The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor

[Typhonis 1]

Ok heres my question for you gentle people and a poll please explain your reason for your vote.

Did FDR know the Japanese were going to attack Hawaii and left the Pacific Fleet open for the attack by tying his commanders hands out there. Or was it a surprise?Or here is a therory I have heard before did he Provoke the Japanese into attacking Hawaii

[AdmiralKanos]

Ok heres my question for you gentle people and a poll please explain your reason for your vote.

Did FDR know the Japanese were going to attack Hawaii and left the Pacific Fleet open for the attack by tying his commanders hands out there. Or was it a surprise?Or here is a therory I have heard before did he Provoke the Japanese into attacking Hawaii

Of course he provoked the Japanese into attacking, although he didn't know when and where. Conspiracy theories seek to explain human incompetence with grand secret machinations; not exactly reasonable.

[The Kernel]

I don't think he knew they would attack Pearl specifically and in such force, but FDR was a sharp cookie and I believe that he knew that he was antagonizing both the Japanese (with the embargos) and the Germans (with the Cash-Carry and Lend-Lease programs) so that a conflict was inevitable. He did need an excuse to enter the war before the UK fell and the Japanese gave him one.

[The Duchess of Zeon]

He was as surprised as the rest of the nation as to the attack at Pearl Harbour and almost certainly the general strategy of attacks directly on U.S. assets as well. He was, however, aware that Japanese forces were massing in Southeast Asia and that a conflict of some sort--which could draw in the USA--was probably generally imminent. This is reflected in the orders to the U.S. military forces in the pacific which were given and the precautions which were successfully taken (and the ones which weren't and should have been according to those orders, or weren't because the orders had not yet been received).

As for his culpability in provoking the Japanese? Up until the end I suspect he wanted peace--bear with me, here--on his terms. There was no question that FDR wanted the Japanese out of China and was using the embargo to try and get them out of China. However, he was also open to the negotiation initiatives attempted by moderates in the Empire of Japan and his own cabinet for that matter.

But it was clear there were certain things that he simply wasn't going to give on before the embargo was lifted, and combined with an atmosphere of considerable mistrust and clouded perception, meant that there was wiggle room for Japan to meet the American demands and come out with what they wanted--and there were a fair number of Japanese militarists who wouldn't have been satisfied with anything short of gains that would have involved America no matter what, though I grant they were not the whole government. Quite simply, what FDR did was set up a roadblock infront of a speeding eighteen wheeler.

[Sea Skimmer]

I get irritated that the American oil embargo is all that's ever getting mentioned, Japan got much of its crude from the Dutch east Indies, only a limited amount plus refined aviation gasoline, which was embargoed much earlier came from America. However not long after the full American embargo came into effect the British and Dutch followed.

As for the issue of China. All logic suggested that Japan should get out. Manchuria was the only part that actually provided them with anything worthwhile, but America wasn't demanding they withdraw from it and in fact acknowledged their control of it.

The invasion and occupations of central and southern China was costing Japan vast numbers of men and the whole thing was sucking up most of their army and economic strength. I think FDR may have underestimated how valuable China was in the eyes of the IJA. They simply couldn't give it up. They'd lost too much and any sign of giving into the US, or logic, was simply unacceptable. As the negations dragged on FDR likely did suspect an attack was in the works. But when and where he would have no idea. The conspiracy theory bullshit about him know it would be Pearl is just that, bullshit and defies logic.

[The Kernel]

I get irritated that the American oil embargo is all that's ever getting mentioned, Japan got much of its crude from the Dutch east Indies, only a limited amount plus refined aviation gasoline, which was embargoed much earlier came from America. However not long after the full American embargo came into effect the British and Dutch followed.

And the United States' biggest single supplier of oil is Canada. Doesn't mean we don't care about Middle East oil.

[BlkbrryTheGreat]

Heres an article that should clear up the matter.

http://www.lewrockwell.com/orig/stinnett1.html

December 7, 1941 . . . a Day of Deceit
by Robert B. Stinnett

This week, as Americans remember those 2403 men, women, and children killed – and 1178 wounded – in the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii on December 7, 1941, recently released government documents concerning that "surprise" raid compel us to revisit some troubling questions.

