Iraqi Resistance Group

[jegs2]

There appears to be an organized Iraqi resistance groupcalling itself the Mujahedeen of the Victorious Sect

An Iraqi resistance group has reportedly claimed responsibility for recent attacks on US forces - and warned there will be more.


The news came as four more lives were lost in a wave of attacks on US troops - and UK troops continued their hunt for the killers of six British soldiers.

The Arab satellite station Al-Jazeera said it had received a statement and videotape from a group calling itself the Mujahedeen of the Victorious Sect.

The group warned Iraqis away from "places where the American forces are deployed".

When we find out who is paying that militia, then we can neutralize them. Always follow the money.

[The Duchess of Zeon]

There appears to be an organized Iraqi resistance groupcalling itself the Mujahedeen of the Victorious Sect

When we find out who is paying that militia, then we can neutralize them. Always follow the money.

That name isn't as amusing as the Algerian "Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat," but comes close (Do these guys get their ideas from watching Chuck Norris movies or something?).

Infinite Money are the Sinews of War, indeed...

[Vympel]

If only it were that simple- what if no one's paying them? Or, worse, what if significant portions of the Iraqi population (especially the Sunni areas) provide aid and comfort to them? With more joining their 'cause' everytime one of their number is killed (bastards killed my father/brother/son/sister/mother/daughter!), or they set up an attack so the Americans look like the bad guy (take for example the power station RPG attack- those incompetent American pigs have cut our power again, they accidentally shot my sister blah blah blah).

[The Duchess of Zeon]

If only it were that simple- what if no one's paying them? Or, worse, what if significant portions of the Iraqi population (especially the Sunni areas) provide aid and comfort to them? With more joining their 'cause' everytime one of their number is killed (bastards killed my father/brother/son/sister/mother/daughter!), or they set up an attack so the Americans look like the bad guy (take for example the power station RPG attack- those incompetent American pigs have cut our power again, they accidentally shot my sister blah blah blah).

You can't run military operations without money.

[Gil Hamilton]

Ah, cool. Another group with a goofy name. Really, some terrorist group needs to just push the envelope some day and call themselve Al Qillstorm.

[Vympel]

You can't run military operations without money.

Sure you can. You just need resources, not cash. These people aren't getting paid. In their case- guns and ammunition which is in plentiful supply, as well as food and shelter which they can also easily get among sympathetic portions of the population- is all they need to prosecute their attacks.

[jegs2]

Sure you can. You just need resources, not cash. These people aren't getting paid. In their case- guns and ammunition which is in plentiful supply, as well as food and shelter which they can also easily get among sympathetic portions of the population- is all they need to prosecute their attacks.

Nevertheless, funding is coming from somewhere, especially if the attacks are coordinated and the group falls under some form of a command structure. The idea that "the people" are supplying, arming, equipping and housing such a group is for the most part a romantic notion (echoes of "the people" backing the old Communist movements, which as we all know was complete hogwash). There are folks with money, and lots of it who want the US out of Iraq, and they are funding those groups. Yes, those groups may be getting some support from your generic angry Iraqi, but the bulk of the funding is coming from other actors. The Afgans had no love for the Soviets, but it wasn't just their hatred of the Soviets that forced the Soviet Union out of Afganistan. The Vietnamese had no love for Americans, but it wasn't just their hatred for Americans that forced US forces out of Vietnam. In both cases, their were outside actors funding and equipping the opposing forces. The following is from the Contemporary Operating Environment (COE) threat model:

Given this overall situation, what does all this mean for future warfighting involving U.S. forces? Warfighting in the COE may transcend the traditional definitions of what constitutes “war” or “victory.”


Most of the participants in conflicts around the world would not start out with the intent to fight the United States, so they are looking for ways to keep us out of the conflict or keep us from staying involved. If it does come to a fight, they are not going to fight us the same way they would fight their peers or lesser forces in their region. Thus, we can expect potential adversaries to adapt their methods of fighting, most likely using a combination of the following principles:

• Control access into the region
  Change the nature of the conflict
  Employ operational shielding
  Control tempo
  Neutralize technological overmatch
  Cause politically unacceptable casualties
  Allow no sanctuary

These principles attempt to exploit weaknesses or vulnerabilities believed to exist in the U.S. force's activities, force structure, or rules of engagement (ROE). Many of these principles are interrelated and overlapping, since all contribute to the overall goal.


Initially, potential opponents will seek to selectively deny, delay, and disrupt entry of U.S. forces into their region. Even if the opponent can’t deny the U.S. access, he will seek to control it. Meanwhile, the time required for any phased U.S. deployment affords the enemy the opportunity to begin changing the nature of the conflict to something for which the U.S. force is least prepared once it gets there.


The enemy will begin to use operational shielding to protect key elements of his combat power from destruction – particularly by U.S. air and missile forces. This protection may come from use of any or all of the following: dispersion, complex terrain, fortifications, countermeasure systems, information warfare, and the risk of unacceptable collateral damage or noncombatant casualties.


During the initial phases of U.S. entry, the enemy may employ a high operational tempo, taking advantage of the weaknesses inherent in U.S. power projection. As U.S. forces gain a foothold in the region, the enemy may slow the tempo to prolong the conflict, taking advantage of a perceived lack of U.S. commitment over time. He will try to survive tactically and operationally long enough to win strategically. For the enemy, a stalemate may be good enough, as long as he maintains enough power to live to fight another day.


As our adversaries focus on preserving their own combat power, they will try to neutralize our technological overmatch, particularly our long-range, standoff precision fires. They will not mass their forces in predictable linear patterns of echelonment and timing. Rather, they will disperse forces in areas of physical or moral sanctuary often located in urban or other complex terrain and shielded by civilians and manmade structures. Then they will use maneuver tied to opportunity, massing forces and fires from dispersed positions at a time and place of their own choosing. At the tactical level, there is a high likelihood of close combat in urban environments or other complex terrain. In specific tactical situations, the enemy might be able to employ a niche technology to create parity or overmatch U.S. forces deployed in that particular area.


The enemy will not avoid combat, but will seek battle in urban environments and other complex terrain that may be better suited for his forces than ours. Since we are fighting in his region, he may also have the advantage of being more familiar with the terrain and other features of the environment than we are. He will be looking for conditions or creating conditions advantageous for using his forces at the time and place of his choosing. When opportunities arise, he will use these forces to destroy high-visibility U.S. targets and cause politically unacceptable casualties. Thus, his targeting of U.S. systems and personnel is not always linked to military-style objectives, but often aimed at creating a psychological effect.


The enemy will seek to deny U.S. forces safe haven during every phase of deployment and as long as they are in the region. He is prepared to attack U.S. military and civilian targets anywhere on the battlefield, in the region, or even in our homeland.

The enemy isn't stupid. They know that they cannot hope to match the US military one-on-one, so they use some of the above tactics in order to score "victory," which in their case is nothing more than US forces leaving Iraq. Someone is funding those activities, and finding out who that is can only be helpful in neutralizing the threat. Gone are the days when a nation's leader surrenders in a formal ceremony, thus relegating the will of his people to the victor. We now find ourselves in a different kind of warfare, and there are a number of actors with which me must deal. Those who have fought in the jungles of Vietnam would tell us they saw the COE threat model in action long ago...

[HemlockGrey]

'Mujahedeen of the Victorous Sect'? I'm lovin' it.