine which had ~400 U-boats at the time of Germany's submission (that's almost the powerful U-boat Navy in the world) and just didn't do jack shit, because of it's silly U-boat oriented strategy. That's what I could call worthless (not in money terms, but in war effect terms).

Interesting- I had no idea they had that many U-boats at the end of the war. Given your viewpoint on the matter, I simply have to ask- what would you have done with them, and what effect would this have had on the german war effort?

MKSheppard wrote:

Stas Bush wrote:Yeah; the point is, the 6th SS Panzer Army and additional divisions were moved after the Ardennes Offensive, on 13-20th January. So my point still stands, how the hell did the Germans move an entire tank Army?

Without most of their tanks.

Got source?

BlkbrryTheGreat wrote:Interesting- I had no idea they had that many U-boats at the end of the war.

The majority of them were Type XXI U-Boats still in workup, only one XXI actually did anything close to a war patrol before the end of the war; at that point, the VII and IX were just dead meat.

Ace Pace wrote:Got source?

Pretty much every German unit that actually managed to survive the Bulge, and the subsequent battles and retreat back to their lines did so without the majority of their heavy equipment.

Good case in point, KG Peiper:

From
5,800 men
60 Tanks (of which 7 were Tigers)
3 Flak Tanks
75 Half Tracks
14 Flak Wagons
27 Assault Guns
etc

only
about 800 men got back to german lines. No heavy equipment at all.

Without most of their tanks.

Huh? Source? It took action in February, and in the Balatone Debacle early March the Soviets scored quite a few tanks from the 6th Panzer Armee. So I believe some of it's tanks at least got to the front. The Balatone Group, the core of which was the 6th SS Panzer Armee, had 900 tanks; where did they come from? And what was the point of moving a Tank Army without tanks? That's ridiculous.

My sources say the 6th SS Panzer Armee moved into Balatone offensive with 400 tanks - where the hell did they come from? Air? So actually, we see that the 6th Panzer Armee NOT ONLY was redislocated, but also served as one of the core striking units in Germany's last offensive - the Balatone Debacle. Your claim just does not add up.