At issue is American foreknowledge of Japanese military plans to attack Hawaii by a submarine and carrier force 59 years ago. There are two questions at the top of the foreknowledge list: (1) whether President Franklin D. Roosevelt and his top military chieftains provoked Japan into an "overt act of war" directed at Hawaii, and (2) whether Japan’s military plans were obtained in advance by the United States but concealed from the Hawaiian military commanders, Admiral Husband E. Kimmel and Lieutenant General Walter Short so they would not interfere with the overt act.

The latter question was answered in the affirmative on October 30, 2000, when President Bill Clinton signed into law, with the support of a bipartisan Congress, the National Defense Authorization Act. Amidst its omnibus provisions, the Act reverses the findings of nine previous Pearl Harbor investigations and finds that both Kimmel and Short were denied crucial military intelligence that tracked the Japanese forces toward Hawaii and obtained by the Roosevelt Administration in the weeks before the attack.

Congress was specific in its finding against the 1941 White House: Kimmel and Short were cut off from the intelligence pipeline that located Japanese forces advancing on Hawaii. Then, after the successful Japanese raid, both commanders were relieved of their commands, blamed for failing to ward off the attack, and demoted in rank.

President Clinton must now decide whether to grant the request by Congress to restore the commanders to their 1941 ranks. Regardless of what the Commander-in-Chief does in the remaining months of his term, these congressional findings should be widely seen as an exoneration of 59 years of blame assigned to Kimmel and Short.

But one important question remains: Does the blame for the Pearl Harbor disaster revert to President Roosevelt?

A major motion picture based on the attack is currently under production by Walt Disney Studios and scheduled for release in May 2001. The producer, Jerry Bruckheimer, refuses to include America’s foreknowledge in the script. When Bruckheimer commented on FDR’s foreknowledge in an interview published earlier this year, he said "That’s all b___s___."

Yet, Roosevelt believed that provoking Japan into an attack on Hawaii was the only option he had in 1941 to overcome the powerful America First non-interventionist movement led by aviation hero Charles Lindbergh. These anti-war views were shared by 80 percent of the American public from 1940 to 1941. Though Germany had conquered most of Europe, and her U-Boats were sinking American ships in the Atlantic Ocean – including warships – Americans wanted nothing to do with "Europe’s War."

However, Germany made a strategic error. She, along with her Axis partner, Italy, signed the mutual assistance treaty with Japan, the Tripartite Pact, on September 27, 1940. Ten days later, Lieutenant Commander Arthur McCollum, a U.S. Naval officer in the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), saw an opportunity to counter the U.S. isolationist movement by provoking Japan into a state of war with the U.S., triggering the mutual assistance provisions of the Tripartite Pact, and bringing America into World War II.

Memorialized in McCollum’s secret memo dated October 7, 1940, and recently obtained through the Freedom of Information Act, the ONI proposal called for eight provocations aimed at Japan. Its centerpiece was keeping the might of the U.S. Fleet based in the Territory of Hawaii as a lure for a Japanese attack.

President Roosevelt acted swiftly. The very next day, October 8, 1940, the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Fleet, Admiral James O. Richardson, was summoned to the Oval Office and told of the provocative plan by the President. In a heated argument with FDR, the admiral objected to placing his sailors and ships in harm’s way. Richardson was then fired and in his place FDR selected an obscure naval officer, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, to command the fleet in Hawaii. Kimmel was promoted to a four-star admiral and took command on February 1, 1941. In a related appointment, Walter Short was promoted from Major General to a three-star Lieutenant General and given command of U.S. Army troops in Hawaii.

Throughout 1941, FDR implemented the remaining seven provocations. He then gauged Japanese reaction through intercepted and decoded communications intelligence originated by Japan’s diplomatic and military leaders.

The island nation’s militarists used the provocations to seize control of Japan and organized their military forces for war against the U.S., Great Britain, and the Netherlands. The centerpiece – the Pearl Harbor attack – was leaked to the U.S. in January 1941. During the next 11 months, the White House followed the Japanese war plans through the intercepted and decoded diplomatic and military communications intelligence.

Japanese leaders failed in basic security precautions. At least 1,000 Japanese military and diplomatic radio messages per day were intercepted by monitoring stations operated by the U.S. and her Allies, and the message contents were summarized for the White House. The intercept summaries were clear: Pearl Harbor would be attacked on December 7, 1941, by Japanese forces advancing through the Central and North Pacific Oceans. On November 27 and 28, 1941, Admiral Kimmel and General Short were ordered to remain in a defensive posture for "the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act." The order came directly from President Roosevelt.

As I explained to a policy forum audience at The Independent Institute in Oakland, California, which was videotaped and telecast nationwide over the Fourth of July holiday earlier this year, my research of U.S. naval records shows that not only were Kimmel and Short cut off from the Japanese communications intelligence pipeline, so were the American people. It is a coverup that has lasted for nearly 59 years.

Immediately after December 7, 1941, military communications documents that disclose American foreknowledge of the Pearl Harbor disaster were locked in U.S. Navy vaults away from the prying eyes of congressional investigators, historians, and authors. Though the Freedom of Information Act freed the foreknowledge documents from the secretive vaults to the sunlight of the National Archives in 1995, a cottage industry continues to cover up America’s foreknowledge of Pearl Harbor.

December 7, 2000

[phongn]

Oh, look, that article has no citations on it whatsoever.

The island nation’s militarists used the provocations to seize control of Japan and organized their military forces for war against the U.S., Great Britain, and the Netherlands. The centerpiece – the Pearl Harbor attack – was leaked to the U.S. in January 1941. During the next 11 months, the White House followed the Japanese war plans through the intercepted and decoded diplomatic and military communications intelligence.

Yes, yes, we all know about the US codebreaking program. However, simply because we broke many communications does not mean we broke all communications. To assume so is a rather big leap in logic.

Japanese leaders failed in basic security precautions. At least 1,000 Japanese military and diplomatic radio messages per day were intercepted by monitoring stations operated by the U.S. and her Allies, and the message contents were summarized for the White House. The intercept summaries were clear: Pearl Harbor would be attacked on December 7, 1941, by Japanese forces advancing through the Central and North Pacific Oceans.

Which messages? Furthermore, since the IJN attack fleet operated on strict radio silence, how would radio intercepts assist us in finding the exact date of the planned attack?

On November 27 and 28, 1941, Admiral Kimmel and General Short were ordered to remain in a defensive posture for "the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act." The order came directly from President Roosevelt

Yes, yes, because he didn't want us to be the one who started the war. However, his order to remain in a defensive posture did not preclude more agressive patrols, or keeping the radar station properlly manned, or having the Fleet antitorpedo nets installed, or any of many things that should have ensured that the Pacific Fleet was not caught with her pants down.

Perhaps the most damning evidence against Stiller's assertion is this: despite his claims, Clinton did not restore Kimmel and Shorts to their original rank; had the evidence been so clear-cut as seen I severely doubt that they would have been denied.

[BlkbrryTheGreat]

Oh, look, that article has no citations on it whatsoever.

Hes pluggin his book you fucking moron, click on the link and you'll clealy see that this is the case. Regardless, hes made his case, either contradict his arguements or STFU.

[phongn]

Hes pluggin his book you fucking moron, click on the link and you'll clealy see that this is the case.

Yes, I read the damned article.

Regardless, hes made his case, either contradict his arguements or STFU.

See above.

[BlkbrryTheGreat]

Yes, yes, we all know about the US codebreaking program. However, simply because we broke many communications does not mean we broke all communications. To assume so is a rather big leap in logic.

Strawman, the communications that needed to be broken were the ones that stated if, where, and when an attack would occur. Stinnett asserts that there was pleanty of evidence that this was the case. Contradict his evidence or the point stands.

Which messages? Furthermore, since the IJN attack fleet operated on strict radio silence, how would radio intercepts assist us in finding the exact date of the planned attack?

I do not know exactly which messages, however Stinnett asserts that the White House Summaries, read by Roosevelt, contained the information.

Perhaps the most damning evidence against Stiller's assertion is this: despite his claims, Clinton did not restore Kimmel and Shorts to their original rank; had the evidence been so clear-cut as seen I severely doubt that they would have been denied.

Strawman (along with an appeal to authority), Kimmel and Short's security measures has no relation to whether FDR actually
1. Knew of the coming attack
2. Provoked it in the first place

Kimmel's and Short's actions were consistent with the theory that they were kept in the dark, even if these actions cannot actually be used to support Stinnet's theory.

[Stormbringer]

Moved to N&P where this belongs.

[HemlockGrey]

Stinnett's book was universally trashed by pretty much every academic historian in the field. Try again.

[HemlockGrey]

Strawman, the communications that needed to be broken were the ones that stated if, where, and when an attack would occur. Stinnett asserts that there was pleanty of evidence that this was the case. Contradict his evidence or the point stands.

Such as? Ultra did not start cracking Japanese military codes until after Pearl Harbor.

[phongn]

I do not know exactly which messages, however Stinnett asserts that the White House Summaries, read by Roosevelt, contained the information.

And, by that article, an unsupported assertion. I find this rather odd, especially as Purople - the major Japanese code broken by the Army team - was a diplomatic cipher. It would not have been able to give information on any attack. The IJN military cipher, JN-25, had not been broken until after some time the attack. So, how are we suddenly getting this top-grade military intelligence?

Furthermore, how did the information get leaked to the US in January 1941 when the attack plan was not even adopted until November 1941 and then decided on in December 1941?

Yes, the plan was made out in January 1941, but the details of it were not even worked on until September 1941. How is FDR's cabinet supposed to know that an attack on Pearl Harbor will happen?

Strawman (along with an appeal to authority), Kimmel and Short's security measures has no relation to whether FDR actually
1. Knew of the coming attack
2. Provoked it in the first place

This part was actually intended as a rebuttal to Stiller's assertion that their original rank should be restored.



EDIT: Errata: That should be JN-25B, not JN-25, which had been cracked earlier.

[Howedar]

I believe FDR knew an attack on US interests was imminent, but not an attack on Pearl Harbor.

[The Dark]

I believe FDR knew an attack on US interests was imminent, but not an attack on Pearl Harbor.

I agree. The evidence I've read seems consistent with FDR expecting an overt military attack on American "interests" overseas (such as the China/Burma area, where the American Volunteer Group were gathering information), but nothing so bold as an attack on Hawaii itself. That was well outside the field that had been played by the Japanese to that point, and there was no real evidence that could have been obtained on it. ULTRA had not yet broken the current Japanese codes, and as the Japanese diplomats themselves did not know of the pending attack on Pearl Harbor, it is extremely unlikely (I won't say impossible, no matter how I'm tempted to) that PURPLE codes were used to transmit any data on the attack.

[phongn]

I believe FDR knew an attack on US interests was imminent, but not an attack on Pearl Harbor.

I agree. The evidence I've read seems consistent with FDR expecting an overt military attack on American "interests" overseas (such as the China/Burma area, where the American Volunteer Group were gathering information), but nothing so bold as an attack on Hawaii itself. That was well outside the field that had been played by the Japanese to that point, and there was no real evidence that could have been obtained on it. ULTRA had not yet broken the current Japanese codes, and as the Japanese diplomats themselves did not know of the pending attack on Pearl Harbor, it is extremely unlikely (I won't say impossible, no matter how I'm tempted to) that PURPLE codes were used to transmit any data on the attack.

American war plans had also assumed that any attack would be on the PI first and foremost (hence War Plan Orange), not several thousand miles to the east. AFAIK, we didn't even know if the IJN had perfected in-transit refueling yet.

[Axis Kast]

Phongn is correct. War Plan Orange does bespeak of shared belief among America's military and political leadership that war with Japan was inevitable. Yet Roosevelt and others deemed the Philippine Islands - territory that was being reinforced until the time of the invasion - a prime target, not the naval base at Pearl.

[Joe Momma]

Phongn is correct. War Plan Orange does bespeak of shared belief among America's military and political leadership that war with Japan was inevitable. Yet Roosevelt and others deemed the Philippine Islands - territory that was being reinforced until the time of the invasion - a prime target, not the naval base at Pearl.

IIRC, it was also commonly that the Japanese were physically, materially, psychologically, and culturally incapable of an attack like the one on Pearl Harbor. The best source that I can think of off-hand regarding these American beliefs about the Japanese pre- and post Pearl Harbor was War Without Mercy by John Dower. He also discusses in some detail the view that the Japanese would attack but that they wouldn't go anywhere as far west as Hawaii.

-- Joe Momma

[Typhonis 1]

However Short and Kimmel should have been given more intel than they were I believe . Wasn`t Kimmel quoted as saying" You mean the Jap fleet could be rounding Diamond Head by now?" Also th Navy should have been aware of how Japan fought the Russian Navy in 1904 they started with a sneak attack.

[Sea Skimmer]

American war plans had also assumed that any attack would be on the PI first and foremost (hence War Plan Orange), not several thousand miles to the east. AFAIK, we didn't even know if the IJN had perfected in-transit refueling yet.

We didn't, and in fact the Japanese only developed the capability in the months leading up to the attack. Even then it was over the stern, not actual UNREP.

As far as the US military knew, Japan almost certainly could not bring an attack force into range of Pearl with a destroyer escort, and the only way it could even come close to doing so would be to come north from the Marshall's, which was the direction air and submarine patrols where directed in.

[Axis Kast]

IIRC, it was also commonly that the Japanese were physically, materially, psychologically, and culturally incapable of an attack like the one on Pearl Harbor. The best source that I can think of off-hand regarding these American beliefs about the Japanese pre- and post Pearl Harbor was War Without Mercy by John Dower. He also discusses in some detail the view that the Japanese would attack but that they wouldn't go anywhere as far west as Hawaii.

In my own, personal opinion, I find accusations of racism against Japan a bit overdone. Call it revisionist history if you will, but it is my observation that something like War Plan Orange belies an underlying respect for the power potential of the Japanese. The rank and file soldier or average citizen might have disregarded Japan, but most experienced soldiers most likely did not share such polarized notions.

[Andrew J.]

I think FDR knew his foreign policy would eventually lead to a war with Japan, but he didn't know the specifics of any Japanese attacks.

BlkbrryTheGreat: You seem to believe in a lot of conspiracies; first the Liberty incident, and now this.

[The Duchess of Zeon]

I also think that racist assumptions about Japan in the 20s and 30s are overdone, at least in terms of how their capability was judged by the upper levels of the governments and military of the West. They existed like that at one time--and they also died with the Battle of Tsushima. Indeed, they almost ran in the opposite direction after the Russo-Japanese War. Theodore Roosevelt thought that Japanese, an organized, efficient, and "obedient" state, might "lead the yellow races in a challenge against the West" (to paraphrase), etc, and had a very high opinion of them--if one that also made him concerned over Japanese power for precisely that reason. There were novels of the 20s and 30s on a speculative conflict of the future, for that matter, that presented Japan not entirely inaccurately--as a skilled and ruthless opponent (the technology, OTOH, is a different story--no gas bombing of ships to knock them out of action, for instance).

There was definitely fear of Japan in certain circles--because they were undercutting western labour markets in certain categories even then; they were industrializing, as no other asian country had; and because of their huge and growing population and aggressive policies. Essentially, they were Doing What We Were Doing And They Aren't Us. But I think the contempt would only come from the ignorant by the era of WWII. Really the problem was one of the mode our strategic thinking was locked into. I mean, even look at Kimmel's quote: "The Japanese might be rounding Diamond Head right now."

If it's anything more than an offhand remark, then it bespeaks of a man thinking of a threat from surface warships, not carriers which never got within sight of the Hawaiian islands. And that's what War Plan Orange was all about--a combat based around the Line of Battle. The Japanese got us, alright; but not because of a conspiracy--because of their innovation and our refusal/inability to innovate in time.

Any suggestion otherwise without supporting evidence--which has not been provided so far--is honestly a bit racist itself, suggesting that the Japanese needed help from conniving American politicians to pull off the attack.